I have almost finished reading Bloom's Closing of the American Mind and, while I am sure I will have more to say in way of criticism and discussion in the future, for now I feel the need to summarize what he has written. The book is heavier reading than I expected, and I anticipate that the finer points may become blunted with the passage of time unless I commit his general thesis to writing while it is still fresh in my mind. Any corrections or comments are welcome.
Bloom argues that in modern culture, people have become homogenized; differences are shallow and culture presently contains only the most superficial elements of what culture used to mean.
Parents have lost control over their children's moral discipline with television and music replacing an anchored morality with relativistic moral theories. There are new morals for new times, and the old generation might get out of the way if they refuse to lend a hand.
Modern American interest in music, other people, relationships, religion, and love, lacks that which gave these things meaning and value. They are now immediate and appreciated for the most superficial elements they possess: love and Eros are really just sex; musical complexity, shades of meaning and passion are really just the heavy, brutish sexualized beat of rock. Making these sublime aspects of life immediately tangible and attainable by everyone, we have robbed them of their height; the ascent to the pinnacle of the mountain has been plowed to a plateau that is the lowest common demoninator.
American democracy has led to an egalitarian push to say that every child is creative, exceptional and genius. As soon as someone develops truly into these things, as a Beethoven or a Shakespeare, democracy pushes them back into the pack, because everyone standing out means no one really can.
In modern society's greatest success, the Enlightenment, Locke and his compatriots cast off the shackles of a social order led by a monarch (the type of society which put Socrates to death) who endangered the scientist/philosopher by trying to fit him into the social system and control his thoughts. They deliberately replaced monarchy with liberal democracy, which saw as the most protected, and the most sacred, the untouchable, the scientists and philosophers, who ultimately ran the society as puppeteers. However, natural science went its own way with its freedom, leaving the unifying meta-system, philosophy, in the cold. While Kant bridged the gap, giving natural science and reason its limits and providing a framework for everything else, Rousseau, and, later Nietzsche and Heidegger, saw the weakness of reason and the contemplative life. They saw action as superior to thought. Thus, in a backlash against the contemplative side of the scientist/philosopher, and against the Enlightenment in fact, they took advantage of the natural sciences and eschewed the historical consciousness called for by the Enlightenment (a prime example is the philosophical climate of the Soviet Union). Viva Activa was better than Viva Contemplativa. Values are relative, and there is no way for one to pass judgment other than action. It is this reaction that ushered in the collapse of the University as an independent, sacred ground for thinkers with true academic freedom. It is here that the University became simply another arena in which the cultural and political theories and parties acted out their battles.
And it is precisely this backlash against the Enlightenment that has come to the shores of America, decades after Heidegger's capitulation of the German University. In the American sixties, as in the twenties in Germany, the University has lost its sacred status as the source of contemplative thought and open, free discourse. The Black Power movement is only a powerful example of what is happening and continues to happen. Bloom quotes Marx, that "History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." In Germany, it was the right, here, it is the left, but it is the same dismantling of the University and the contemplative life in both cases. The professors are unable to defend the University because they have lost vision of its purpose. They try to give the public what it wants, because they have forgotten what it means to educate, to raise above the mundane and create a beacon of academic freedom and honesty. They strip core classes of languages, history, philosophy, and they thus turn their schools into vocational schools, not meant to educate and ennoble, but meant to give economical and political power to their charges.
In addition, a new interest in morality rose in the student body (which was indicative of general society). This was not the quiet morality of doing no evil, telling the truth and respecting elders -- the brand of morality that makes sacrifice every day, which Kant claimed is understood by the child but takes a lifetime of humble goodness to achieve. Rather, this new morality was the morality not of keeping laws, but of breaking them in the name of a higher law. It was a constant crisis, not acknowledging true morality, and seeing the moral struggle only in the epic, they type of struggle which in reality is truly rare. (We can see this today with University students championing the major moral causes as their own, while living personally amoral lives. They are "nice", they exude a childish veneer of pleasantness, but have lost Polaris in the search for truth.) Aside from its own problems, this morality had the unfortunate result of allowing students to blithely equate morally between the Beast of Belsen and the secretaries of the War Draft Board. (To my mind comes immediately the ridiculous assertion held on many University campuses and in society as a whole that Israel is as apartheid South Africa was, or that IDF commanders are Nazis. When we see things so starkly, and see our moral banners as the apex of moral struggles, we tend to blur the distinctions between situations, and judge passionately instead of rationally.)
The loss of purpose in the American university is mirrored by the inability of the students to see anything in life as worth striving for, as of higher moral or cultural value than anything else they see around them. The High Culture of society, embodied in the University has become lost and that institution simply reflects now the low culture of society.
The University has excelled at pigeon-holeing increasingly specific fields of knowledge, demonstrating an ability to split the atom, cure cancer, aggregate lexicons of lost languages, collate and study massive amounts of data in psychological studes. It remains, however, unable to define a basic path to a general education of its students. This path, Bloom states, is the concept of the Great Books. Reading these works without the historicism of the humanities, rather as living documents that speak to modern society, is the only way to provide a passion and interest in a holistic application of education to the students. However, most faculties ignore this method, or despise it.
The fact is that natural science sees itself as the sole posessor of true knowledge. It handles empirical fields, the ones that see matter as unified and humans as matter. They see the Great Books as a spiritual quest, but not immediately impactive of their study. On the other hand, the study of that which makes a human human, what is known in religion as the soul, this study is split into humanites, viewing it as an art (Rosseau), and the social sciences, which prefer to view it as a science (and itself as the next rung on the ladder after biology), and qunatifiable (Locke). These two disciplines disagree over their very subject matter. The latter views the Great Books as inapplicable to itself as they are in essence a science (desiring to attain the status of the natural sciences), while the former is embarrassed by what is exposed in the Great Books, rascism, elitsm and sexism.
The destruction of the University and the cheapening of the human experience is what America must struggle with. History will judge her, and we must act to provide the University with a reason for existence, and the student a true depth resultant from a true education. (I believe Bloom's statement here may be reflective of his feeling toward modern humanity in general, not just America.)
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind, A Summary
Tuesday, October 05, 2010
A Hauntingly Beautiful Song
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Tearing "K'ri'ah" At the Kotel
Disclaimer: As in all halachik discussions, what appears below is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.
The Talmud (מו"ק כו:א) discusses the commandment of rending one's clothing in three distinct situations: the first is when learning of a relative's (or, under specific circumstances, even non-relatives) death. This is a commonly known law. However, less known is the law to 2) tear "קריעה" (rending) upon various pieces of bad news. An additional category of קריעה is 3) upon the desolate cities of Judea, and the remains of the Temple:
"אמר ר' אלעזר: הרואה ערי יהודה בחורבנן אומר ערי קדשך היו מדבר וקורע. ירושלים בחורבנה, אומר ציון מדבר היתה ירושלים שממה וקורע. בית המקדש בחורבנו, אומר בית קדשינו ותפארתינו אשר הללוך אבותינו היה לשריפת אש וכל מחמדינו היה לחרבה וקורע."
Cities that are under Jewish control would no longer be subject to this law (see שו"ע או"ח תקס"א -- it seems הכל תלוי בשלטון) -- such that we would no longer tear קריעה on Jerusalem, but we would on Bethlehem which, while given to us in the Six Day War by God, was handed over to our enemies by our own government later on. However, even while under Jewish sovereignty, the Temple Mount would still be subject to קריעה, as the tragedy is not so much its control by others, as its desolation and absence of the בית המקדש.
Codified by the Shulchan Aruch (יו"ד ש"מ ל"ח-ל"ט), the law is that one who visits the Temple Mount after longer than 30 days of absence tears his garment. (If one finds this law difficult to observe, he can give his shirt to a friend as a gift, and even while he still wears it, would be exempt from tearing it, since one may not tear a shirt owned by another. This gift must be true, and Rabbi Eliezer Melamed comments that one should at least tear a shirt over the desolation of the Temple Mount once in his life.)
The question that came up yesterday was, what if a person visits the Kotel for the first time in 30 days on חול המועד? On the Sabbath or full-fledged holiday, it is clear that קריעה is not done (שו"ע סע' ל"א). What of חול המועד?
As with the other two categories of קריעה, this would be subject to a rishonic dispute. According to the Mordechai and Ramban, one would tear as usual during חול המועד, but according to the T'rumat Hadeshen, one would refrain, as one does on a full-fledged holiday, unless the קריעה is on parents. The Shulchan Aruch declares that one would tear on חול המועד. The Rema rules as the T'rumat Hadeshen, and yet, in a place with no standard tradition, he rules as the Shulchan Aruch.
It would seem from this that the S'faradim would tear on Chol Hamoed, while the Ashkenazim would refrain. However, Rabbi Melamed mentions that in general, the מנהג is that on Chol Hamoed, one does not tear. (This combined with the especially festive atmosphere at the Kotel during Chol Hamoed make it seem particularly out of place for a person to tear קריעה in front of others at a time when even the laws of אבילות are only observed in private.)
The question that remains is, if one arrived at the Kotel on חול המועד and therefore did not tear, but then re-visits within 30 days, after the holiday, would he be required to tear since he did not fulfill his obligation on the holiday? Is the obligation to tear one that is simply נדחה, pushed off, during the holiday, and re-devolves upon a person immediately afterwards (as is the case in tearing over a death), or is the nature of the obligation different?
The answer can be inferred from the מגן אברהם in או"ח סי' תקס"א, where the law of tearing for the Temple is discussed again. He deals with a case where a person was raised in Jerusalem. As a child, he does not have a requirement to tear. However, upon reaching the age of Bar Mitzvah, although he has an obligation to tear, he is not in a position to tear, since he has seen the Temple area within thirty days! Such a person would never be required to tear, unless he were to leave Jerusalem for longer than thirty days. The ערוך השולחן rules so, as well.
It seems clear from this discussion that the requirement to tear is fundamentally one which requires the "newness" of not having seen the Temple area for thirty days. Only if this requirement is fulfilled would one tear. If one has seen the Temple Mount during a time of פטור, when he is younger than thirteen, it seems clear that he has nonetheless seen the area and is thus no longer obligated in tearing קריעה. Tearing over the Temple Mount is fundamentally different in its parameters from tearing over a dead relative.
It seems to me that this reasoning applies in completely the same way to seeing the Kotel on חול המועד. Thus, one who sees the Kotel on חול המועד and then returns to the site afterwards, would not tear on חול המועד, and would also not tear after the holiday, until having been absent from the Temple area for longer than thirty days. (I was pleased to see that Rabbi Melamed comes to the same conclusion as I do.)
May God help us rebuild his Holy Temple quickly. May these laws become theoretical discussions, and no longer practical, with the pilgrimage of the nation to the בית המקדש.
Again, the above is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.
Monday, September 06, 2010
Basics of Music
Apropos of not much, here is an outline sketch of what is colloquially called "Classical Music":
Early Period: Voice, Gregorian chant, Choral church music. until about 1400.
Medieval Period: More instrumentation, Renaissance period -- introduction of bass instruments and musical transcription. 1400 - 1600.
Common Practice Period:
Baroque Period: 1600 - 18th C. Continuous bass line, use of counterpoint (independent musical voices enunciated together that are harmonically interrelated), distinction of maj/minor motifs. More ensemble, chamber music. eg Bach, Handel.
Classical Period: 18th C - 1820's. Symphonies. More order to music, use of single reed instruments. eg. WA Mozart, Haydn.
Romantic Period: 1820 - 1910. Nationalist (eg Wagner, Dvorak). Less order, even as orchestras began forming for classical period music. Nocturnes, preludes -- free-form. Piano in present form. Romantic, emotional motives and themes. Grand opera. Eg. Beethoven (really straddles Classical and Romantic), Shubert.
Friday, August 06, 2010
Universal Kindness
In parashat Re'eh, the Jewish nation is poised on the banks of the Jordan, ready to enter the Promised Land. Here, at the threshold of their national destiny, Moshe their leader delivers an epic farewell oratory. The speech is more than a review of their past; it is a vision of their future. Moshe focuses upon the laws that have particular relevance to the national and civil aspects of communal life. It comes as no surprise that Moshe exhorts the Jews regarding laws such as charity. However, he also reviews the foods Jews may eat, and those from which they must abstain. How do the laws of kashrut relate to the nation as a whole?
The food we ingest becomes part of our bodies. In the most literal way possible, what we intake is the source of our energy. Every word spoken, every lifted finger, is powered by what we have eaten. And so, a Jew is careful of what he eats and how he eats it. The commentators discuss many kosher and non-kosher animals, pointing out traits that are desirable or undesirable, to help explain their kosher status.
However, Rabbi Wollenberg from England points out in an article on this week's parsha, one non-kosher animal seems to have a positive trait. The Talmud explains that the stork, called chasidah, is so named for its propensity to do chesed, kindness towards its own kind. This seems like an emulable trait; why is the stork forbidden?
The Kotzker Rebbe explains: the stork engages in acts of kindness towards its own kind. However, this kindness does not extend to those outside the stork's family. The rabbi from Kotzk says that it is not enough, and we may not ignore those outside our circles.
On the face of things, this answer seems like quite a beautiful lesson. However, if we examine the laws of charity, we find that (ב"מ ע"א) "aniyei ircha kodmim": when giving tzedaka, we are responsible first for our own families, then for our own town, then our own city. The laws of charity seem to agree with the kindness of the stork! How can the Kotzker call kindness directed towards one's own kind "unkosher", when that is precisely what the halacha seems to require?
The answer to this question can be found in a subtle distinction between the two. In the laws of charity, the closer circles to a person take precedence. It is not that one may cease to give charity after his own are satisfied. The halacha simply informs us of the proper order. Loving-kindness begins at home, but in no way does it stop there. The light and benificence of the Torah emenates forth and eventually envelops the world. This is in stark contrast to the stork, who the Talmud tells us, limits its kindness exclusively to its own.
It is one of the hardest tasks in our lives not only to do good, but to do ordered good. Order, seder, gives structure to our actions, and allows them to be, not only good now, or in an hour, but in twenty years. My father-in-law often tells me that this is a lesson he received from Rabbi Tessler, of blessed memory: ensure that the good you do is true good, not superficial good. When we order our priorities, we are able to ensure that no good goes undone, while at the same time, none is decayed by exaggeration or neglect.
In one of Rav Kook's pieces of poetry, his 'שיר מרובע', he describes the passage of a man from his concern over his personal redemption, to an interest in Jewish National redemption. From there, the protagonist finds a higher plane of redemption, that of all Mankind. Finally, he ends by finding the ultimate redemption, the redemption of the Universe, and the validation of Creation.
Rav Kook in this poem is not describing layers of consciousness that replace each other. He is rather speaking about maintaining four discrete views in harmony, allowing each to influence and vitalize the other properly. The song is of wisely choosing from a blending of the four perspectives that which best suits whatever situation one experiences.
In Moshe's time and today as well, the transition from desert to Israel is one in which the Jews are tasked with taking the physical and spiritual midbar and converting it to a gan Hashem. Upon entry to Israel, a group of individuals begin the task of building a healthy national home. The rights of the individual and the needs of the community will come into conflict more and more. How are we to properly provide each with their just desserts?
The only way to do this correctly is to maintain different perspectives, individual, national, global and universal. We may not stop at any point, as the stork does. We must recognize the priorities set, but not lose ourselves within their details and waypoints. Thus the chasidah gives way to true chesed, and the individual finds his place not by being erased or lost in the group, but by being given his proper place within the community.
Kashrut, then, provides deep lessons for a nation building a state. The teachings imparted certainly are relevant to the Jews at the doorway to Israel.
Thursday, June 17, 2010
בענין שהייה מטעם הטמנה
Tuesday, June 08, 2010
Hirsch and the Categorical Imperative
"It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our sense. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them; that manner...not necessarily shared by every being, though, no doubt, by every human being." (Critique 37)
With this revolution in epistemology, Immanuel Kant forever changes the direction of philosophy. After ensuring that all noumena are permanently and fundamentally hidden behind the veil of human perception and sense in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant finds religion and morality in quite a precarious position. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he discusses the saving grace, in his thought, of morality, an a priori and innate morality not derived from experience. Kant calls this objective foundation of "good", the categorical imperative. A necessary corollary of such an innate drive is a God. Thus, Kant, in his own mind, provides for the necessity of a God, and a general inborn human drive to be moral. This far comes Kant.
The purpose of this short post is not to point out the weaknesses in this theory. Kant's ideas were the turning point of philosophy, and the percussions of his ground-breaking theory of the ultimate reality, conceivable by thought and yet un-perceivable in experience, were felt everywhere. So, it is valuable to see how a Jewish philosopher might respond to this theory that rejects absolute knowledge of Godly command.
And indeed, Rabbi SR Hirsch praised Kant. He considered him one who reached the doorstep of Judaism, and by tragedy of ignorance, came no further. For Hirsch, the categorical imperative is not morality, for the moral universe is not what is, but what must be (Grunfeld LXXV). (Rabbi Hirsch makes this point in discussion of the Golden Calf: that the sin immediately after revelation is yet another indication of the Divine origin of the Law, a Law that is hoisted upon people by God who are not yet morally ready for it, as opposed to an organic moral progressive process of wise men in the life of the people.)The innate moral voice in Man is not the voice of morality, it is the yearning for morality. Man's sense of good and evil is not perfect, too much variation exists to be able to call it that. What is constant however, is the desire, the striving to a moral structure. Kant confused the homonomy (self-commanded law) with the desire for a formulated heteronomy.
By making this simple but crucial adjustment in Kant's theory of Practical Reason, Rabbi Hirsch supremely empowers the categorical imperative. No longer does morality hinge upon the sparse commonality of Man's inner moral voice. Hirsch's innate desire for a moral structure, as Kant's innate morality, posits a God. However, Hirsch's conception of the imperative also posits a revelation of Divine Will -- the definition of the heteronomous morality towards which the yearning innate in Man strives. For if humanity is to strive towards an ideal of morality, and if this yearning presupposes a God, then, taken together, these two ideas require a God-given moral code for Man to work towards. The categorical imperative then, for Rabbi Hirsch, is not the oracle of "good" carried personally in every man's breast. Rather, each man carries within him a piece of the morality puzzle, an innate reminder that there is a moral law that must be attained in this world, and that it must be available somehow.
Of course, this leads in to a discussion of the Torah and the scientific necessity to study it from within instead of from without. Perhaps more on that some other time.
Tuesday, June 01, 2010
Gaza Flotilla
The international media and world governments have reacted to Israel's boarding of the Gaza flotilla. The almost universal reaction has been the condemnation of Israel's boarding of a peacefully intentioned vessel in international waters.
I am not so naive as to believe that the truth will change the minds of the media and global leaders. I have seen enough to know that the world has lost its patience with the truth in Israel's case. The media and world organs have provided the Arab world with a mouthpiece, and have repeated the lies so often that they trump truth. The word "occupation" has been used so much, that the world forgets the armistance agreements in '67 and '73, agreements which define Israel's legally binding international frontiers, and provide the West Bank and Gaza as Israeli territory until Israel, Egypt and Jordan, draw up new agreements otherwise. The word "apartheid" is bandied about so that the true racial oppression of actual citizens in South Africa is forgotten. Israeli treatment of non-citizen terrorists is viewed as the mistreatment of law-abiding citizens. Israel's equality and democracy for its diverse citizenry is ignored. The terms "illegal settlement" and "illegal blockade" twist morally and legally acceptable actions into evil practices. And the final, perfect irony, the use of the term "Nazi", calling to memory the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians, is used to describe the limited actions of a state surrounded and attacked on two sides, to handle actual terrorists intent on the murder of non-combatants.
However, I know that in the end, the truth matters. It matters to us, as we deal with attacks from every side. It matters to Jews world over who know not what to say when confronted by enemies of the truth, who use lies and propoganda to veil their new anti-semitism, called anti-zionism. And the truth will matter when the world once again, for however short a period of time, considers the facts instead of the screams of the mob.
So what is the truth?
1) Hamas is an internationally recognized terrorist organization. (Many may feel that Hamas is a freedom-fighting organization, and not terrorists. In a moment of honesty, however, the free world has named them terrorists because they attack civilians and utilize tactics to induce the population of Israel to fear. Those who choose to label Hamas as anything other than terrorists will have to redefine the word terror.)
2) Hamas is in control of Gaza not through democratic means; rather, they wrested control from the ruling party through violence, bloodshed and intimidation directed towards the residents of Gaza.
3) Since the violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel and Egypt, with the support of most western Governments, have effected a blockade of Gaza.
4) The sole purpose of this blockade is to prevent arms from reaching the terrorists. Literally hundreds of tons of food reach Gaza from Israel weekly. Gazans are routinely brought to Israeli hospitals for treatment that is beyond the ken of Gazan doctors.
5) The flotilla's express purpose is not to bring food and relief to Gaza. If that was their purpose, they would have agreed to Israel's offer to take the supplies in to Gaza after inspection. The expressed purpose of the flotilla was to break the blockade in place to prevent weaponse from reaching terrorists.
6) According to international agreements regarding running of blockades (see the San Remo Manual, article 67), a ship is boardable even on the high seas if it intends to run a blockade. It is considered in violation of a blockade the moment it sets out from port with the purpose of running the blockade. Israel acted within international law. The use of force is permitted as a last resort.
7) Some say Israel should have allowed the ship through. They say that this would have been less damaging to Israel. However, this is far from true. Israel had three choices: 1) allow the ship through, 2) physically block the ship and reach a standoff situation, 3) take the ships to Israel after boarding them. The third option was the best choice in a sitation that contained only bad choices. (1) would have presented Israel as a paper tiger, unable or unwilling to enforce its own blockade. Further, it would have allowed in potential weaponry and terrorists to Gaza. (2) would have resulted in a standoff situation in which the flotilla members would have used the media to their advantage: imagine the flotilla members going on a hunger strike until being allowed to run the blockade! Or the flotilla ships may have rammed Navy vessels, requiring the use of much more force. Israel really had no choice but to board.
7) The flotilla members claimed the would be non-violent and resist passively. Video and images from the boats reveal these verbal assurances to be lies. The soldiers of Israel's Navy, carrying out legally sanctioned actions, were beaten and thrown overboard, stabbed and shot, by the 'non-violent' protestors. The fact that the feeling around the world is that Israel opened fire on unarmed civilians shows just how powerfully the flotilla members are in control of the media surrounding this event, and/or how biased the world is against Israel.
In conclusion, the Israelis acted within their legal rights and responsibilities towards their citizens. The flotilla was made up of provocateurs whose purpose was to score a big PR win for their side. The state of Israel's image in a world that is tired of the truth and just wants Israel to go away is such that Israel lost the PR battle before it began. Anything Israel did would be reported gleefully, either as a weakness in blockade, or cruelty in boarding.
And to counter all the disinformation, here is a picture of a 'peaceful flotilla member' describing his plans for the Israeli soldiers:
And here is a video documenting the violence met by the Israelis in enforcing their internationally-recognized blockade:
Friday, May 14, 2010
Good Neighbors
In the description of the encampment of the different tribes around the mishkan, the Torah (Bamidbar 3:29) tells us that the tribe of Reuven was in the vicinity of the family of Korach. The Rabbis learn from this that, "Woe is to the wicked, and woe to his neighbor," while "good befalls the righteous, and also his neighbor."
This teaching is mentioned in three different rabbinic sources, and each one delivers it utilizing slightly different diction. In Likutei Sichot, the Lubavitcher Rebbe examines each one in depth. The changes are nuanced, but reflect more than one would think at first glance. By examining each variation, one in Midrash Tanchuma, one in Bamidbar Rabah, and the final one in Rashi's commentary, we can come to a deeper understanding of the power and meaning behind being judged by the company we keep.
In the Tanchuma, it states that the tree tribes bordering on Korach and his compatriots, "avdu imo b'machlok'to", they were destroyed with Korach on account of his divisiveness. This describes the most superficial result of proximity to the wicked: when they get punished, those who dwell beside them are affected, as well.
Rashi's commentary changes the language: "l'kach laku mehem Datan V'Aviram...shenimsh'chu imahem b'machl'kotam", because they joined in the clash with Korach against Moshe, Datan and Aviram were punished. Clearly, Rashi implicates the non-Levites who died with Korach in his sin. It is not mere proximity that doomed them; rather, their proximity led them to join in the sins of the wicked, and thus, deserve punishment. This is a second way that neighboring with evil people brings disaster: there is a palpable danger that one will learn from their ways.
Finally, Bamidbar Rabah puts forth a third variation upon the midrash. "mi hayu ba'alei machloket? Korach...ul'fi shehayu s'muchim kahem R'uven, Shimon v'Gad, hayu kulam ba'alei machloket." Who were the ones in dispute with Moshe? Korach. However, the tribes who lived beside them were all parties to dispute. Likutei Sichot notices the use of the past tense verb here, and therefore understands that this is yet a third dimension to the teaching of chazal: one who ends up dwelling with the wicked reveals a latent tendency within himself to negative influences and behaviors. This is reminiscient of Lot, whose greed and desire for importance led him to the decedance of S'dom, where he became "head to jackals", rather than remain the tail of Avraham's lion (Avot 4:20).
The three aspects of neighblorly effect on one's life also seem to be present in those who choose to live in the vicinity of the righteous. One who makes himself close to tzadikim can benefit from their blessings, as well as learn from their ways. Also, it seems that the impulse to be close to good people is, in itself, fulfillment of an ethical imperative. Rabbi Yose ben Kisma summed this up in 6:9 of Avot.
In modern times, we do not have as much choice as we may like in who our neighbors are. We have limited control over who our children play with, as well. Furthermore, we have a responsibility to help fellow Jews who have lost the path of Torah back to orthodoxy. In light of these realities, how are we to assure ourselves that these aspects of peer pressure are kept in check?
In the past, the book of Job has been quite boring for me. More than forty chapters of long-winded speeches, alternatively complaining about and defending God's ways seem almost like a literary attempt at redundancy. However, I am reading Job's Path to Enlightenment, by Ethan Dor-Shav. By reading the text of Job closely, he comes up with some fascinating insights into the psychology and foundations of faith and religion that apply not only to people in pain and suffering, but to anyone who finds value in a real relationship with Hashem. One of his points, I believe, may perhaps shed light on how we can defend ourselves against the concept of "woe to the wicked's neighbor."
It is generally assumed that Job was a model of virtue before his test from Satan. However, if we pay closer attention, he is only described as lacking the negative: "innocent and straight, and one who feared God and turned away from evil." Indeed, tamim carries a connotation throughout the Bible of naivete. The fourth son at the seder would hardly be considered a tzaddik because of his "innocence"; it is rather a fundamental simplicity that is to be removed by the father and replaced with knowledge and sophistication. Also, Job is described as turning away from evil, but not at all as one who embraces good. He is a model of "virtue devoid of awareness." He is good by rote, by mechanical practice of duty, without developing that spark of interest and passion that marks individuals who engage in a search for closeness to God, "kirvat elokim li tov." Indeed, the essay goes on to demonstrate how Job's suffering bring him to a renewed interest in authentic communion with the Divine, which is only possible when blind routine is expunged from his life.
Most of us live with elements of Job-ness every day. Even when we are passionate and feel close to God, we find ourselves fulfilling the letter of the laws of prayer, tefillin, shabbat-observance and kashrut with an atmosphere of dissociation. In this type of situation, we are in danger of all three elements of neighborly influence. Our very passivity leads us to associate with like people, and we influence each other. The general level of communal observance and passion towards spiritual endeavors may fall, and ultimately, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. So, the lowest common denominator can be reached.
By learning a lesson from the book of Job, we can infuse our duties towards God and our desire for an intimate bond with Him with a sense of true longing and active, authentic growth. With a sense of purpose and awareness of our position, we can overcome the problems of Korach and Reuven. Instead of being influenced by those who are less than perfect, we can develop ourselves as strong role-models for them, and bring them up, rather than be dragged down.
Monday, April 19, 2010
Independence Day
Monday, March 15, 2010
Pay Attention, Obama!
Obama and Clinton, over the past few days, seem to have fallen into the fantasy so common to presidents of the US -- the belief that they control the world. It seems that Obama has chosen to take out the anger he feels from his impotent obsessions with domestic issues such as health care reform and the struggling economy. He has decided upon the classic, historical whipping boy, the scapegoat of every raging leader: the Jew and, lately, his State. The vehemence and acerbity of Obama's and Clinton's anger at Israel concerning an issue that is well beyond their domain is astounding; the world is stunned, and the evil revel.
What is amazing is the extent and distance Obama and Clinton have been willing to go in publicly embarrassing an ally. They explicitly agreed months ago with Israel that the "ten month building freeze" would apply to the West Bank and not Jerusalem. Indeed, on Thursday, the US admitted that the announcement of 1,600 new housing units in Israel's capitol did not consist of Israel reneging on any agreement, and that it would simply be prudent to be careful when dealing with matters of such a sensitive nature. Days later, Obama and Clinton decided to make this a public international incident. In order to do that, they have lied, and taken offense where none was present. They are manufacturing an Israeli-US crisis to serve their other interests. It is absolutely shameful that a US president and secretary of state would act in such an unprofessional, eminently dishonest manner.
Obama had better think carefully about the danger of publicly alienating an ally in public view, allowing the true enemy (Islamic terror including Iran) to believe that the coalition of good is fragmented and weak. Far from Israel "insulting" the US, Obama and Clinton have chosen to insult Israel, trying to demonstrate to the world the power they wield over the Jewish State. They are choosing to side with evil and terror against democracy and good. Obama is walking a very damaging road, one which will not aid his failing domestic policies, and one that will only hurt the concepts of justice and good in the world over.
I received a timely and relevant quote by email I would like to share with Israel and America, and Obama, Clinton and Netanyahu in particular (originally written on Yaakov Kirschen's blog called Dry Bones) :
'In December 1981, the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Law extending Israeli law to the Golan Heights. In reaction the American administration declared that it would "punish Israel". Prime Minister Begin then issued a statement that he read to the US Ambassador to Israel and released to the public. It reads, in part:
"A week ago, at the instance of the Government, the Knesset passed on all three readings by an overwhelming majority of two-thirds, the "Golan Heights Law."
Now you once again declare that you are punishing Israel.
What kind of expression is this – "punishing Israel"? Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic? Are we youths of fourteen who, if they don't behave properly, are slapped across the fingers?
Let me tell you who this government is composed of. It is composed of people whose lives were spent in resistance, in fighting and in suffering. You will not frighten us with "punishments." He who threatens us will find us deaf to his threats. We are only prepared to listen to rational arguments."'
Obama, you have lied to the world, and used Hilary Clinton as your messenger girl. Why don't you both face up to the real problem in the Israeli - Arab problem -- the unwillingness of Hamas, Hizbollah, Iran and most of the Arab world to admit Israel's right to exist? Why don't you face the increasing problem in the Western world -- the emergence of the belief that the Jews have no right to defend their population from onslaughts from those who deny their right to exist?
While Obama and Clinton choose to find "insult" in Israel's announcement to build houses, they ignore the true colors of the Arabs: in the same week, the 'Palestinians' honored a female terrorist who committed one of the worst acts of terror in Israel. They also called for the Arab public to arrive at the Temple Mount and stage riots there. A double standard of epic proportions -- truly the "change" we all hoped for from Obama. (For a sane editorial from CNN regarding the underlying issues, see here. Important quote: "The most dangerous cause of instability in the Middle East is the so-called peace process itself.")
I am disgusted with the US president and his lap-dog secretary of state.
UPDATE: Netanyahu seems to realize the moment of truth in his premiership, and has announced (in decidedly less hot-headedness than Clinton's and Obama's announcements) unequivocally that building in all of Israel's capitol, Jerusalem, will continue despite Obama and Clinton's hysterical fits of frustration. Further, at the end of ten months, building will continue in the West Bank, as well.
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
Refresher Course on Your Enemy
We all need a reminder every now and again why we cannot let our Jewish (and non-Jewish) mercy take over regarding our enemies. They understand their religion as requiring them to take over the world by sword, and freedom or democracy are of no value.
Here are some photos from a recent Arab demonstration in England:
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Deeply Moving
I haven't written in a while, but I just came across something that moved me. A Jew named Ronen Levi Yitzchak Segal, a commenter on various blogs, has a large number of Youtube videos that he made. In these videos, he looks into the webcam and answers questions posed to him by email. His answers contain a certain simplicity and heartfelt property that I think all rabbis would do well to cultivate, though Ronen is not a rabbi. I have watched a few of these videos, and his calm, quiet manner and gentle responses (though I do not agree with all he says) leave a deep impression on me. From the comments there and on his Facebook page, it seems that he touched many people.
Ronen died in April, and when I read that, I was shocked. It is a call to action for me and all of us still alive, that this gentle, kind man was able to make such a mark on this world with a few videos on Youtube. I learned many things from him.
Check his pages out if you have an interest: http://www.youtube.com/user/ronennachman770
חבל על דאבדין -- It is such a shame to have lost such a powerful voice for God. May our world learn from him, and may we all merit soon the coming of the redemption.
Monday, November 09, 2009
Coming of Age in Avraham's Tent
The book of Bereishit is a book of family. The subjects of father, mother and child, filial responsibility, parenthood and inheritance -- spiritual and physical -- are featured as central themes of the first fifth of the Torah. At the end of Vayera, the Torah presents its reader with two clearly connected stories, which, through subtlety and hints, reveal the roots of geo-political realities for centuries to come. The two stories are separated only by the flimsiest of pretexts; the episodes are the story of Yishmael's deportation, and the tale of Yitzchak's near sacrifice.
The parallels between the two episodes are many and multi-layered, found in both the language the Torah employs, as well as the imagery and details of each story:
- In both events, a cherished and beloved son is sent out of Avraham's tent, seemingly never to return.
- Both include a seemingly completely passive actor (a son), and an active parent.
- In each (21:14, 22:3), וישכם אברהם בבקר, Avraham rises in the early morning to dispense with a distasteful task.
- In both tales, the passive child is literally about to die.
- In both passages (21:17, 22:11, 16), a מלאך, a heavenly angel, protests the death.
- Both stories have the angel of heaven revealing to the active parent something which he did not see before, but now sees (a well for Hagar in chapter 21, and a ram for Avraham in 22).
- Each episode ends with a blessing of the child as the source of a great and numerous nation.
- Both end with hints at a suitable marriage for the passive child (now a man), and thus a way for the blessing to be actualized.
- In the Yishmael story (ch. 21), Avraham protests Sarah's demand of deportation initially, and only agrees when God commands it. In the Yitzchak episode (ch. 22), there is no scriptural evidence of Avraham's protest.
- In ch. 21, it is the women who take active roles in the events, while in ch. 22, Avraham does so.
- In ch. 21, Hagar, in her anguish over the deterioration of her son's situation, shows selfishness in casting him away so that she "not see the death of the boy". In stark contrast, even in the most trying time for the father-son relationship, Avraham and Yitzchak's relationship is twice described as the most intimate, filial, loving relationship, יחדיו -- they are sublimely, simply, "together".
- The word גוי, "nation" is used in ch. 21 to refer to Yishmael's future nation-offspring, while in ch. 22 the word is used only to describe the other nations, those not from the seed of Avraham.
- The angel in ch. 21 is a מלאך אלקים. The name of God used here traditionally signifies Lord of judgment, strictness and nature. In ch. 22, it is מלאך ה' -- the name of God is the personal God, That of mercy, loving-kindness and intimacy.
- In ch. 21, the ending blessing is given directly to Yishmael. However, in ch. 22, Yitzchak does not receive any direct blessing. Rather, it is given to Avraham.
It first strikes the reader that these episodes are really coming-of-age stories. In both, a passive child is transformed into a man with a divinely-mandated destiny. It is important, therefore, that the two children be passive initially. However, by the end of the story, each child is prepared for marriage. Marriage is the threshold of majority; when Yishmael's mother chooses a wife for him (21:21), he is invested as a grown man, ready to fulfill his destiny. And at the end of the Yitzchak tale, the lineage of Betuel, and Rivka his daughter, is seen by the Rashi as the oblique reference to Yitzchak's being mature for marriage. Finding appropriate wives, Yishmael and Yitzchak are ready to begin their Godly destinies.
However, these destinies are widely divergent. One will become the unique vessel through which God fulfills His promise to His beloved Avraham. The other will bring forth twelve princes of the desert (17:20), living and dying by the ethos of the sword (16:12). This point is brought to light by the difference in the stories regarding the final blessings (difference #6). Yitzchak's blessing is given to him indirectly; Avraham receives the blessing from God, and this blessing as a matter of course devolves upon Yitzchak. This is evident because the blessing is immediately followed by the marriage of Yitzchak. כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע -- In Yitzchak you will have "seed" (21:12). The Torah is quite exact in its choice of terms in the blessing of ch. 22: "כי ברך אברכך והרבה ארבה את זרעך ...וירש זרעך...והתברכו בזרעך". In this blessing (22:17-18), the term for the progeny is "seed", reflecting the fact that the blessing currently being given to Avraham will only be fulfilled through his "seed" -- previously identified exclusively as Yitzchak.
On the other hand, Yishmael's blessing is given directly to him, through no intermediary. Indeed, in the eyes of destiny, Yishmael is a new man, a man without a father, a man who carries no previous tradition into his future.
This distinction is evident in the diction of both blessings. Whereas Yishmael is blessed to be a גוי גדול, Yitzchak's blessing (through Avraham) states that through him, גויי הארץ, the nations of the land, will be blessed. The word for "nation" that tells what Yishmael will become is precisely the same word used to tell Avraham and Yitzchak who will be blessed by them, and who is considered outside of their chosen group. Yishmael is a גוי, he is a nation amongst the nations of the world, and set apart from the זרע הנבחר.
In the same vein, the God that saves Yishmael is אלקים -- God of strict, natural justice. It is the God that does not judge Yishmael on future actions, but באשר הוא שם, in what he is now. This is quite different from being saved by the loving, intimate and merciful ה', who saves Yitzchak. Indeed, the blessings and methods of salvation continue to delineate between the divergent futures of these two sons of Avraham.
Perhaps these divergent futures are necessary products of the parenting exhibited during the coming-of-age crises. Yishmael is fatherless in his story -- he has been exiled by his father. (Indeed, he returns (according to the midrash) only to bury his father with his brother, and to demonstrate that he has no part as a chosen son.) His mother exhibits callousness and selfishness. The pain of watching her son wither away is too much for her, and she casts him away from her, the distance of an arrow's flight (21:16). Her callousness develops her son and his descendents into men who place themselves at odds with other men, and at odds with the Jewish spark (Yishmael is seen by Rashi (commenting on Zecharia 6:1) as the final exiler and oppressor of Israel). Perhaps to underscore how deeply the parental instinct of Hagar has impressed itself upon Yishmael, a mere four verses after she casts him away, the same bow and arrow is employed in 20:20 to describe Yishmael's weapon of choice. Yishmael's mother and her persona make him unfit as a son of Avraham.
On the other hand, Yitzchak, as pointed out earlier, is imbued by Avraham, his parent, with tremendous love and kindness, even when obeying God's most seemingly harsh commands. Together, intimately, father and son scale a mountain, and together, just as intimately, they descend it, and the son is invested not only with his destiny, but with his inner character.
(To further drive home this dual, inter-generational relationship, a parallel can be found in the fact that this is not Hagar's first exile from Avraham's home. In ch. 16, she leaves leaves to escape Sarah's abuse. The cycle seems to be repeated in Yishmael, although in his case, the exile is divinely justified, whereas in Hagar's case, it is not. On the other hand, Avraham is also commanded to self-exile himself (parallel to Hagar) from his father's home. He does so, and thus provides prental precedent for Yitzchak's sacrifice event.
Ultimately, in a social setting where birthright and inheritance are of extreme importance and fought over vehemently, it was important for God's plan to leave no uncertainty as to which son bore the noble title of "Son of Avraham". The coming-of-age denouements related in our parasha show how God defined each child with their destiny, and set them on their often-opposing paths for subsequent history. In this light, we understand well the Torah's decision to tell, in 25:6, of the sending away of Avraham's subsequent children. As with Yishmael, they needed to be unequivocally denied the option of supplanting or even joining Yitzchak as the physical or spiritual inheritor of Avraham.
Tuesday, November 03, 2009
Vayera and Providence
The Ralbag (late-13th C - mid-14th C) was a great talmudist and halachist. He is perhaps remembered best, however, for his commentary on the Torah. To the modern and traditionalist views, the Ralbag's commentary is quirky; he believed in astrology, and yet had non-conventional views on Heavenly omniscience, because of philosophical considerations. His commentary to the Chumash is a very interesting read, for its diversity of thought and divergence from other Jewish thinkers.
It is the Ralbag's habit, after explaining the story verse by verse and conceptually, to list a number of "benefits" that are to be reaped from the passage. Some are character-building, and some are philosophical lessons. In the story of Lot and Sodom, Ralbag finds a philosophical lesson regarding the nature of Divine Providence. This lesson explains the method through which God affects providential salvation1 of humans.
The Ralbag states (עמ' קלח בהוצאת מוסד הרב קוק): "It is unbecoming of Man to neglect his own safety, [and rely] exclusively on the protection of God. Rather, he should be very diligent, for God causes his deliverance through man utilizing the best method available to protect himself. This is one of the tools with which God's providnece is completed: when a person is notified of the evil that will befall him...God provides salvation when [the man] tries to distance that evil in any possible way. And for this reason, Lot was commanded to quickly run, not look back or rest, until reaching the place where his salvation would be completed. If he did this, he would escape; if not, the evil would befall him."
Essentially, Man's own efforts to insightfully and wisely defend himself against danger through the natural means at his disposal is a part of the providence through which God protects those deserving of protection. This idea is crystallized by the Ran in his eighth essay (דרשות הר"ן, עמ' שיט בהוצאת מוסד הרב קוק). In discussing one method through which God protects people from dangers that crop up in life, he writes: "God places in the hearts of those who do His will the idea to do actions which by their nature protect them from damage from the system of the universe [luck, chance, uncertainty, call it what you will]." (This is also the view of the Ibn Ezra, as mentioned in a footnote to this page.)
In other words, the very insights we often have in a time of danger -- which path to take, what to say -- these ways that we extricate ourselves from perilous situations, are part of God's providential protection. What we see as our proactive stance and willingness to do our utmost to help ourselves are, in reality, a critical element of Divine assistance. (Perhaps this is what Rambam meant when he wrote (in his Letter on Astrology, translated here) that the destruction of the Jewish State around 70 CE was a result of the Israelites spending time learning astrology, instead of focusing their efforts the study on war- and states-craft. In the light of the above discussion, perhaps this missallocation of intellectual resources was God's providence removing its protective shield from Judea, leaving them open to attack and destruction.)
It is interesting to see how our sages of centuries past viewed the philosophical issues with which we still grapple. I am not sure that Ralbag would see God's Providence in only the terms set out by the above-quoted passage, and am certainly not sure that I see it only in these terms. Part of religious life is to experience God and His providence personally. This leads away from the "how" of Divine providence, which is an abstract philosophical challange, to the concrete affirmation of our lives as a part of the Divine plan, no matter the exact mechanism we can envisage that God used to alter the course of events. To experience the latter is life changing, to say the least.
And so this short post is not at all meant to limit the "acceptable" answers to this and other philosophical questions, but to widen the scope. Considering these issues will, I hope, motivate us to think deeply about modern Man and God -- to reference our intellectual history (which often had different philosophical assumptions than we do today), and blaze trails where novel ideas can be of assistance. I pray that this ultimately allow us to see God's interest and intimate involvement in our lives more clearly each day.
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1 For other discussions of Divine providence that we have had here, search the blog for the term 'Providence'.
Thursday, October 29, 2009
False and True Leadership
I wish to juxtapose two passages, from two very different leaders that the Jewish nation has produced. Suffice it to say, one demonstrates false leadership, while the other demonstrated honor, bravery and dignity, dying for the Jewish cause. Let us mourn for him who has been lost, and learn from the failures of him who remains. חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין...
Ehud Olmert, former PM of Israel (currently defendant in a number of criminal suits):
"We are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies, we want that we will be able to live in an entirely different environment of relations with our enemies. We want them to be our friends, our partners, our good neighbors. "
Rabbi Kahane (God avenge his blood), approximately 15 years earlier:
"We are weary? We are weary of having to serve in the army each year to defend our state? How much would a Jew in Auschwitz have given for the opportunity to see a Jewish army, a Jewish tank, a Jewish plane – and with what joy he would have agreed to serve each year in a Jewish army of a Jewish State, created so as to help guarantee that never again will there be an Auschwitz for its Jewish citizens!
Peace? Of course we want peace. Who does not want peace? It is not the monopoly of the guilt-ridden and self-hating hypocrites, the artists and intellectuals (sic) of the left. We all wish peace; we all fervently pray for peace. We all look for the day when the nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares. But, meanwhile, as they continue to have swords with which to destroy us, let us not be so mad as to wave ploughshares.
Give up land. For “peace” that the “poor Palestinian” is prepared to grant us? The ultimate peace of the dead? Are we mad? The ones who launched four wars of aggression against Israel and lost for wars of aggression, dictate terms to us? The ones who launched four wars of aggression and a thousand terrorist attacks, who slew thousands of Jews, and who lost – now present us with demands? They insist that we, who won, give up land? Let the Arab aggressors and murderers learn a very basic rule of life: Losers lose. Winners win. Losers and especially losers who launched wars of murderous aggression, do not dictate terms. Aggression is not a game in which one attempts to wipe out innocent people, loses and then returns to “Go”. No, aggression is a gamble and if the aggressor loses – let him know the full bitterness of his reality – that he has lost. Then, perhaps, he will think deeply and carefully before embarking on another adventure. For let the “poor Palestinian” know in every fiber of his body, that he had best leave well enough alone. Let him accept a peace that will see him establish a state of his own in Jordan, if he can do it. For should he be so foolish as to begin another murderous war of aggression, let him be certain that that which he still possess in Jordan will be ours too.
Land for peace? By all means. The Jews who were the victims of countless efforts to destroy them and who are the rightful owners, will keep the land and be prepared to graciously give the murderous Arabs, peace."
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Noah and Self-Control
When Adam and Chava sinned in their first hours in the garden of Eden, it was a sin of passion. The allure and promise of a fruit that would make them into gods was something that they could not resist. And with this sin, the seeds of mankind's ultimate failure are sown. Cain kills Hevel in a fit of passion, and history spirals downward. Humanity seems controlled by its baser instincts, with desire and passion in control.
On Noah's release from the ark, the Torah talks of God's resolution to never destroy all of mankind again. "ויאמר ה' אל לבו..." "God said to his heart...." The sages (quoted by Rabbi Hirsch) point out that whenever a biblical figure who is a model of virtue speaks in his heart, it is in this mode 'to his heart'. In contrast, when evil men do so, it is בליבו, in his heart. In this first post-diluvian proclamation by God, the very wording is a lesson to humanity: make sure that your heart-seated passions are not the decisors of your actions. Let your emotions be subservient to the intellect.
This lesson is repeated in the three brothers. Shem, model of intellect, and Yaphet, representing aesthetics and beauty, the noble elements of our passions, are told by Cham, symbolic of the base passions, that their father has shamed himself. Noah's reaction is to curse Cham and make him the slave to Shem. Yaphet is blessed, but dwells only within the tent (the parameters and limits) of Shem.
The three brothers are embodied in every human being. We all have base passions, noble desires, and an intellect and spirit. It is our task in life to enslave our base passion to our intellect. Even our noble aesthetics must be tempered and used only within the limits that our intellect must set; otherwise, it is easy for the Yaphet that is within us to lead us to Cham. Our intellect is subservient to God's will, and allows us to use it to bring out the good and decent in all our other attributes.
This idea was articulated by Plato as well, in book four of the Republic. The soul, says Plato, is triumverate, composed of three parts: the appetitive, the rational, and the spirited. The appetitive is the source of the base desires of mankind and society. The rational is the seat of wisdom and drives towards truth. The spirited is the source of "higher" desires, such as (platonic) love, honor, and victory. The ideal man has the rational controlling the appetitive with input from the spirited. The platonic republic contains these on a macro level: the king-philosopher is the rational, the auxiliary class (made up of soldiers and enforcers) is the spirited, and the worker class is the appetitive. By correctly applying the mastery of the one over the other, with the assistance of the third, individual and society can find the best way forward for private and public life.
(One distinction between the Republic and the Jewish ideal is the the purpose of society. According to Plato, society is a necessary tool to find the best result for each individual. Society is not an end in and of itself. However, the Jewish ideal is a nation, a כלל, serving God, in which the individual and the collective each have purposes and importance in and of themselves. Humanity is of a dual nature, as an individual and as a group, and each purpose provides sustenance to the other, and allows the completion of the other within itself. A Jewish society is nothing without individuals, but a Jewish individual is very little without his כלל.
)
There is nothing more noble than a person whose intellect controls his urges. In contrast, there is nothing more ignoble and pathetic than the opposite. And, looking back at a life mis-spent, nothing seems easier than to have lived it correctly. In The Power and the Glory, Graham Greene (an English playwright) tells the tale of a priest who lives a life guided by his passions. As he stands before a firing squad, "He felt only an immense disappointment because he had to go to God empty-handed, with nothing done at all. It seemed to him, at that moment, that it would have been quite easy to have been a saint. It would only have needed a little self-restraint and a little courage. He felt like someone who has missed happiness by seconds. He knew now that at the end there was only one thing that counted - to be a saint."
As we look back at our actions, it seems so petty, a little self restraint and a bit of courage were all that it would have taken to turn a sinner into a saint. This sentiment is an echo of the talmud (Sukah 52a): לעתיד לבוא מביאו הקב"ה ליצר הרע ושוחטו בפני הצדיקים ובפני הרשעים, צדיקים" נדמה להם כהר גבוה ורשעים נדמה להם כחוט השערה, הללו בוכין והללו בוכין, צדיקים בוכין ואומרים היאך יכולנו לכבוש הר גבוה כזה, ורשעים בוכין ואומרים היאך לא יכולנו לכבוש את חוט השערה הזה" At the end of days, God will slaughter the evil inclination before the righteous and sinners. It will seem to the saints as a high mountain, and they will cry [in joy] and marvel how they were able to conquer such a mountain. On the other hand, it will seem like a hairs-breadth to the wicked, who will lament that such a small distance they were unable to go in order to be good.
Those who place their desires and passions at the service of their intellect will ultimately see how easy it would have been to do good. On the other hand, the righteous will remember the hardships over which they prevailed to control their urges.
Self-restraint is something that seems easy to have in retrospect, and yet, at the point of struggle, can be the hardest thing to attain. It may be even harder to maintain the belief that we can repent and re-arrange our lives after years of sin. However, every breath we breathe is testament to the fact that Hashem has not given up on us, and we have no right to resign ourselves, either. May we all succeed in our individual and national struggles against the evil inclination.
Friday, October 16, 2009
There's a Fly in my Soup!
Disclaimer: As in all halachik discussions on the internet, what appears below should not be taken as a ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.
In honor of my fifth rabbanut bechina in about 10 days:
In the halachot of food, insects are particularly hard to defend against, since they are small they often show up in the most unexpected places. Insects furthermore carry the distinction that if eaten whole, they encompass multiple infractions, or לאוין.
If an insect falls into a cup of juice, one may immediately remove it, and may continue to drink (although practically, one may wonder where the insect may have been, and what disease it may carry). This is because the taste of the forbidden insect did not transfer into the food or drink. However, in a situation where the offending insect falls into cooking liquid, or is steeped in liquid for 24 hours (see SA YD 105:1), the situation is more complex. Here, we assume that taste has transferred (as happens during cooking), and therefore, the taste of the forbidden insect has been diffused throughout the cooking. In a case like this, one may only eat the food once the insect is removed if there is sixty times the forbidden taste (approximated by volume of the offending insect) in the food (ששים כנגדו). However, there is a more subtle case, where the food is hot but not cooking on the fire. This discussion will center around a fly in soup, and the worm that is often placed in a bottle of tequila.
Normally, an item is considered cooked with another item if it is brought to a temperature at which a hand is burnt, or if it steeps (כבישה) in it for 24 hours. The later authorities discuss the temperature "at which a hand is burnt" or יד סולדת בו. The פתחי תשובה brings two opinions (105:2), that it is either heat that would burn a baby's stomach, or that which makes it impossible to hold a vessel. He says that the practical reality is that people rely on the second opinion, which is approximated at 120o F (see the Star-K site).
Once the soup is placed in a bowl, however, it is considered in a כלי שני and thus not capable of cooking. However, the Rashba posits that even though it does not cook, it still transfers taste (מפליט ומבליע) and so it can still create forbidden mixtures. In this case, the soup with the fly may be forbidden even after the fly is removed, since the taste of the fly is considered by Rashba to have transferred into the soup (כדי קליפה, only into a thin layer surrounding the food). However, the Shulchan Aruch (105:2) only rules stringently as the Rashba in an ideal situation (לכתחילה); practically, if the accident has already occured, he allows one to behave as if a second vessel, a כלי שני does not pose the problem of flavor transferral. The ש"כ goes further and says that most authorities rule that כלי שני presents no problem whatsoever.
In addition to this reasoning permitting the soup in a bowl after the removal of a fly, even a pot on the fire could be permitted in the case of a fly falling in. In YD 104:1 (which rules like Rava in ע"ז סח:), we read that mice, flies, ants and other things that are disgusting to everyone, would be considered in essence things that give off a bad flavor (נותן טעם לפגם). In this sistuation, the requirement of sixty times the forbidden amount is unneeded, since that is in place only to ensure that the benefit from the forbidden part is imperceptible. So, you could remove the fly and eat the rest of the soup, even if the fly fell in while the pot was on the fire.
(This reasoning is restricted by a caveat: if we are dealing with beer or vinegar into which the forbidden item fell, even if the item is something that is essentially disgusting, they may, in these media, somehow enhance the flavor. In this case, we would need sixty times the forbidden item after it is removed in order to permit the soup.)
At the end of 104:3, the Shulchan Aruch rules thus, and permits these disgusting things, even if they are dissolved and mixed so completely as to make it impossible to remove them. However, we are required to do the best we can to remove them, like straining the soup before serving it. This issue is brought up again in 107:2. While the Rema there permits as did the Shulchan Aruch, the Bach quotes the שערי דורא who is strict and forbids it. The ש"כ mentions there are many who forbid.
And so, if the fly is visible or locatable, remove it. Otherwise, the Shulchan Aruch and Rema both would permit the soup. If the item is removed, and the soup has more than 60 times the forbidden item, everyone would permit.
The Aruch Hashulchan says its not reasonable to assume that a fly would be so mashed and dissolved by regular cooking as to permit it simply by being lost, according to the Shulchan Aruch and Rema. Therefore, how can we allow eating the soup? The same question applied in their days when the flour was full of bugs (as opposed to today, when there are so few bugs in our packaged, expiry dated flour, that you do not have to sift if the flour is not passed its expiration date and it has been stored safely).
The Aruch Hashulchan says that when something is completely lost in the soup, and is bad-tasting, it is completely unimportant, and therefore you can eat it. Otherwise, one might still say that the cooking according to Shulchan Aruch does dissolve even ants(which most would disagree with), or that it is only permitted if one sees a wing or something, to ascertain that it has been mashed.
Thus in the final analysis, a fly in soup (on the fire) must be removed. If it is, or it is mashed and dissolved (or even just lost according to the Aruch Hashulchan), it is permitted even without sixty times the forbidden item's volume of permitted matter (ששים כנגדו). According to the Bach's stringency, we would still require sixty. And if the fly has fallen into a כלי שני, then the circumstance is one of בדיעבד, and it is permitted after the fly is removed.
Now, in the case of a worm in liquor (as is common in bottles of tequila), the question is, what is the worm's purpose? Is it there to add flavor or coloring? Chardal, my resident alcohol expert, claims that the worm in tequila is simply for show. He says that "while it does not harm the taste of the liquer, it also does not enhance it. Frankly, no one can tell the difference between tequila with a worm or without one (assuming it is the same quality base tequila)."
If the worm had been there to enhance the flavor or look of the drink, certainly, we would need sixty units of permitted matter for each unit of forbidden matter, after removing the worm. However, we may be sure that the taste is still there, since the worm is in the bottle to demonstrate that the liquor is flavored (as is traditional) with that worm. Therefore, even if there is sixty in the bottle, it would not help, because either 1) the one worm is enough to give its taste to that bottle or (more likely) 2) the liquor was steeped in enough worms to make it taste, and the worm in this bottle is just for show. Either way, the liquor certainly has the taste of the worm. (This ignores the possibly relavent fact that if the worm is מעמיד, that it makes up an integral part of the liquor making process, then a מעמיד of איסור is not ever בטל (See end of YD 87).
However, in light of Chardal's insight into alcoholic bevarages, the worm does not add flavor. However, even in this situation, the Shach (based on the הגהות אשרי) forbids the mixture even when the forbidden does not add taste, unless there is a measure of sixty units of permitted volume for each unit of forbidden volume, and of course, requires the forbidden item to be removed. Thus, if the tequila can be proven to never have been in a situation where the tequila was less than sixty times more in volume than the number of worms, the tequila may be allowed if the worm is removed. (See the Rama, who may be lenient and allow something of neutral taste contribution to be removed and בטל without ששים כנגדו.) Of course, all this applies only if the tequila itself is kosher. The only issue under discussion here is if the worm forbids otherwise kosher tequila.
Again, the above is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.
Monday, October 05, 2009
The Kohanic Gene
A number of years ago, researchers delighted the Jewish world by discovering that the Y-chromosome of Jewish kohanim points to one unique ancestor. The Y-chromosome is, of course, passed patralinially, and thus can serve as proof of familial relation for males.
The science is fascinating. However, I never felt that the purported religous implications claimed by some were strong at all. Throughout history, there were undoubtedly families who were priestly who, over years of secularism and the pressures of the exile, forgot their lofty status. Certainly, there were also families that accidentally or not, took on the kohanic traditions mistakenly. It seemed too pat, and worked out only too well, that all kohanim tested seemed to point to one ancestor. Support for this reservation can be found in the mishna Midot 5:4, where the Oral Law records the fact that the Jewish High Court had to sometimes sit in judgement on questions of priestly lineage, and would attempt to clarify a family's status: a man who was found to be an authentic Kohen would wear white, and one found to be unpriestly wore black. Furthermore, in Eduyot, 8:7, Rabbi Yehoshua states that in the times of the redemption, Eliyahu the prophet will not come to confirm or deny the legitimacy of families accidentally mixed, but only to do so regarding families that attempted to mix themselves in with higher station willfully. (See Kehati's commentary here that expressly includes the kohanic honor as one of the items that this statement includes.) For all these reasons, the kohanic Y-chromosome was never much more than a curiosity to me. I found the underlying science much more compelling and fascinating than the religous implications.
Today, I have learned that my reasoning to be less than impressed was well-guided. New research seems to agree that there was not one ancestor for the kohanim, but a number of ancestors. Those who feel this to be a blow to the authenticity of the Torah's narrative would do well to remember the line of thought I mentioned in the previous paragraph. For if in 2008, a (for example, reubenic) family is erroneously assumed to be kohanic, they would be, in the eyes of the study, full kohanim, just as authentic kohanim would be. Thus, when the study looks at the Y-chromosomes of true kohanim and faux kohanim that they assume to be true kohanim, they would find that some of these Y-chromosomes trace back 3000 years ago to kohanic roots, and some to reubenic roots. However, because the study in 2008 does not know that the reubenic Y-chromosome is being mistaken for kohanic, it will assume that both Y-chromosomes have equal claim to kehuna, and thus conclude that there are multiple ancestors for the kohanic tribe. This is not a deficiency in the genetics or the science, but an epistemological deficiency; we simply cannot guarantee that everyone who claims (even in good faith) to be a kohen, is indeed a kohen!
Of course, it does not matter when the error was introduced; whenever this occurred, the Y-chromosome of the "new kohen" would automatically join the genetic pool of "known kohanim" and wait patiently to be discovered.
(It is important to note that people who are halachikally Jewish can still come from differring Y-chromosome branches, since Judaism has always accepted converts, even at the time of the Exodus. However, converts could never become kohanim, as this was strictly a birthright.)
Thus, the new study should not at all be seen in any way as denying or disproving the Torah traditions. It is however interesting to note that, "Cohanim Y chromosomes from both Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi Jewish communities, is virtually absent in non-Jews..."