mevaseretzion

Intra-Religious Violence

2012-01-03T05:22:00.000-08:00

Just reported on Ynet, a haredi family has complained to police that their eleven year old boy was attacked in Jerusalem by secular thugs.

Whether or not this story proves true, it is imperative that all Jews recognize that violence directed against children, or indeed, any non-threat, is antithetical to Torah values, and antithetical to secular ethical systems as well. It must be publicly stated that such Jew-on-Jew violence is horrifying and must be stopped.

A School in Beit Shemesh

2011-12-28T23:41:00.000-08:00

The Agudath Israel of America released a statement concerning the violence in Beit Shemesh. Read it here. Here is my response:

many charedi Jews, men and women alike, see a need to take special steps – in their own lives and without seeking to coerce others – to counterbalance the pervasive atmosphere of licentiousness, so as to avoid the degradation of humanity to which it leads.

If increased modesty is expressed by individuals' attempts to avoid situations they feel are improper, that is one thing. If a man feels unable or uninterested in walking on the same sidewalk as a woman, and he switches sides, no one will complain. If a woman chooses to not speak with a man out of a sense of modesty, again, no one will complain (although people may question the motives, value and repercussions these types of behavior have on the individual and on the community).

However, if "special steps" taken include gender-segregated buses, signs asking women to walk on the other side of the street, and an unwillingness to vociferously reject the more radical embodiment of these strictures (such as assault (insults and taunts against adults and, more horrifically, children) and battery (spitting, brick throwing, etc)), then, far more than the "atmosphere of licentiousness" the charedi community wishes to avoid, they contribute to the degradation of humanity.

The true irony is found when considering the very concept stated above in my first paragraph: the idea that as long as one does not impact others with his "special steps" in modesty (or other strictness), one should be allowed to take them. This idea of personal autonomy and freedom comes not from the Torah, but from liberal philosophy.In the past, the danger posed to society from overly strict individual behavior was viewed as damaging no less than overly lax individual behavior. One who deviated too far off the golden mean, the societal norm, in either direction, was herded back to the norm. It is ironic that only in the context of modernity and the liberalism it engenders that the charedi world can support "special steps in their own lives", steps that have no basis in normative Halacha and derive their validity from modernity's "individual freedom".

Finally, while Aguda's condemnation of the violence is welcome, it comes belatedly, at a time when the media has picked up on an old story in Beit Shemesh. This has been going on for months, the segregated buses (and violence in their defense) has been going on for years. Why is the vast majority silent? Why is it only when the media pick up a story that the leaders of the charedi world in Israel feel the need to begin to condemn? Was there nothing to condemn months ago, when the heckling of little girlds started? Was there nothing to condemn years ago, when women were assaulted on buses for not moving to the back?

Could it be that the majority supports the goals of the violence, and therefore, they ignore the means?

Finally, I want to point out that there is a troubling view of today's society as extremely licentious. Judaism has existed and survived in cultures far more explicit and licentious than today's. Just think about ancient Greek or Roman culture, or the 18th century dress and behavior across Western Europe.

Later, Rabbi Yaakov Menken posted a comment responding in part to me. I fisked it, and this comment has yet to be approved by Cross-Currents, even though Yaakov Menken has commented since. Here is the unapproved comment from me:

"

Daniel Weltman

Your comment is awaiting moderation.

December 29, 2011 at 11:31 am

If you condemn the charedi separate buses, and do not condemn those in Korea and Mexico City, you are a bigot.

I guess I am not a bigot then, at least by your standards.

I know you don’t mean to sound this way, but you sound as though you are trying to defend the indefensible. And so:

They didn’t speak fast enough.

They sure didn’t. Women have had bricks thrown at them, been physically (!!) assaulted on buses that are segregated, and little religious girls (albeit not charedi) have been called whores and prostitutes, and yet there has been no backlash from official charedi organizations until now, until the media blitz. In fact, rabbis have said that they refuse to speak out against these activities, because they are not related to them at all. It is sad that it takes what you call a “deliberate provocation…media tactic” to get the ball rolling on some much-needed, sadly missing public charedi outrage.

They dare to operate gender-separate buses.

No, Egged does. They do not operate the buses. If this were a private bus company, things may be a bit different, don’t you think…

They dare to help their own values by suggesting opposite sides of the street before Sukkos, when the crowds and tiny sidewalks of Meah Shearim make physical contact mandatory.

Suggesting? Or enforcing? I think your comment suffers from pollyanism. How about the mob-style forcing of stores to keep the placards about “please only enter modestly dressed” in their windows? What happens to those who refuse, Yaakov? How about Manny’s bookstore? If these actions are really only those of fringe elements, then the complaint of the mainstream charedim is much too late, and too little besides. If not, then I do not really know what point you are making.

All of that means the charedim (including Rav Lipman, who is in Beit Shemesh and has vociferously opposed the Sikrikim) condone their behavior.

שתיקה כהודעה – Silence implies consent. I doubt that anyone would say that any rabbi who “vociferously opposed” the hooligans condones their behavior. Let’s discuss without the false choices.

Deliberate provocation is an acceptable media tactic against them.

See above.

or present a verbal confrontation as violence.

Yaakov, spitting at someone is considered נזיקין in Halacha. It is ironically listed with one who “uncovers a woman’s hair in public”, and has the same compensation to the victim — 400 zuz (quite a sum of money). See Bava Kama 8:6.

Screaming obscenities in public is certainly against the law, and not covered by Free speech when it is disorderly conduct. Particularly when directed at a person in a threatening way, it is assault. It is assault. Throwing feces, rocks, bricks, and other objects at a person or a home is battery and property damage.

When you say “present a verbal confrontation as violence”, do you mean to imply that the above occurrences (some recorded) did not occur?

truly the Jews’ Jews

If by “Jews’ Jews” you mean, finding a demand to react against fringe elements of their society vocally and consistently, and not to allow evil and thuggery to fester in their midst, yes they are Jews. If you mean the colloquial usage, that they are the scapegoat for the people who serve as scapegoats for the rest of the nations, you are simply wrong, and throwing around loaded terms will do nothing to help anyone in the Beit Shemesh situation today.

Rav Soloveitchik and Historical Positivism

2011-12-13T00:58:00.000-08:00

In this post on TorahMusings, Rabbi Wurzburger is quoted as saying: "The Rav’s objection to the employment of modern historic and textual scholarship to ascertain the meaning of halakha reflects not naive traditionalism but highly sophisticated post-modern critical thought. He insists that halakha operate with its own unique canons of interpretation. According to R. Soloveitchik, scientific methods are appropriate only for the explanation of natural phenomena but have no place in the quest for the understanding of the normative and cognitive concepts of halakha, which imposes its own a priori categories, which differ from those appropriate in the realm of science. It is for this reason that the Rav completely ignores Bible criticism and eschews the “positive historical” approach of the “Science of Judaism.”"

Perhaps the use, in the passage quoted above, of the term 'post-modern' is to simply refer to a category of thought that is "after" modernism. After all, Rav Soloveitchik is clear in Halachik Mind that (as pointed out in the passage), to the extent anything can claim the title "true" or "valid" in a post-Kantian world, there are many parallel systems of cognition, which are valid for their field of application. A key element of this is that, within their fields, these systems are valid. This is far from the standard definition of post-Modernism, that apparent realities are nothing more than social constructs, and that narratives take the place of the search for truth.

In fact, Halachik Mind ends up vouching for a methodology of religion and by extension, Halacha, which is essentially scientific: "...it would be fallacious to apply the method of independent philosophy in the field of religion. It would inevitably result in a labyrinth of mysticism. If modern philosophy, in it quest for "independence", has become arbitrary, then religious thought, which is particularly prone to abstruseness, needs be all the more wary of such an alignment. The student of religion, starting from the principle of cognitive pluralism, would act wisely in taking his cue from the scientist rather than the philosopher. The structural designs of religion cannot be intuited through any sympathetic fusion with an eternal essence, but must be reconstructed out of objective religious data and central realities. The uniqueness of the religious experience resides in its objective normative components." (62) We must go from the objective to the subjective, and not the other direction.

However, the scientific method wielded in Halacha must be based on different data points than in common scientific inquiry: legal ones. In Part Four, Rabbi Soloveitchik explains that the very data points of the scientific exploration of religion must be the normative objective components, the legal rules themselves. We start not from an ethical question of "why" but the descriptive question of "what". Instead of putting Halcha up to be constructed out of extra-religious considerations, he claims that Halacha contains the data from which we reconstruct our subjective activity. We blow the shofar, not because it (and only it) reminds us of teshuva; rather, we do teshuva because we recognize that as the subjective origin (and a non-necessary result which we are expected to glean) of the objective commandment (94-96).

This view of Rav Soloveitchik is not, to my mind, necessarily at odds with historical positivism. Nothing in this view fundamentally eschews the historical approach to legal theory and Halacha. Rav Soloveitchik's unwillingness to engage in the "science of Judaism" is much more a function of the prevailing mood in Weimar Germany against historicism. See Gordon's Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy 195n5, and see his reference to David Myers' Historicism and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought. This tendency is aptly summed up: "By the late nineteenth century and into the Weimar period, historicism was seen by many as a grinding force that corroded social values and was emblematic of modern society's gravest ills." (I am not here judging the merits of historicism or the dangers articulated by its critics.) Additionally, the realization that historical positivism would be a tremendous innovation and revolution in standard yeshiva study, to wit, the controversy over Wissenschaft des Judentums, probably also tempered the willingness of many rabbis to engage in it (as commenters point out on the post) . Thus it is not at all his post-Kantian view of reality that led Rav Soloveitchik to reject the historical positivist approach to Halacha, but, ironically, historical, sociological and cultural considerations.

UPDATE:

After discussion with two friends, I realize that there is a need to differentiate between historical positivism as a theory, and historical necessity as an explanation of data points. Historical positivism as a theory states that the historical realities results in the creation of legal principles. For example, the shortage of wood leads to the creation of the Halachik concept of lavud, and the reticence of lenders leads to the creation of the concept of prosbol. The very concept is created out of historical necessity, and Halacha is in a large sense, a function of reactions to socio-historical events instead of a unified legal theory.

On the other hand, even one who rejects these theories on the grounds that Halacha is an objective, conceptual system which is unchanging at its core, would still accept historical data as explanations, not for the creation, but for the development (or discovery) of latent halachik principles into halachik tools or takanot. For example, the concepts at the root of lavud were part of the core halachik system from the beginning. The rule that loans owned by the courts are not subject to cancellation in the sh'mitta year, and the idea that one can pay a partner a certain amount and thus purchase the responsibility for fluctuations (up or down) in the business venture (the foundation of the heter iska), are concepts that are not groundbreaking; they existed in halacha from the very beginning. However, this viewpoint would not discount that the process of the development of halacha is historically contingent. Socio-historic necessity is valid as an explanation as to why the Rabbis decided to innovate the idea that one can give his personal loans to the courts, thus turning them into court-held loans which are not cancelled. The innovation lies in the willingness to turn a personal loan into a court-held one. Once this development is accomplished, application of the age-old idea that court-held loans are not subject to shemitta cancellation is non-controversial. Similarly, once social changes necessitated the chiddush that we may view interest on a loan as a business venture in which a partner purchases responsibility for fluctuations in the business venture's profitability in exchange for a fixed percentage, the application of the heter iska becomes non-controvesial as well.

Thus, historical considerations play a part in the development of the application of core halachik ideas, but they do not engage in the creation of these ideas. This is the point at which Rav Soloveitchik and historical positivists would diverge in principle, ideologically.

Major Events of Jewish History I

2011-11-28T04:14:00.000-08:00

In this post, I will list a skeletal timeline of Jewish History, from the exile of the ten tribes through the Golden Age of Spain. In a future post (probably towards the middle of 2012) I hope to cover from the end of the Golden Age until modern times. Please feel free to make use of this admittedly rough timeline, and please mark your corrections or additions in the comments section.

719 BCE - Exile of 10 tribes of Israel to Assyria
586 BCE - Destruction of the first Temple & Exile of Judea to Babylon
             - Begin Babylonian Exilarch (Jewish leader)
             - from Davidic dynasty (which lasted past 1000 CE)
537 BCE - Babylon conquered by Persia
516 BCE - King Cyrus offers Jews return to Judea
                - begin second commonwealth
500 BCE - Cyrus, Ezra, Nechemia
334 BCE - Persian Judea conquered by Syrian-Greeks
               - Alexander the Great, Hellenization
200 - 150 BCE - Macabees
190 BCE - Book of Ben-Sira (list of heroes, evidence
                - of Neviim as corpus of scripture)
200 - 100 BCE - Dead Sea Scrolls - Evidence of Biblical
                         - Canon and sectarian writings
165 BCE - Hanukah
               - Later Hasmoneans, Hasmonean dynasty
               - Hycran, Queen Salome, Aristobulos
135 BCE - Judeans conquer Edom
                - Political/religious parties of Pharisees, Sadducees
75 BCE - In Parthia (Persian Empire, Babylonia), Hillel leads

67 BCE - Rome annexes Judea, Idumeans (formerly ruled
              - by Judea) become Kings of Israel
40 - 30 BCE - Herod
37 BCE - Rome rules Judea through procurators, eg. Pontius Pilate
100 BCE - 100 CE - Apcocalyptic books - Pseudopygrapha
                               - Philo
                               - John the Baptist
                               - Jesus of Nazareth
70 CE - Destruction of second commonwealth, Temple
           - Massada
           - 1 million Jews in Persia at this time
135 CE - Mishna
             - First citation of Ketuvim, discuss re: Kohelet, Shir Hashirim
             - Canon
132 - 134 CE - Judea: Hadrian reneges on promise to rebuild Temple.
                       - Judea: Rebellion against Rome. Akiva, Bar Kosba
                       - Judea: Betar. Rebellion crushed. Rename J to AC
                       - Judea: Yavneh and Sanhedrin destroyed
135 CE - Judea: Christianity parts ways forever with Judaism. ולמלשינים
150 CE - Judea: Bet Din restarts with Shimon II
100 CE - 300 CE - Jews follow Roman army to future France, Germany
                             - Spain, Portugal inhabited by Jews also
                             - (perhaps from times of King Solomon)
200 CE - Parthia: Rav in Sura, Shmuel in Pumpedita
260 CE - Parthia: Naharda'a destroyed because of Roman-Persian war
300 CE - Constantine turns Rome Christian
325 CE - Council of Nicea Separations between Jews and Christians
429 CE - Judea: Abolition of Patriarch in Judea/Palestine
400 CE - 470 CE - Parthia: R Ashi collates learning: Babylonian Talmud
                             - Parthia: Mazdaism tries force the Jews to immorality
470 CE - 500 CE - Parthia: Mar Zutra, Reish Galuta, rebels, is executed
412 CE - 700 CE - Spain: Jews forced to convert or leave
500 CE - Parthia: Begin Saboraim notes, order, editings to text of Talmud,
             - which they no longer added to
600 CE - Judea: Persians briefly take Palestine, Rome reconquers soon

622 CE - Mohammed, Islam. Destroys Jews of Arabia or exile them
until 450CE - Northern Europe: Jews were farmers
until 650 CE - Become merchants from oppressive
                    - laws in France, Spain, Italy
650 CE - 700 CE - Islam conquers Persia, Palestine, North Africa
711 CE - Mohammedans from North Africa conquer Visigothic Spain
             - Pact of Omar invoked

760 CE - Parthia: Karaism: Anan Ben David and Chanania rebel
             - against Talmud and Geonim.
800 CE - Pact of Omar - Jews allowed to live in Islamic-controlled
             - areas with reduced rights. Yellow patch
850 CE - Central Europe: Rabbeinu Gershom & Takkanot in Mayence
860 CE - Parthia: Geonim
             - Parthia: Siddurim: Rav Amram Gaon's, Rav Saadia Gaon's, Geonic responsa
875 CE - First appearance of Sambatyon & Eldad the Danite story
500 CE - 900 CE - Judea: Cantillation
                            - Judea: Vowel system (Tiberian massorah)
                            - Judea: Midreshei Agada, Piyyutim
500 CE - 1100 CE - Europe: General goodwill between Jew and Christian.
                                  - Laws against Jews but not practically enforced.
                                  - Jews were merchants, government functionaries,
                                  - eg. Charlamagne
750 CE - 1240 CE - Khazars led by Jewish convert king
900 CE - Parthia: Rav Saadia Gaon saves Judaism
             - from disintegration from Karaites, among others.
             - Unifies Jews, becomes Gaon of Sura
970 CE - 1038 CE - Rav Sherira and Rav Hai Gaon
                              - Decline of Babylonian community's leadership role
1000 CE - Our earliest extant Torah Scrolls date from around this time
1040 CE - France: Rashi made knowledge the rule
               - and ignorance the exception for Jews. Emphasis on study
               - Fez: Spanish School of Talmudism
               - Rif. Emphasis on halacha
1096 CE - Central Europe: First Crusade
1144 CE - Central Europe: Second Crusade
1189 CE - Central Europe: Third Crusade
               - York becomes a second Massada
900 CE - 1200 CE - Spain: Golden Age for Jews
1092 CE - Spain: Ibn Eztra, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, R' Bahya ibn Pekuda
1135 CE - Spain: Rambam comes from North Africa to flee persecution
1200 CE - 1400 CE - Western and Central Europe:
                                 - Slow process of Expulsion of Jews
1144 CE - Norwitch - first blood libel
1200 CE - Rabbi Yehuda Hachasid - Sefer Chasidim
1239 CE - France: Talmud burned publicly by wagonload
1290 CE - Jews expelled from England
1306 CE - Jews expelled from France
1200 CE - 1400 CE - "Silver Age" of Spain
1212 CE - Moors lose Spain to Christian armies
               - Cultural center of Jews moves to Provence
1250 CE - Spain: Zohar introduced by Moses de Leon
1263 CE - Spain: Disputation between Ramban and Pablo Christiani

R Judah Halevi and Asceticism

2011-11-23T01:46:00.000-08:00

Rabbi Yehuda Halevi (turn of 11th century in Spain) wrote the Kuzari, a work of original and traditional Jewish philosophy. Rabbi David Cohen (הרב הנזיר), in the middle of the 20th century, gave a series of lectures upon this book in the Merkaz Harav yeshivah. His notes were edited and have been printed as a three volume commentary on the Kuzari. In this edition of the Kuzari, Rabbi Cohen points out that in his earlier years, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi tended towards asceticism. It is clear from the Kuzari (2:56), however, that the author changed his mind.

The Kuzari makes a passionate case against asceticism or פרישות, when he states: "It is not proof of the Godly [within a person] when he is overly careful about pronunciation, or lifts his eyebrows and squeezes his eyes shut, or engages in profligate pleadings, prayers, gesticulations and pronouncements which have no action backing them up. Rather the pure conscience is proven by actions whose commitment is hard for a person to accomplish, but he nevertheless acts upon them with motivation and love, with a goal of closeness to God..."

He goes on to describe the details and minutia of practical commandments not only which lead a person to ethical life and performance of loving-kindness towards others, but also allow a person the ability to become intimate with the Creator through עבודה, service as commanded by God. The choosing of one's own path towards closeness to God is the foundation of idolatry, for Rabbi Yehuda. It is only through meticulous performance of commandments from God, active physical expressions of closeness to God on his terms, that we are able to serve Him.

Centuries after Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, Rabbi Dr Eliezer Berkovits would write in God, Man and History, that, "the task of relating the physical component of the human being to God can be accomplished only by a divine law...the body is not accessible to logical reasoning. One can only teach it by making it do things. One does not learn to swim by reading books on swimming technique, nor does one become a painter by merely contemplating the styles of different schools. One learns to swim by swimming, to paint by painting, to act by acting. One learns how to do anything by doing it. This applies nowhere more strictly than in the realm of ethical action. The only way of educating the biophysical instrument of action is by making it perform."

The ascetic drive in Man can only bring him so far upon the path of service of the Divine. It is only physical, God-commanded, theonomic practice which allows the whole being of a human to serve God. The pre-occupation with asceticism is to engage in a never-ending enterprise which, if allowed, will easily prevent the whole human from accomplishing his religious and God-ordained goals.

Isaiah I

2011-09-25T22:31:00.001-07:00

The book of Yeshaya starts during the reign of Judean kings, when Jerusalem sits secure and physically safe. However, the prophet looks to the moral state of Israel and finds the nation terribly wanting. The complaints listed by Yeshaya are all of the moral and ethical type. In fact, the language he employs makes it clear that the practice of the Jewish ceremonial-religious service has not lagged. By asking, למה לי רוב זבחיכם, Yeshaya admits that the sacrificial service in the temple is uninterrupted. When he says, חדש ושבת קרא מקרא, he implies that the societal structure is one which still maintains outward practice of the law of Moses.

Yeshaya complains, though, that the nation has lost its sense of social justice. The judges of Israel are corrupt; they do not seek justice. Halacha, instead of having as its goals good and "ways of pleasantness", has been turned into a tool for everything but that. The judges, those who are charged with the direction of the courts and halacha, have become corrupted. They do not judge correctly for יתומים, and they ignore the plight of widows (v 23). This corruption is the necessary and sufficient cause for the destruction of Jewish society. Courts no longer dispense justice, they contribute to injustice.

Moreover, Judean society has placed a premium on religious activity and piety, and has allowed expressions of these to overcome and hide the sins of the judiciary (and the judicial conscience within each individual). For example, in v 4: נאצו את קדוש ישראל נזרו אחור. Radak and Ibn Ezra bring as an explanatory verse on the word נזרו, the verse וינזרו מקדשי בני ישראל. The verb נ.ז.ר means to withdraw, to remove oneself. In the context of the Pentateuchal verse, this is a desirable action. The priests are exhorted to withdraw from taking קדשי בני ישראל, and doing so is right. The very commandment of נזיר, in which a person withdraws from worldly pleasure to focus on inner, spiritual development, is generally seen as a good thing (even if according to some the very need to do so is a negative). However, Judean society in the times of Yeshaya had perverted this concept of holy withdrawl, נזירות של קדושה, and twisted it into נזירות של רשעות, withdrawl from קדוש ישראל Himself. They have removed themselves from intimate and immanent communion with God through their didactic observance of details, while allowing themselves to ignore the injustice and evil of כלו אהב שחד ורדף שלמנים (v 23).

From this, comes the thesis of the prophets in general: החפץ ה' בזבחים ועולות כשמוע בקול ה'? Does God really want your offerings and automaton service in His Temple, if that means you ignore the moral and ethical spirit of His commands? Torah and Mitzvot are supposed to make us moral people, Halacha should make us cringe at injustice and in its face, burn with the fire of justified rage. The commands of God are supposed to make us better people. If they do not, then the result is exile and punishment.

The promise of God in v 25-26 is clear. Which enemies will God take vengeance upon? The judges and politicians, and those elements within indviduals that allowed injustice and perversion of social norms. Those who are charged with social justice are the ones who will be corrected, along with a society that allowed their perversion. Only upon justice will the righteous city be so called, and the returnees will enjoy צדקה (v 27).

When Israel returns to God, it begins by returning to the orphan and the widow. When halacha does not countenance the undue suffering of the innocent, then can Israel be redeemed.

Torah and Truth

2011-09-01T01:28:00.000-07:00

(UPATE: In response to feedback from a reader, I decided that this post probably deserves a disclaimer. The topic it addresses is always a difficult topic to approach. It seems to border on a grey area which for many, may tread on ground thought of as Reform. First, let me say that the main problems with Reform Judaism are its antinomianism and its willingness to reject the giving of Torah by God directly to Moshe at Mt Sinai. I certainly deny both these stances: First, the Laws of the Torah (and the Oral Law and Rabbinic Traditions) are in force and every Jew is religiously obligated to follow them. Second, the Jewish people's collective experience at Mt Sinai is a crucial article of faith that I have no intention of denying or discussing in this present post.

Finally, allow me to draw a comparison to the present essay's discussion of the stories of the book of Genesis and parts of Exodus, and the midrashic discussion of the book of Job. There is ample support for the notion that the entire book of Job is an allegory; it does not purport to present a historical discussion of the life of a man named Job; rather, it tells a story with moral and ethical lessons. Additionally, keep in mind that the Rambam is willing to take various stories of the forefathers as prophecies rather than literal occurences (for example, the three angels appearing to Avraham after his circumcision). It is in the above light and the above vein that the following discussion of Genesis and Exodus should be taken.)

As science and the studies of history and archeology continue to progress, the Torah seems under attack from many different directions. Was the world created in six days? Is it really only 5,767 years old? Was there a global flood? These questions and many others like them have caused many to doubt the authenticity of the Torah. They have spawned countless apologetic re-interpretations and explanations, trying to resolve the apparent problems in our tradition¹.

Some quite sophisticated mathematic acrobatics have been produced reconciling the six days of creation with different time-lines proposed by theoretical scientists. Heated debate raises questions on these types of work. While it is sometimes exciting to observe the ingenuity of such interpretations, they are unnecessary².

As Rashi makes clear in his commentary on the first verse in B'reshit, the Torah is not a book of history. The purpose of God's word is not to tell us what was, but what shall be in our realm of thought and action. Torah is a book of ethical instruction. It is to teach us how to act, and how to live. And so, Rashi states that the purpose of the story of creation is to impress upon us the absolute dominion God has over creation, and explain that Jewish rights to the land of Israel are divine. The question of exactly how the world was created, while of possible esoteric value, is not the thrust of the creation story.

Indeed, the concept that the Torah existed before the creation of the world, and served as its blueprint, is certainly not to be taken literally. A basic tenant of Judaism is that God imbued Man with free will. The Torah could not have 'destined' our nation to the stories of the spies or the golden calf written within it. Even the concept of Adam's sin being predetermined would raise problems.

A Rabbi (זצ"ל) who taught me during my semicha studies agrees and quotes midrashim to the effect that the Torah is a unified, pure ray of light. It is the kernel and essence of truth in this world. It is in this regard that, 'אורייתא וקודשא בריך הוא חד הוא'. When exposed to the physical world God created, this light is refracted, much as sulight is broken up by a prism. The more complex the world, the more refraction occurs. In the world of Eden, the essence of truth was broken into one positive and one negative commandment. After the flood and the sins of humanity, it was broken into seven commands. Finally, it settled in our present situation of 613 commandments. The important point here is that the practical form of the divine Torah, in a different reality, could conceivably be different.

My teacher mentions in his writings the possibility that the book of B'reshit and parts of Sh'mot was written by the forefathers (he bases this on Psikta Rabati Chapter 3). It was the material studied by the Jews in Egypt. When the nation gathered at Mt. Sinai, God canonized the teachings of the forefathers and made it part of the divine Torah he imparted to Moshe³. It is certainly clear that our forefathers were not historians or scientists. Just as the people around them, they took for granted certain versions of the history of the world, and used them to teach moral lessons to their children. They even took laws from surrounding cultures (such as yibbum and certain civil and criminal laws) and, with certain changes, made them part of their teachings. These teachings and rules were canonized at Mt. Sinai for the ethical and legal lessons they contained. This was a natural way to teach these truths to a nation that was used to being taught lessons based on stories from the past.

Thus, the questions of historicity or science and Torah really are non-issues. The Torah's purpose is not to teach history or science. One might even say that the Canonical genre transcends the concepts of truth and falsehood. God utililzed the universal stories, the world's wisdom and the common idioms to convey to the Jews the eternal essence of truth that is that unadulterated ray of Torah. It is a generalized version of Rabbi Yishmael's "דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם", that the Torah is written in the lyric of the time in which it was given. (If one thinks about it, it is impossible to imagine otherwise; how, then, would the people receiving it understand it?!)

In the first book of his Guide, Rambam states that the Torah does, in fact, say things that are not true, in order to allow the people who received it to more readily understand it. He brings as an example the phrase 'the hand of God'. This anthropomorphic statement, implies the Rambam, was not naturally understood by most Jews to be an allegory. On the contrary, the majority took it literally! And although it is false that God has a hand, says Rambam, it is written in the Torah in order to make it easily understood.

In the same way, we may say that the Torah contains stories that may not have literally, historically, happened. There is not even a need (nor desire) to allegorize a story if it is proven to be unfounded. Although our forefathers may have believed in their literal truth, we do not have to in order to gain the true point that they are meant to teach. They are there to teach lessons in an approachable way to the Jewish nation that received it from God. The actual facts are simply vehicles to drive home the main thrust, which is the moral lesson and divine command. (This is not to say that we must or even should deny the literal historical occurence of these stories. Rather, what it means is that if they are ever somehow proven to have not historically have occurred in the way the Torah describes, this would not shake one iota of their import, lessons and ultimate truth value. The truth value of these stories lies not in their historical accuracy but in the lessons and molding of Jewish and global values. This remains in effect whether or not the stories in their literal form occurred. With this in mind, the goal of the stories shifts from literal historicity to moral teaching; this is perhaps a deeper understanding of Rashi's statement that Torah is not a history book. In addition, it causes the stories to transcend the binary dichotomy of truth and falsehood; the truth value of these stories no longer rests on their literal historical accuracy. They are transcendentally true (and valuable) even if they did not occur, by virtue of the noble and ennobling lessons they plant in the spirit of their audience.)

This view creates a theological foundation that is more flexible and thus more powerful than others. Science and history may lay claim to evidence that contradicts parts of our tradition. However, with our thesis in mind, these questions from fact become non-questions, ones that attack the outer garments of our faith as if these attacks are aimed at the beating heart. However, the heart continues to beat, and the stories themselves maintain their vitality, for their purpose is not historical accuracy but moral education.

While I cannot ensure that this essay will not be misinterpreted anyway, allow me to point out one caveat immediately. This post in no way denies the divinity of the Torah; on the contrary, it strengthens it. The practical laws of the Torah are certainly not under discussion here. They are the commands of God to His world. Also, the authority of the Oral Law is certainly not attacked. This discussion is limited to a study of how God chose to couch His teachings to the world at the time He revealed them.

This approach obviates the need to harmonize the literal word of the Torah with the latest scientific or archeological find. The Torah's lessons are ethical and theological, not scientific or historical. The more we internalize this, the faster we will find peace of faith in our modern world.
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¹ Many thanks to S. His input was invaluable for this post.

² Dr Wolowelsky's note at Tradition Online has recently come to my attention (after writing this essay). See footnote 9 at the end of his article at Tradition Online for expansion on this point, and the article in general, which agrees in large part with my essay here.

³ Also post-publication of this essay, see an explanation of Rabbi Emanuel Rackman's Bibilical theology, here. Also, see אגרות ראיה חלק א אגרת קל"ד which agrees with the thrust of this essay.

Peace as a Meta-Value

2011-07-14T23:57:00.000-07:00

After zealously defending the honor of God and the Jewish people in an act of extra-judicial killing, Pinchas is blessed at the beginning of our portion with the covenant of peace. The blessing bestowed upon the zealot seems at odds with the profound violence of his act. Does the juxtaposition of a graphic act of killing and the promise of peace not seem vulgar? Upon further reflection, however, it may become clear that this vulgarity is a function of our general misunderstanding of peace as a value.

Also, another curiosity exists in the verse. Pinchas is promised a "covenant of peace". Should the verse not say "blessing of peace"? What is the meaning of this covenant? The same question applies to the mishna. The mishnah states in Uktzin: אין לך כלי שהוא מחזיק ברכה אלא שלום, שנאמר ה'--עוז, לעמו ייתן; ה', יברך את עמו בשלום. There is no vessel that holds blessing better than peace. Rabbi Tubi of Kerem B'Yavneh asks: why is it that peace is referred to as a vessel that holds blessing? Should not peace be the blessing itself?

The standard working definition of "peace" is the absence of conflict or violence. Nations that do not make war are at peace. However, upon closer examination, this definition breaks down. Would we call it peace, if World War II had come to an end of hostilities with the Axis powers destroying all opponents? That would be a cessation of war, but most would agree that their intuitive sense of what peace means would not be fulfilled by this outcome. What is it, then, that we really mean when we speak of peace?

Rabbi Hirsch points out that peace is not simply the absence of violence. It is rather the completion experienced when the world is right - when the world is on the path to fulfilling its mission to God. Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits discusses the purpose of the world in his God, Man and History. Free will is given uniquely to Man in order for humanity to take responsibility for what goes on down on earth. Only Man can choose to do good, go against their basic animalistic nature and live the higher moral and ethical life. Man is charged with the task of conquering with his free will his nature, and submitting his inclinations for evil to the good commanded by God.

Three times did man fail. Adam and Eve's fall in Eden was the first. Then, sin of the generations leading up to the flood caused God to try again, giving the world a fresh chance at holy greatness in the seed of Noah. In their third failure at the Tower of Babel, God decided to install a priestly nation, the Jews, to shine the light of the moral and ethical greatness and purpose of existence upon the rest of the nations.

Now that we have a basic understanding of the purpose of the world, we can answer the first question. If humanity had given the Nazis control over the world, there may have been an absence of war. However, there would certainly not be a concert of the real world with the word of God. Hitler made it his mission to destroy the two curses he said the Jews bestowed upon humanity: the curse of circumcision and the curse of conscience. Hitler wanted the social darwanistic, Nietzschean "might makes right", power of the sword to rule the world. This proposed destruction of Godly ethics and the destruction of the Jewish people would have cast the world into a shadow of darkness from which it would not have recovered. Without the light of the Jewish Torah and its ethical teachings, there would be no hope for humanity. And so, our intuition is right to tell us that Nazism over the world would have been far from peace. It would have been peace's antithesis. It was the world's fight to the last drop of blood against Hitler which was, paradoxically, its only chance at true peace.

And in the same vein, it is precisely the act of Pinchas, violent though it was, that brought about a semblence of true peace. Zimri's action was a direct rebellion against the kingdom of God and the very purpose of Israel's earthly charge. And it was Pinchas who stemmed the tide of that rebellion, and brought the Jewish world back into harmony with the commands and ethics of God.
As for the second question: why does God give a "covenant" of peace to Pinchas? A blessing is a gift that is uncontingent. However, a covenant implies a challange to the receiver, that he deserve and live up to it.
Each individual human is a microcosm of the world entire. Just as peace is a meta-value that provides correct and appropriate expression of the various and diverging values beneath it for the world, so does peace act as a meta-value for the individual, categorizing and applying various character traits appropriately for the service of God. Peace is not a value in and of itself. It is a meta-value that acts as a harbor for the other values and emotions that Man subscribes to, providing appropriate dock for each one. When one finds the appropriate use for each value, he is able to maintain stability in the face of diverse situations and conditions.

This is the meaning of the covenant of peace that God forges with Pinchas. Pinchas has demonstrated, by his violent actions on behalf of God’s honor, his ability and willingness to use the value of קנאות, zealotry, at the appropriate time. However, God needed to teach him of the balance that is necessary in life. Zealotry was appropriate here, but elsewhere it will be inappropriate. Therefore, God gave Pinchas the priesthood. כהונה is a mantle that requires the priest to be totally and unreservedly at one and in love with his brothers. Indeed, a kohen must feel this specifically, every day, when he blesses the nation באהבה. By making granting Pinchas the priesthood, God added to his natural zealotry the necessary counter-balance, meek willingness and fore-bearance to all. With this equilibrium, Pinchas is able to enter into covanental שלום, complete wholeness resulting in true peace, with God.

Aharon, the archetypical priest, is a shining example of the opposite personality. He was so loving, so full of חסד, that he participated in the Golden Calf with the people, all the while trying desperately to temper their sin. His overflowing love and willingness to give in was his Achilles heel, and is the only sin which we find him explicitly culpable for. To balance this value, God commands that it be him and his tribe who kill those who worshipped the idol. Perhaps this is also a reason for the prominent place the priest has in the array of war according to the Torah. Pinchas and Aharon represent one value that must be tempered with the other in order to bring about שלום, peace. Indeed, when they reach their perfection, each is an archetype of peace – Aharon the רודף שלום, and Pinchas, he who is granted בריתי שלום.

The same lesson is furthered in our haftarah. Eliyahu, prophet par excellence, leaves Jerusalem, his ministry largely failed. He finds himself in a desert, and, at a moment of personal and ministerial crisis, he calls out to God, declaring himself a קנאי and wishing for death. God provides him food and water, and then reveals a prophecy to him: a whirlwind, then an earthquake, and finally a consuming fire. Yet God is not to be found in these. In the stillness that follows, a small voice is heard. The metaphor is clear: sometimes, it is not in aggrandized, noisy and powerful displays of zeal, but in meek willingness to fore-bear in which the path to God can be found. However, Eliyahu is too much a zealot, and he again wishes for death. God realizes that Eliyahu is no longer suited to his ministry, and directs him to choose a successor.

The background story in this haftarah is recognizable in the later prophet, Yonah. After prophesying to Ninveh, he goes to the desert, where he asks, as did Eliyahu, for death. God provides him a tree for sustenance and shade, and then allows a worm to devour it. Again, the lesson teaches the prophet to recognize the need for mercy as opposed to zealous justice only. In contrast to Eliyahu, Yonah learns the lesson, and the Yalkut Shimoni completes the story that the prophet leaves unfinished, saying “he fell on his face and pleaded that God treat the world with mercy!”

The contrast of Aharon and Pinchas in the Torah and Eliyahu and Yonah in the Nevi’im certainly bear out the lesson of שלום. It is not enough to be zealous or meek. One must be both, at the appropriate time for each.

The lesson of שלום is not a simple one. We may find zeal and fore-bearance touted as the correct response to various occasions strewn throughout Jewish history and Rabbinic literature. God Himself is sometimes portrayed acting with strict justice, as when punishing the city of Sodom, rejecting the pleas for mercy from Avraham, and at other times, He is portrayed as acting with tender fore-bearance, such as when he waits patiently for the repentence of the idolatrous Ninveites. God is zealous for his honor when he kills the sons of Aharon when they offer a forbidden incense-sacrifice, and yet on the other hand, he is so self-effacing that he permits His holy name to be erased to reconcile the estranged husband and wife. We can often lose sight of the larger picture of peace as a meta-value throughout the year, as we become preoccupied with the values that make it up. It is common for us to feel the strength of mercy and its all-encompassing purification during the High holidays to be the only way to ever act, and yet then to feel the absolute zeal of Pinchas when we read the parasha of Balak a few months later. How then, in the face of contradictory evidence, are we to decide the true path to tread, in order to correctly apply the zeal of Pinchas and the self-effacement of Aharon appropriately, so that we may be inductees to the covenant of true peace?

When conflict arises, and we must engage, we may ask ourselves a critical question: would showing fore-bearance to the adversary destroy the moral and ethical fabric of our Torah? Would it destroy the soul of mankind? This question needs to be asked in every era and its answer may be different depending on the time. If the answer is yes, then there is no choice but to zealously set forth in battle, adorned with the values of Pinchas. For if we do not, the kindness and meekness we display will simply be the cause of the downfall of the task of Judaism in this world, to let the light of the Torah shine forth for mankind. If, for example, we had taken Gandhi’s advice to German Jewry in the 30’s and commit mass suicide as a non-violent protest to Hitler’s designs, the very ethics for which the world was created would be gone. If the allies had decided that, in order to avoid war at all cost, they would submit to the Nazi plan and allow Germany to rule over all, perhaps the most immediate immanence of war would have been avoided for a time; however, this would not bring peace, this would not bring a situation where good and God’s will prevail. On the contrary, it would bring darkness and savagery, and all that the morality of Torah sets about to eradicate from the world. With this possibility on the horizon, the task of Judaism and indeed, of all that is good in humanity, is to fight to the last drop of blood. Even within this just war there is peace, the peace of mind of a world that will not bow to evil, but stands up for God and good.

To use a more contemporary example, we may consider the “peace” process being shoved down Israel’s throat for the past 20 years. When an adversary explicitly states his desire to destroy your nation, fore-bearance and meekness, concessions and compromise is wrong. Giving in to this enemy irretrievably negates your very right to exist, and by extension, your claim to a moral code that is necessary for the world. As the midrash says, those who fight against Israel are really using Israel to fight against God.

Back to our portion, Pinchas’s killing of those who, at a critical time in Israel’s history, sought to destroy the morality and purity of the Jewish nation, was an act of peace precisely because inaction would have shattered those ideals without which the world is not worthy of existence.

On the other hand, if the answer to our critical question is no, and fore-bearance will not endanger the values of the Torah, then it is possible to utilize the value of חסד, meekness and fore-bearance, and Aharon’s technique of winning over an adversary with love.

In fact, far too often, we may find ourselves arguing with others and sure of our pure intentions, defending God’s honor, when it is in reality only our own honor which is at stake. These situations are ones where the proper path is that of Aharon, leaving the zeal of Pinchas for other times.

The story of Pinchas is here for us to learn from. While zealotry has its place, we must make sure that it is appropriate. Far too often, we stand upon principle when the only principle is personal pride. In order to be people of שלום, a nation of true peace, we must internalize the complexity of each situation, and choose the correct value. When we do so, we make ourselves privy to the true brotherhood of God, where each thing is done for the sake of heaven and with the purpose of bringing about the ultimate purpose, a world run in harmony with God’s plan, a covenant of peace.

Redemption of the Land

2011-06-16T01:26:00.000-07:00

or, Apropos to the spies of Parashat Shelach

Leviticus 25:25 discusses the situation where a person has to sell his homestead in the land of Israel. Relations of the impoverished are expected to buy back the home or land, so that the land not be lost to the family. Interestingly, the Or Hachayim takes this opportunity to discuss the ultimate redemption of the Land.

At the culmination of his essay, he says that, "the redemption of the Land [with this double entendre he implies the final redemption of the nation of Israel] will begin when the souls of the righteous stir within them. They will ask themselves, is it really enough for us to remain outside, exiled from the table of our Father? How can we be satisfied with life in this world, when it is devoid of that divine communion? These righteous ones will begin to loathe the perceived glamor and luxury of life outside the Land. They will be gripped by a spiritual desire to perfect their actions in the Land, and thus redeem Israel. In this way will God affect the redemption of His land and people.

The leaders of the people and the great ones of the Jewish nation are destined to give an accounting of why they were not motivated thus, and it is from them that God will demand redress for the shame of His desolate house [a double entendre referencing the ruins of the Temple, and the poor man's house that is the subject of the verse]."

Providence and Evil

2011-06-08T22:48:00.000-07:00

On Shavuot, I was thinking about divine providence and the concept of evil. I would like to share a thought that may not be novel, but certainly seemed eye-opening to me (perhaps mostly due to the early hour of morning at which it occurred).

Rambam in the Guide accepts the idea (mostly found in Yerushalmi, and rejected in Bavli, see Y Elman's essay on rabbinic contributions to a philosophy of suffering in the Orthodox Forum series) that there is no suffering without sin. However, Rambam claims that the measure of divine providence experienced by a person is a direct result of the intellectual occupation with God. When his mind wanders, providence does too, and this is when evil can befall him. It seems clear that Rambam views the all too human proclivity to distraction from enraptured intellectual intimacy with God as the mechanism by which a person becomes available to the vagaries of the natural world and thus evil. Ramban replaces intellectual occupation with the more mystical d'vekut, cleaving to God, but it is the same idea.

Rav Saadia Gaon's view is less absolute. In Emunot V'Deot, he first states that most suffering can be understood as serving the purpose of punishment for past sins, or making the subject more worthy of reward, or a test for the subject. However, he also states that free will allows a person to plan a murder. However, in an occasionalistic passage, he explains that while Man can commit the act of murder (say by pulling a trigger), only God can cause death (the gun firing correctly and the bullet hitting its mark). Finally, he leaves wiggle room for cases that defy these rules by stating that divine providence does not abrogate the need for precaution and does not justify recklessness¹: a person must take care to avoid known dangers and things of that nature (this last part is similar to the Bavli's caveats of luck, קביעה הזיקה, עידן דריתחא, etc).

It is interesting that though Rambam views evil and a lack of divine providence as products of sin, the sin which causes them cuts to the very core of what it means to be human. It is impossible to take suffering and evil away from the human condition, precisely because their causes are part of what it means to be human. The same idea is paradoxically accepted by the Bavli's (and to a lesser extent, Rav Saadia's) general conclusions which claim that there is suffering without reason. The world around Man, whether by nature, demonology, luck or astrology, can affect humans in negative ways that God does not always halt; nature often is left to run its course.

Essentially, as R Elman concludes, it is our inability to come to definite answers regarding these questions that leaves the Bavli and Rambam to an open ended philosophy of suffering, which, while trying to lay ground rules, leaves enough space for the reality witnessed around us, of things often countering these rules.

A similar open ended, non-answer appears in the midrashim and kinnot of the 10 martyrs, עשרה הרוגי מלכות. At the very climax of the suffering of the sainted rabbis, heavenly angels cry out to God, "is this the reward of Torah?!" This is a simple demand for divine justice in our world that is familiar to anyone who has witnessed suffering, especially that of a child. Is this the justice of God?!

It always bothered me that God does not answer the angels with words of comfort, or explanations regarding the world to come, of future reincarnation and dispensation of ultimate justice. God thunders back, "this is my decree, and if I hear another word, I shall destroy the whole world!" Why does God answer in this way?

I think perhaps the response of God (as imagined by the פייטן) leaves a very important imbalance or unease in the minds of readers. Yes, there is injustice and you have just witnessed it. Now, God will not provide you with comfort and make you feel good about it, for injustice is implied in the very free will that makes this world worth living! Injustice is woven into the fabric of our existence, and we are not to find comfort or solace from it. On the contrary, we must feel the tension, the evil, the wrong about it so acutely, for it is our task to fight it with every ounce of our strength. Any validation or justification for the evil or suffering which we witness weakens our resolve to fight it to the end. Although intellectually we know of the world to come, and future divine retribution, and we may discuss theodicy when we have nothing else to do, we are not to allow that to assuage our moral outrage at evil. And so, precisely at the times when injustice enflames our instinct for justice, at precisely those times, we are tasked not to explain away the injustice, but to fight it!

It seems to me that this is the response of the Bavli and Rambam as well: although we have a partial understanding of divine providence and the causes of suffering, we cannot have a full understanding; that is not within our power. What we are able to do, and this is our task, is realize that sometimes things will not fit in our philosophical boxes, and recognize the divinely mandated command to be His partners in perfecting the world: heal the sick, conquer disease, set up ordered and ethical societies, punish evil, reward good. We complete the intentionally unfinished business of creation by fighting injustice, destroying evil, and mitigating suffering as best we can.

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¹ Tangentially, Rav Saadia responds to those who rely on bitachon in a reckless manner by saying that if one believes in the concept of bitachon, they are essentially accepting the concept that God runs this world. In that case, he states, it would be a profound folly to believe that this gives them license to ignore the laws of cause and effect, which are the practical way that God causes the world to run according to His plan. Faith in God leads to wanton disregard for careful, planned living only in the most foolish of minds. See chapter 12 of Sefer Hap'rishut Hash'lema, which forms a sub-composition in treatise ten of Emunot V'deot.

Thread of Kindness

2011-06-01T23:11:00.000-07:00

Upon a cursory reading of the book of Ruth, it may be hard to perceive why this simple, seemingly provincial story was canonized as part of the Bible. However, upon deeper consideration of the themes present in this megilah, universal lessons are revealed, which make our heroine, Ruth worthy not only of the canon, but of serious study, and her book as a moral text which sheds light on the social and religious bonds that give strength and versatility to a healthy society.

Of the many themes available in the book, this essay will focus upon that of חסד, loving-kindness. This word recurs repeatedly in Ruth, and, indeed, sets the motif of kindness playing a central role. While the firm, legal strictures of Halachah give a baseline by which we measure our actions, it is לפנים משורת הדין, extra-legal kindness which decides the survival of a person, family or society at large. Halacha cannot legislate each and every way in which one must help his fellow, but this does not weaken the importance of such non-legally required actions. Indeed, כופין על מידת סדום (see תוס' בבא בתרא יב: ד"ה כגון). It is this necessary (though unlegislated) חסד which forms a parallel structure which unifies the book of Ruth. On the one hand, we see Elimelech and the results of his actions, and on the other, we see Ruth and Boaz, and the effects of their activities.

At the beginning of Ruth, we are introduced to Elimelech, one of the leaders of the generation. The Malbim, echoing the midrash, explains that as a result of the famine, the poor would throw themselves before the rich, demanding sustenance. Elimelech fled this situation, fearing that his whole fortune would be consumed before the multitudes. Although one is not required to become poor himself by distributing all of his wealth to the needy, Elimelech is viewed as a selfish and flawed character by the midrash. "Anyone who turns a blind eye from those who need charity, is as though he has no God," quotes Malbim. Perhaps by the strict letter of the law, Elimelech cannot be faulted for not giving his all, on a חסד level, he failed. A famine, a time when society is at the verge of collapse, is precisely when greatness is required, when going above and beyond the call of simple duty is demanded. (We leave aside the sin of leaving the land of Israel, for which Elimelech is called to task by חז"ל. Even had he not left, his relative stinginess would remain reason for rebuke.)

Instead, Elimelech leaves his people and settles temporarily in Moav. And in the familiar irony of מדה כנגד מדה, as he forsook Judean society, leaving it to crumble, so does his own family security and cohesion begin to disintegrate. Elimelech dies, and his sons marry outside of the faith. They also, eventually, die, and leave their mother bemoaning her fate, telling her friends from happier times, "do not call me Naomi [= pleasant], rather call me Bitter, for God has made my life exeedingly bitter." (1:20) Judea thrives again, despite Elimelech's abandonment, for God has not abandoned the Jews; however, He seems to have abandoned the family of Elimelech. (This is reminiscient of another Jewish heroine, Esther, being warned precisely of this possible result by Mordechai, "...for if you are silent now [and choose not to use your position as queen to help your bretheren], salvation and comfort will be given to the Jews from another source, while you and your father's house will be lost." (Esther 4:14))

The Bible sets Elimelech as an example of someone who shied away from חסד. He went as far as the law required, ignored the larger picture of the situation regarding the starving Jews of the time, and refused to be swayed by the historical context of his actions into going beyond the letter of the law, into the realm of loving-kindness. For society cannot hope to exist by virtue of the letter of the law. Mutual consideration and feelings of extra-legal responsibility towards one another are critical in order for a nation to function. Avot declares (5:10) that "what is mine is mine and what is yours is yours...this is the trait of Sodom." When we think that strict legal possession should decide who gets a bite of bread, without considering our liability towards others, we exhibit the features of corruption, callousness and evil; in a word, Sodom. By acting in this way, Elimelech invited upon himself and his immediate family the very consequences he would have allowed to befall his nation.

How does one redeem a family whose lives, honor and wealth are deteriorated by a lack of חסד? This is the main question of the book of Ruth. The tragic tale of Elimelech is a preamble to a series of particular events which lead a weak and seemingly fogotten family back up to the position of kings. How is this accomplished? The answer is our heroine, Ruth, and hero, Boaz.

Ruth and Orpah, the widows of Naomi's sons, both insist upon going with her. This is the natural, socially expected loyalty of daughter-in-law to her new family. Especially in patriarchal social orders such as Moav and Judea, a marriage makes the wife a part of the husband's father's home. These two Moavite women performed their social responsibility by travelling with Naomi. However, when she beseeches them to return to their fathers' homes, Ruth and Orpah are freed from this responsibility. Orpah returns home. However, Ruth goes beyond the call of duty, refusing to abandon her poor, helpless and lonely mother-in-law. She declares her determination to stay with her until death. This is the first act of חסד, kindness beyond that which is required, and suddenly, Naomi is not so lonely, and not so helpless. Ruth has placed Naomi's physical and emotional well-being above the tempting comforts of her old Moavite home.

However, it does not stop there. As pointed out by others, Naomi must have been familiar with the laws of לקט, שחכה, פאה, and מעשר עני. As the wife of one of Israel's wealthiest, she probably witnessed the poor avail themselves of these in her husband's fields many times. However, precisely because of her wealthy past and subsequent shameful poverty, she is embarrassed, and does not even suggest that she and Ruth could find sustenance in the "Poor Laws" of the Torah. And so, Ruth takes the initiative in an unfamiliar social order and religious milieu, learning of these laws. She tells Naomi that she will bear the burden of shame; after all, what shame is there in a lowly convert-widow collecting forgotten gleanings in the fields of the wealthy? This is a second point where the megilah goes out of its way to point out the חסד Ruth continues to perform for her mother-in-law.

And yet again. Naomi, encouraged by Boaz's interest in Ruth, suggests that Ruth literally throw herself at his feet, and all but demand marriage. Ruth, a beautiful, young woman, would surely have been found an attractive wife for many of the young men of Beit Lechem, and would probably have wanted such a marriage herself. However, her next act of חסד was to follow Naomi's suggestion. She gives her life, dignity, and finally, her love, in her devotion to her mother-in-law. Boaz himself is amazed by the loyalty and expressions of kindness Ruth demonstrates towards Naomi, and agrees to marry her.

Boaz, the distant relative of Elimelech, furthers the mission of חסד which will ultimately redeem Elimelech's sins. Although the parallels between the mitzvah of yibum and what Boaz does are clear, it is equally obvious that Boaz is not actually doing yibum. He is not the brother of the dead husband of Ruth. He is a kinsman, and the book of Ruth makes it clear that this is not yibum by stating, "Boaz took Ruth to be his wife." (4:13) This is not the order of things in true yibum, where there is no separate acquisition of the wife other than beginning to live together. Here, Boaz did normal kiddushin. Legally, he had no requirement to marry this poor convert. Doing so, with the precise hopes to raise a family for the name of Ruth's dead husband, is a clear act of חסד, kindness beyond the requirements of law. In fact, his name, Boaz, is seen by some as a contraction of "בא עז" -- one who acts with valiance, for going above and beyond the call of duty. His word choice, "אנכי אגאל", can be taken to not only mean redeeming Elimelech's property, and marrying Ruth, but in the larger context, the redemption of Elimelech's sinful lack of חסד.

We have observed a thematic parallel structure in the book. We have, in the preamble, a lack of חסד, and its destructive results. This is symbolized by the names מכלון and כליון, of Elimelech's sons. Meaning emptiness and destruction, they are the natural "children" of the actions of Elimelech. Parallel to this, and yet in contradistinction, we have the kind acts of Ruth and Boaz, which bear, quite literally, the future royal line as their children.

The threads of kindness and compassion demonstrated time and again by Ruth and Boaz, culminating in their marriage, were sufficient to reverse the damage done by Elimelech's unwillingness to go beyond the law. A family once great, now low and trampled, is given a new chance, and produces the greatest family of Israel, that of Kind David. The delineation of this lineage at the end of the book of Ruth serves as a focal point, directing the theme of kindness towards its result. If a lack of חסד can nearly cut a strong, honored family off of the vine of Israel, then the profusion of חסד by a young convert girl and an old man can renew the spirit and honor of that family. The least noble of beginnings, when watered with the spirit of going beyond the call of duty for one another, can produce the nobility of the Davidic line.

The חסד theme of the book of Ruth justifies its use on the holiday of Shavuot. This spirit of ערבות, mutual responsibility, is noted at the foot of Mt Sinai just before the giving of the Torah. "ויחן שם ישראל נגד ההר," and חז"ל state, "כאיש אחד בלב אחד," that Israel was completely at one. Each Jew felt responsible and liable for the benefit of the others. It is in this spirit that we accept, each day, the Torah upon ourselves anew, as a nation committed to one another. In Orot Hakodesh (חלק ג' עמ' שכד), Rav Kook makes the point that the sin of the Second Temple era was that the people did not feel this way; they demonstrated שנאת חינם. The correction of this sin is אהבת חינם, as demonstrated by Ruth and Boaz. Through the application of mutual responsibility and חסד, may we merit the redemption soon.

Modern Hebrew and L'shon Hakodesh

2011-05-23T00:26:00.000-07:00

On Rabbi Adlerstein's excellent latest post at Cross-Currents, the question arose in the comment section regarding the relationship between לשון הקודש and Modern Hebrew. Here is my response there:

The distinction is technical, and really hits at a question of modern theory of linguistics. One hundred years ago and beyond, changes in grammar were seen as corruptions with grammars being viewed as proscriptive (see Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar as an example of this school of thought). Later theory maintains that any spoken language changes, and these are shifts, not corruptions. Grammars are essentially descriptive in that they describe how a language is used, and do not define how a society may use language. One generation’s mistake is another generation’s rule (See the history of the word “ask” in English, for example.)

Modern Hebrew (MH) is unique in that it is a revived language. It started as a proscriptive grammar which takes its rules virtually completely from descriptive examinations (grammars) of Biblical Hebrew (I assume that is what you mean when you say L’shon Hakodesh; parenthetically, “Loshon Kodesh” or Loshon Hakodesh is grammatically incorrect — לְשון is in construct form, vowelized with a shva, not a kamats). Although there are stylistic differences (using for example simple perfect as opposed to the vav-consecutive imperfect), these are not changes or differences, but choices of use — generally using a subset of what is possible in Biblical Hebrew (BH) to simplify MH. MH contains the same grammatical rules and thus the same possibilities as BH. A student of modern Hebrew will be able to fluently read the Bible, for example, and understand it at least on a basic, literal level (of course there are places where this will not be sufficient to acquire the meaning of the text).

That said, certainly there are new words and idiomatic phrases, foreign words, and new concepts present in MH. However, these are not changes, but additions. Furthermore, once MH came to be used as a language by Israeli society, its very grammar will shift as any living language’s does.

Compare this question to the situation in English. Would one say that Shakespeare was not writing “English”? Would one say that his English is ancient English as opposed to Modern? (If you did, Chaucer would require a new category, would he not?) Clearly usages and grammars change over time, and any grammar, even one resurrected and therefore initially proscriptive as Modern Hebrew’s, will immediately begin to shift and therefore become of necessity descriptive; however, this does not mean that learning one will not give you the ability to read and understand the other. One learns English to read Shakespeare, with an eye out for shifts in meaning and grammar.

I find that usually those who distinguish between לשון הקודש and Hebrew do so with an agenda. (I believe this agenda has to do with an unwillingness to concede anything of inherent value or holiness in the enterprise of Zionism and the modern State of Israel.) It is implied that one is holy and one is not. By this measure, distinctions of linguistic holiness would have to be made between the Torah, Nevi'im and Ketuvim, since the style and grammar does shift between them and even within them, as well (where does the word של appear in the Bible, for example? In Shir Hashirim, which Rabbi Akiva called קדש קדשים, incidentally. Why not earlier?). Furthermore, the implication is that Mishnaic Hebrew, Rabbinic Hebrew, and later Responsa are all holy (לשון הקדש), but they are even more different from Biblical Hebrew than Modern Hebrew (think of all the Aramaic)! Modern Hebrew was an attempt to revitalize the Hebrew of the Bible.

In fact, the very term לְשון הקודש does not imply a holy language at all! That would be הַלָּשׁוֹן הַקָּדוֹש — HaLashon HaKadosh. L’shon Hakodesh means quite literally "the language of holy things (texts)". Hebrew’s holiness is a function of what it was used to record (the word of God), the people who used it, and their self-perceived task in this world. (I am aware that this linguistic explanation accords generally with the view of the Ramban. In contrast, the Rambam views BH as לשון הקודש because it contains no indecent words of phrases. I do not entertain his view in this post because according to him, it is precisely the language used in T'nach which is לשון הקודש. If the vernacular of the times of Moshe were to contain "dirty" language, it would not be לשון הקודש to the Rambam. Hence, to him, it is a subset of ancient Hebrew which deserves the title לשון הקודש. It is less a linguistic explanation of the whole language that he presents, and more a description of the diction used, applying to the subset of the language (which, as a living language, almost certainly contained indecencies) found in the T'nach. Essentially, Rambam applies to part of ancient Hebrew, the part found in the Bible, and describes it as לשון הקודש.

Even so, the view of the Rambam is rational, in line with conventional linguistic theory. See Kol Han'vuah (pp 28-32) by R' David Cohen for a more mystical view of the Hebrew language.)

Extra-Judicial Killings

2011-05-08T10:01:00.000-07:00

בן נח שרצח, הריגתו ע"י עד

לפני בערך שנה, עלתה ליד שולחן סעודת שבת בבית מורי חמי שאלה. כלי התקשורת בארה"ב היו כולם המומים מסיפור רופא בקליניקה להפלות שנהרג ע"י גוי מנוגד להפלות. ליד השולחן, אחד מן האורחים האיר שלדעתו, מה שעשה ההורג, בצדק עשה, מנקודת מבט של הלכות בן נח. חלקתי עליו בתוקף, ובסופו של דבר, החלטתי בליבי לחזור לסוגיה זו עם שובי ארצה. לצערי, לא מלאתי את הבטחתי זאת לעצמי עד היום. כמובן, אין לקחת את הלימוד הבא לקמן כפסק הלכה פסוקה, אלא כעיון בסוגיא חשובה, ולדעתי, לא מלובנת כל צרכה. אשמח לקבל כל הערה או הארה, להגדיל תורה ולהאדירה.

חשוב קודם כל לזכר את הגמ' בסנהדרין נז אשר שם ר' ישמעאל פוסק (וכן פוסק הרמב"ם כמותו, דלא כת"ק), שאסור לב"נ להרוג אפילו עובר. דבר זה לא שייך קודם מ' יום (כי לפני זה העובר מיא בעלמא), אבל לאחר מ' יום, בניגוד למשפט התורה ליהודים, לב"נ יש דין מיוחד, והריגתו מעוררת דין מוות. סיבת הדין הינה מח' בין רש"י לרמב"ם, שלרש"י, העובר כל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא, ואיסור הריגתו לב"נ הינו דין מיוחד שניתנת לדחייה אם קיים סכנה לאמו, כי כל איסור נדחה מפני פקו"נ. אבל לרמב"ם, עובר הוי נפש, ורק ליהודי שאינו חייב מיתה על עובר מותר להפיל להציל האם, אבל לב"נ, אסור. ר' משה פיינשטיין פסק כרמב"ם ולכן אסור כל הפלה לב"נ, וציץ אליעזר פוסק כרש"י וסיעתו, יעויין שם בחלק ט' סימן נ"א לביאור חשוב ומפורט. (אציין פה שבלא לפגוע בכבודם, איני הקטן מבין את שיטת שני הרבנים משה, כי האם נאמר אותו דבר לב"נ, שגניבה, אבר מן החי, וכל המצוות שלהם (שעליהם חייבים מיתה) לא נדחים בפני פקו"נ? היאך יכולה חברה לפעול אם כל איסור הוא יהרג ואל יעבר?)

לאור דברים אלו, ברור שהדו-שיח בבית חמי התמקד על הפלה שאסורה לב"נ, לפי איזה שיטה שתבחר. (עיין בסוף דברינו פה אות ד' שאפילו לדברי הרמב"ם לא נראה שיהיה עונש מוות מעשית לב"נ הרוצח עובר.) אבל כמובן, כל רעיון של הריגת רופא או עובד בקליניקה להפלות מיד מצומצמת נורא ובכלל לא פרקטית, כי האורח חשב שברור שאסורה כל הפלה לב"נ, וזה טעות גמורה. (בנוסף, האם בדק ה"הורג" שהרופא אכן ביצע הפלות אסורות? איזה מין בדיקה הלכתית היתה כאן?)

קיימות שתי סיבות אשר לפיהן יוכל לחשוב איש שמא מותר לב"נ להרוג ב"נ בלא משפט: 1) מטעם רודף, ו2) מטעם עונש. נדבר בקצרה על הראשונה, כי עיקר הענין שעליו דיברנו אותה שבת התמקד על הסיבה השנייה, ועליה נתמקד גם עתה.

א. רודף: היה מקום לומר שכל אדם שרואה אדם בא לרצוח עוד אדם, מותר לרואה להרגו. ואכן, זה נכון, בתנאי שאין בידו דרך אחרת לעצרו. אבל אם יכול הוא לעצור את המעשה ע"י מעשה פחות קיצוני, אפילו הפסקת חשמל, מכות או חתיכת יד, עליו לעצרו בדרך זו. כמובן, אם עוצר הב"נ את המעשה ע"י מעשה יותר חמור ממשנדרש, יהיה הוא עצמו חייב מיתה. ברור איפא, שעל טעם רודף לא מדובר.

ב. עונש: יש מקום לדון אם גוי שעובר עבירה וחייב מיתה, אם הוא נהרג ע"י כל רואה, או רק בבית דין, אף אם זה בית דין שלהם. הגמ' בסנהדרין נז אומרת:

1. בן נח נהרג בדיין אחד ובעד אחד,שלא בהתראה,
2. מפי איש ולא מפי אשה,
3. ואפילו קרוב...

על הפסקה הראשונה לא אומר רש"י דבר. אבל על הפיסקה השלישית, אומר רש"י, "ע"י דיין איש או עד איש". מזה רצה האורח לומר שרק בעי או עד או דיין, כלומר, זה שרואהו עובר, הורגו כב"ד. ובאמת, כן מבין המנחת חינוך במצווה ת"ד, באמרו, "הוא העד הוא הדיין". ובת"ג, אומר שמיד בעשות הגוי עבירה, להרגו, ובניגוד למשפט היהודים, עד נעשה דיין. ועיין אות ד' בסוף מאמר זה.

אבל מה אעשה, שתוס' בע"ז כ"ב ע"ב, ובס"ד ע"ב (ד"ה איזהו) חולקים על זה, ואומרים שבעי דין בפני ב"ד. וגם הגהות אשרי שם. וכן כותבים המאירי ור' יונה בפירושם לסנהדרין (עוד לא ראיתי אותם בפנים). לדעתי, הם מבינים בגמ' כמו שאני הבנתי, שבעי עד וגם דיין. נקודת רש"י אולי תפורש באחד משתי דרכים: שבעי רק אחד, או שרק אחד צריך להיות זכר. מה שלא יהיה, הלשון שכותב הרמב"ם במלכים ט:יד, היא בדיוק השפה של האגדתא דבי רב, "דיין ועד", לא "או". נראה מזה שהרמב"ם דוחה את דעת רש"י. הרגלינו בדיוק לשונו של רמב"ם מטה אותנו לדעה שאם היה מקבל רמב"ם את הרעיון של "או" ולא "ו", הוא היה כותב זאת במשנה תורה. אדרבא, אם היתה הגמ' כותבת "או" ורמב"ם כותב "ו", היה כל אחד מפלפל בדעתו על שינוי הגרסא. עלינו להיות מדוייקים גם כאשר רמב"ם שומר על גרסת הגמ'.

מה שיוצא זה מח' בין כמה ראשונים נגד מנחת חינוך ואולי רש"י. נראה לי שקיים, אם כן, ספק יהרג ואל יעבר, לב"נ שרואה ב"נ אחר עובר עבירה. מענין להדגיש שלבן נח, עדיין קיים רעיון של "אחרי רבים להטות", אף לדעת המנחת חינוך, עיי' מצווה ע"ח.

חושבני שדברי הקודמים מכניסים מספיק ספק לתוך השאלה של הריגה בלא משפט. אבל יש עוד כמה נקודות המחזקות את דעתי בזה:

א. אע"פ שב"נ לא בעי התראה, הרמב"ם פוסק שצריכים לדעת שמה שעשה היה במזיד. בשוגג, פטור. אע"פ שהמנחת חינוך כותב ש"אומר מותר, חייב", אולי זה לא בתוקף במצב כזה שאנו מדברים בו, שהרופא חושב שאדרבא, הוא עושה מעשה חמלה, במיוחד במצב סכנה לחיי האם.

ב. מה שלא יהיה, עדיין בהריגת ב"נ שרצח, אם הב"נ ההורג גם יהרג אחרים חפים מפשע או אפילו יחבל או יהרס אפילו ממון, יהיה חייב מיתה מדינים אחרים של בני נח, אשר גם עליהם חלה חיוב מיתה (אף אם אולי לא עונש מעשי). ואיך יעשה דבר שיביא לחיוב מיתה על עצמו, רק מכוונה טהורה לענוש אחר?

ג. שמא יש כח בידי השלטון להפקיר חיי העובר כאשר הוא מהווה סכנה לאם, כמו ששלטון יהודי יכול להחליט על עונש מוות שלא מן הדין מטעמים מיוחדים (עיי' דרשות הר"ן דרשה ח'). אבל איני כלל בטוח במהלך כזה שצריך יותר עיון.

ד. אם שלטון יאסור הריגה בלא משפט, כמדומני שזה יהיה אסור, משום תיקון החברה, דינא דמלכותא ומשפט המלך. שוב, איני בטוח במהלך זה, ובעי יותר ליבון.

ה. המנחת חינוך במצוה כו מצטט את הרמב"ם מלכים ט:ב שכל שאין בית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליה אין בן נח נהרג, אע"פ שאסור. לפי זה לא ברור כלל שב"נ שהרג עובר ימות על מעשה זה למעשה, אף לשיטת רמב"ם ור' משה פיינשטיין. אע"פ שאסור, לא יוענש עונש מוות, וכמובן לא תהיה דמו מותרת לכל עד ראייה, אלא בדברים שבית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליו, וזה אינו בהריגת עובר.

ו. דבר אחרון, מח' רמב"ם ורמב"ן במהות מצוות ב"נ של "דינים". לדעת רמב"ן, מהות המצווה זו תיקון חברה, שלא יהא כל אחד עושה כחפץ ליבו, אלא שיהיה סדר חברתי. כמובן לדעה זו, רעיון שכל גוי יהרוג גוי אחר שעובר עבירה מופרכת מיניה וביה. וכי איזה תיקון חברה, איזה סדר ושיטתיות חברתית יש כאשר כל אדם בא לחבירו והרגו בלא הסבר? ונניח שרואהו גוי שלישי מייד אחר כך, ויבוא להרגו מאותו סיבה!? אין זה מדניות חברתית אלא מדינת דמים אשר בו כל אדם יפחד שמחר מגיע סופו בידי שכינו.

אבל מדומני שאף לדעת הרמב"ם, שסובר שדינים זה פשוט בית דין לפסוק את כל שאר השש מצוות, עדיין, בענין זה של כל אחד ואחד עושה חשבון דין לעצמו מופרכת. וכי היאך יכולה הב"ד לדון אם איש את רעהו חיים בלעו? שמא מטעם זה ציטט הרמב"ם את הגמ' בסנהדרין בלי להתחשב ב"או" של רש"י.

דברי דלעיל מוגשים כחומר מחשבה ומבקשים תגובות. כל מאן דבעי, כל מי שחושב שטעיתי במשהו לעיל, או שיש שיטות שהתעלמתי מהם, מבוקש לומר כן. ולוואי שיתקיים בתורתינו הקדושה, דרכיה דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותיה שלום.

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בחודש אב, ראיתי לראשונה ספר "דרך המלך" מאת ר' אריאל פינקלשטיין, בו הוא מדבר על אותו רעיונות שהבאתי פה, החל מדף 102. ראה כאן.

Shadal On Shaatnez

2011-05-02T09:19:00.000-07:00

Shmuel David Luzzatto, who lived through the first sixty-five years of the nineteenth century, was a leader of the Italian Jewish community. He fought against what he saw as extremists on either side of him, was willing to accept truth no matter its source, and was confident that even if under-appreciated in his lifetime, the century would come in which his work would find its full glory.

I have just read a letter from him to his father in law, in which he outlines a general overview of the Jewish purpose. In it, he stresses חמלה, which I think he would have translated as intimate sympathy with the position of the other. It transcends straightforward justice or social fairness, and is לפנים משורת הדין; precisely this facet of it is an important foundation of the Jewish ethic. Shadal writes that this emotion is one which is fostered by Judaism as the best way to make Man moral, and to build a healthy, stable society. (Shadal goes through a number of rational arguments for ethics from Greek philosophy, bemoaning the fact that none of them engendered a proper sympathy and caring for fellow humans.) He discusses several places in the Torah where חמלה may seem to be disregarded, and shows that it is not. Usually, this חמלה is applicable to all humanity; Jews believe all humans to be sons of the same Father, and that they should be treated so. Shadal explains the few places where halacha treats Jews and gentiles differently as places where special חמלה is an expression of particularly close national-brotherly bonds. (For example, lending with interest is not immoral, it is perfectly ethical -- indeed, all nations do so. This normative ethic is also acceptable for Jews doing business with gentiles. However, in order to produce strong intra-national links and feelings of fraternity within the Jewish nation, God demands that we abstain from this practice with relation to other Jews.) Essentially, the Torah raises to the status of commandment this חמלה-compassion, sympathy and fraternal love.

Additionally, belief in השגחה, providence, occupies another cornerstone of the Jewish faith, bolstering the possibly weak committment that חמלה creates towards morality and Godliness. Man needs to know that God cares, and indeed, rewards and punishes him for his actions.

The letter goes on to discuss various individual commandments. I found his explanation for שעטנז and כלאי אילן to be interesting. Shadal provides as part of their purpose to deny the idolatrous practices surrounding the Jews. In idolatrous cultures, he writes, it was common to combine naturally separate elements in order to bind together the providential assistance of otherwise competing forces (gods) in benificent kindness towards the idolator. To further remove Jews from any association with idolatrous practices, much less idolatry, these (to the modern mind, seemingly harmless) practices were forbidden, and contributed to the three basic elements of Jewish practice, the betterment of individual morality, strength of religious passion, and the national general good.

This is the Bread of Shame

2011-04-18T07:00:00.000-07:00

It strikes me as emblematic of a waning propensity towards introspection and self-examination in our generation that the Passover seder can be celebrated with such blasé contentment by diaspora Jewry. Blithely are so many comfortable Jews able to glide over the words of our daily prayers, asking God to "assemble us from the four corners of the earth", and the Hagaddah's many appeals for redemption and return to the land of our forefathers fare no better. How can it be that only a generation or two after the Holocaust, Jews have forgotten the bitterness of exile, and relish their self-inflicted imprisonment?

This was never supposed to be. The sting of physical and spiritual exile were supposed to hurt us so badly, that we would do all within our power, and perhaps more, to return to the condition of old, where we sat at our Father's table. We should feel shame, pain, disharmony, angst, in our dispersion. In fact, Rabbi Kook sees this as the reason the Hagaddah starts out with the הא לחמא עניא. The seder is supposed to be a time of glory, pride and happiness. However, during the exile, we read in our seder of customs gone by, and splendor lost. How can a Jew rejoice when he reads of the קרבן פסח, the offerings of Passover, the Temple service, Divine immanence and national exaltation, and yet knows the depths of despair and lowly shame his nation wallows in during the present exile?

For this reason, says Rabbi Kook, the Hagaddah starts with the bread of affliction, literal and metaphoric. Know, says the Hagaddah, that when the Jews suffered in the sweltering heat of oppression and slavery, when their bread was depressed and their hope fleeting, even from that point, God saved them. The הא לחמא עניא is an empathetic passage reminding us in the exile that God once saved us, and he will again. When we say, כל דכפין ייתי וייכול, "all who are hungry, come and eat!", we serve God out of the depths of despair. The responding parallel phrase, כל דצריך ייתי ויפסח, "all who are in need, come and share in the passover offering," is the reward that awaits those who valiantly celebrate in the ignominy of exile; they will merit to take part in the paschal offering in Jerusalem. In this way, the Hagaddah attempts to break the depression and sadness of the dispersed Jews, even if only for one night.

In our present day, it would seem that the opposite lesson is needed. Find shame in the exile, find debasement in your lives as a nation dispersed by God's fury! Come to the point where you need הא לחמא עניא to lift your spirits! A renewed awakening to the ignominy of exile is what is needed now. We stand free of 2000 year old shackles, and God invites us home. Will we take the first step?

May the story of our first deliverance spur us to take the steps to the final salvation, and that of the entire world.

Not In Heaven

2011-04-14T23:23:00.000-07:00

In Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits' extremely interesting work on the essence of Halacha, I found an important paragraph (Not In Heaven, 140) on the relationship between the modern State of Israel and its religious population:

This twofold alienation, from life and from halacha's concern with it, can be best illustrated by the one-sided educational ideal of the yeshivot in Israel. In general, they frown on secular studies. But a state needs an army, an economic system, health and welfare services, scientific research, technology, etc. The question, therefore, is: Does the Torah desire a Jewish people living in its own land or not? If the answer is affirmative, then the Torah must also desire soldiers, physicians, scientists, architects, engineers, policemen, social workers, etc. To say that these professionals should all come from the secular segment of the population would be a confession that the Torah cannot cope with life. On the other hand, to divide the people into a religious elite, exclusively dedicated to Torah study, and a professional majority, rather ignorant of Torah, incarcerates students of the Torah in another form of a Diaspora Museum, that of the present-day yeshivot.

I would highly recommend the whole book, and particularly the paragraph that comes before the above quote. (Read it to see why I am being so vague.)

Journalistic Integrity

2011-03-24T23:49:00.000-07:00

Today, when reporting on the bombing at a Jersualem bus stop, Reuters reported that:

Police said it was a "terrorist attack" -- Israel's term for a Palestinian strike.

An Israeli media source asked for clarification as to why Reuters implied that there was any doubt that this was a terror attack, and received a response from Reueters:

It is not up to Reuters to say who carried out an attack. We always need to quote the authorities, such as the police. On Wednesday, Israeli police used the Hebrew word "peegooa", without specifically mentioning the Palestinians - but in the local context it is clear that this is who they were referring to. We spelt that out to an international audience to clarify precisely who was being blamed.
We were certainly not trying to give a judgment value. We were simply seeking to present the facts, with all the correct attribution.
We have used the same approach for years. This is not a policy we apply only to the Middle East conflict. It is a policy which we use across the globe in all situations.

This biased attitude is similar to that of CNN, who reported the butchery in Itamar (when Arabs entered a home and brutally stabbed to death a sleeping husband, wife and small children and a baby) as "Israeli Family of 5 Killed in 'Terror Attack'". This is a gross, sick understatement, in the guise of objective journalistic impartiality.

Firstly, the term "murder" is the correct one when discussing the illegal taking of lives. To use the term "kill" is to report less than actually took place.

Similarly, the common usage for "terror" is when violence is committed against civilians in order to strike fear in the hearts of the rest of the population. Therefore, placing this term in quotes implies that there is a chance that the event in question was not against civilians, or that it was not an attempt to cause fear in the civilian population. However, any witness would be clear that this attack was indeed against civilians and that it was just the latest in a tradition of bombings, a policy of terror, well reported by the Arabs themselves, attempting to cause Israelis to doubt their safety. Therefore, the use of quotations (or of euphamisms such as "strike") does not only fail to preserve journalistic integrity, it does the opposite: it creates a serious journalistic bias against the truth.

Sometimes, a journalist, or any observer, by simply reporting the honest facts, will have to make a value judgement. Any report from a witness of Jeffrey Dahmer in action would be negligently incomplete without the words "murder", "cannibal" and "repulsive". In this type of extreme circumstance, when purposely using terms that minimize the event observed in order to shy away from passing moral judgement, a reporter ends up making the opposite moral judement. One who claims that Jeffrey Dahmer "killed" instead of "murdered" and "recycled" instead of "cannibalized" would be, in effect, condoning his actions, and making them palatable and justifiable to the audience.

The same applies when reporting on terror and murder. To call the acts of the Itamar terrorists anything less than "brutal murder" simply falls short of the journalistic requirement to report what one sees. To call an Arab bombing in Israel a "Palestinian strike" is an attempt to neutralize the evil being done by the terrorists, and in effect justify it to the readers. It also serves as an attempt to make Israeli "strikes" morally equivalent to Arab terror, ignoring the obvious and clear intent of the Israeli Army to avoid civilian casualties, and the obvious and clear intent of the Arab terrorists to specifically target civilians.

The question to Reuters is: You say that "Police said it was a 'terrorist attack' -- Israel's term for a Palestinian strike." What do you call it when a suitcase filled with explosives is detonated at a civilian bus stop? A "strike". When you are so careful to remove any perceived moral judgement by avoiding the standard terms society uses, you end up siding morally with terror.

Yes, this is exactly what Reuters and CNN have done. The news agencies use euphemisms that they believe will remove any moral judgement, presenting only the dry facts. However, instead of sounding neutral, they end up biased, questioning the basic facts that any witness would acknowledge. They end up at the very least, excusing, and, most likely, rationalizing and validating the murder of innocents. This is bad reporting and an unconsciable display of immorality.

This is not to say that these types of "morally neutral" euphemisms are new to Jews. We Jews have heard these types of phrases before. "Resettlement" (death camps), "lovely new homes for Jews" (Thereisenstadt), "work camp" (Auschwitz), "special treatment" (gas chamber and crematoria), and "final solution" (genocide). The fact is that the media outlets have a huge impact on how the world sees conflicts, and their reporting definitely has taken a side with the "militants" (terrorists) against the "Zionist regime" (democratic, civil Israel).

Not too long ago, another media outlet also tried to supress the reporting of evil perpetrated upon the Jews:

On November 14, 2001, in the 150th anniversary issue, The New York Times ran an article by former editor Max Frankel reporting that before and during World War II, the Times had maintained a strict policy in their news reporting and editorials to minimize reports on the Holocaust. The Times accepted the detailed analysis and findings of journalism professor Laurel Leff, who had published an article the year before in the Harvard International Journal of the Press and Politics, that the New York Times had deliberately suppressed news of the Third Reich’s persecution and murder of Jews.Leff concluded that New York Times reporting and editorial polices made it virtually impossible for American Jews to impress Congress, church or government leaders with the importance of helping Europe’s Jews. (source)

CNN and Reuters editors and journalists should be cognizant of the implications of what they write, apologize to the Jews of Israel, and learn a lesson for the future.

Murder In Itamar

2011-03-13T00:28:00.000-08:00

The world again is witness to Jews being murdered in the most brutal way, for being Jews. Parents and three children, the majority of the Fogel family, is wiped out in a way that is reminiscient of the pogroms of years past. It is up to our government to protect us from the animals that surround us, and yet they point the finger of blame at the enemy instead. Is it any wonder that Arabs murder Jews? Is anyone seriously surprised? The shock should be at the Jewish government which gambles time and again with its citizens' lives, like an addicted gambler, every time coming out the loser.

The 12 year old daughter came home and found her three siblings stabbed, mortally wounded, and a baby lying next to his father crying, "Daddy, wake up!". May God avenge the souls of those murdered, and may this be the last tragedy we suffer.

This poem by Bialik speaks of similarly slit throats, babies snuggling close to dead mothers in an attempt to revive them, and the depths of the galut. As we step through the redemption, may we gather our strength and ensure that this evil occur no more.

בְּעִיר הַהֲרֵגָה
קוּם לֵךְ לְךָ אֶל עִיר הַהֲרֵגָה וּבָאתָ אֶל-הַחֲצֵרוֹת,
וּבְעֵינֶיךָ תִרְאֶה וּבְיָדְךָ תְמַשֵּׁשׁ עַל-הַגְּדֵרוֹת
וְעַל הָעֵצִים וְעַל הָאֲבָנִים וְעַל-גַּבֵּי טִיחַ הַכְּתָלִים
אֶת-הַדָּם הַקָּרוּשׁ וְאֶת-הַמֹּחַ הַנִּקְשֶׁה שֶׁל-הַחֲלָלִים.
וּבָאתָ מִשָּׁם אֶל-הֶחֳרָבוֹת וּפָסַחְתָּ עַל-הַפְּרָצִים
וְעָבַרְתָּ עַל-הַכְּתָלִים הַנְּקוּבִים וְעַל הַתַּנּוּרִים הַנִּתָּצִים,
בִּמְקוֹם הֶעֱמִיק קִרְקַר הַמַּפָּץ, הִרְחִיב הִגְדִּיל הַחוֹרִים,
מַחֲשֹׂף הָאֶבֶן הַשְּׁחֹרָה וְעָרוֹת הַלְּבֵנָה הַשְּׂרוּפָה,
וְהֵם נִרְאִים כְּפֵיוֹת פְּתוּחִים שֶׁל-פְּצָעִים אֲנוּשִׁים וּשְׁחֹרִים
אֲשֶׁר אֵין לָהֶם תַּקָּנָה עוֹד וְלֹא-תְהִי לָהֶם תְּרוּפָה,
וְטָבְעוּ רַגְלֶיךָ בְּנוֹצוֹת וְהִתְנַגְּפוּ עַל תִּלֵּי-תִלִּים
שֶׁל-שִׁבְרֵי שְׁבָרִים וּרְסִיסֵי רְסִיסִים וּתְבוּסַת סְפָרִים וּגְוִילִים,
כִּלְיוֹן עֲמַל לֹא-אֱנוֹשׁ וּפְרִי מִשְׁנֶה עֲבוֹדַת פָּרֶךְ;
וְלֹא-תַעֲמֹד עַל-הַהֶרֶס וְעָבַרְתָּ מִשָּׁם הַדָּרֶךְ –
וְלִבְלְבוּ הַשִּׁטִּים לְנֶגְדְּךָ וְזָלְפוּ בְאַפְּךָ בְּשָׂמִים,
וְצִיצֵיהֶן חֶצְיָם נוֹצוֹת וְרֵיחָן כְּרֵיחַ דָּמִים;
וְעַל-אַפְּךָ וְעַל-חֲמָתְךָ תָּבִיא קְטָרְתָּן הַזָּרָה
אֶת-עֶדְנַת הָאָבִיב בִּלְבָבְךָ – וְלֹא-תְהִי לְךָ לְזָרָא;
וּבְרִבֲבוֹת חִצֵּי זָהָב יְפַלַּח הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ כְּבֵדְךָ
וְשֶׁבַע קַרְנַיִם מִכָּל-רְסִיס זְכוּכִית תִּשְׂמַחְנָה לְאֵידְךָ,
כִּי-קָרָא אֲדֹנָי לָאָבִיב וְלַטֶּבַח גַּם-יָחַד:
הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ זָרְחָה, הַשִּׁטָּה פָּרְחָה וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט שָׁחַט.
וּבָרָחְתָּ וּבָאתָ אֶל-חָצֵר, וְהֶחָצֵר גַּל בּוֹ –
עַל הַגַּל הַזֶּה נֶעֶרְפוּ שְׁנַיִם: יְהוּדִי וְכַלְבּוֹ.
קַרְדֹּם אֶחָד עֲרָפָם וְאֶל-אַשְׁפָּה אַחַת הוּטָלוּ
וּבְעֵרֶב דָּם שְׁנֵיהֶם יְחַטְטוּ חֲזִירִים וְיִתְגּוֹלָלוּ;
מָחָר יֵרֵד גֶּשֶׁם וּסְחָפוֹ אֶל-אַחַד נַחֲלֵי הַבָּתוֹת –
וְלֹא-יִצְעַק עוֹד הַדָּם מִן הַשְּׁפָכִים וְהָאַשְׁפָּתוֹת,
כִּי בִּתְהֹם רַבָּה יֹאבַד אוֹ-יַשְׁקְ נַעֲצוּץ לִרְוָיָה –
וְהַכֹּל יִהְיֶה כְּאָיִן, וְהַכֹּל יָשׁוּב כְּלֹא-הָיָה.
וְאֶל עֲלִיּוֹת הַגַּגֹּות תְּטַפֵּס וְנִצַּבְתְּ שָׁם בָּעֲלָטָה –
עוֹד אֵימַת מַר הַמָּוֶת בַּמַּאֲפֵל הַדּוֹמֵם שָׁטָה;
וּמִכָּל-הַחוֹרִים הָעֲמוּמִים וּמִתּוֹךְ צִלְלֵי הַזָּוִיּוֹת
עֵינַיִם, רְאֵה, עֵינַיִם דּוּמָם אֵלֶיךָ צוֹפִיּוֹת.
רוּחוֹת הַ"קְּדוֹשִׁים" הֵן, נְשָׁמוֹת עוֹטְיוֹת וְשׁוֹמֵמוֹת,
אֶל-זָוִית אַחַת תַּחַת כִּפַּת הַגַּג הִצְטַמְצְמוּ – וְדוֹמֵמוֹת.
כַּאן מְצָאָן הַקַּרְדֹּם וְאֶל-הַמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה תָּבֹאנָה
לַחְתֹּם פֹּה בְּמֶבָּטֵי עֵינֵיהֶן בַּפַּעַם הָאַחֲרוֹנָה
אֶת כָּל-צַעַר מוֹתָן הַתָּפֵל וְאֶת כָּל-תַּאֲלַת חַיֵּיהֶן,
וְהִתְרַפְּקוּ פֹּה זָעוֹת וַחֲרֵדוֹת, וְיַחְדָּו מִמַּחֲבוֹאֵיהֶן
דּוּמָם תּוֹבְעוֹת עֶלְבּוֹנָן וְעֵינֵיהֶן שׁוֹאֲלוֹת: לָמָּה? –
וּמִי-עוֹד כֵּאלֹהִים בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר-יִשָּׂא זֹאת הַדְּמָמָה?
וְנָשָׂאתָ עֵינֶיךָ הַגָּגָה – וְהִנֵּה גַם רְעָפָיו מַחֲרִישִׁים,
מַאֲפִילִים עָלֶיךָ וְשׁוֹתְקִים, וְשָׁאַלְתָּ אֶת-פִּי הָעַכָּבִישִׁים;
עֵדִים חַיִּים הֵם, עֵדֵי רְאִיָּה, וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ כָּל-הַמּוֹצְאוֹת:
מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבֶטֶן רֻטָּשָה שֶׁמִּלּאוּהָ נוֹצוֹת,
מַעֲשֶׂה בִּנְחִירַיִם וּמַסְמֵרוֹת, בְּגֻלְגָּלוֹת וּפַטִּישִׁים,
מַעֲשֶׂה בִּבְנֵי אָדָם שְׁחוּטִים שֶׁנִּתְלוּ בְּמָרִישִׁים,
וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּתִינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד אִמּוֹ הַמְדֻקָּרָה
כְּשֶׁהוּא יָשֵׁן וּבְפִיו פִּטְמַת שָׁדָהּ הַקָּרָה;
וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּיֶלֶד שֶׁנִּקְרַע וְיָצְאָה נִשְׁמָתוֹ בְּ"אִמִּי!" –
וְהִנֵּה גַם עֵינָיו פֹּה שׁוֹאֲלוֹת חֶשְׁבּוֹן מֵעִמִּי.

וְעוֹד כָּאֵלֶּה וְכָאֵלֶּה תְּסַפֵּר לְךָ הַשְׂמָמִית
מַעֲשִׂים נוֹקְבִים אֶת-הַמֹּחַ וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶם כְּדֵי לְהָמִית
אֶת-רוּחֲךָ וְאֶת-נִשְׁמָתְךָ מִיתָה גְּמוּרָה עוֹלָמִית –
וְהִתְאַפַּקְתָּ, וְחָנַקְתָּ בְּתוֹךְ גְּרוֹנְךָ אֶת הַשְּׁאָגָה
וּקְבַרְתָהּ בְּמַעֲמַקֵּי לְבָבְךָ לִפְנֵי הִתְפָּרְצָהּ,
וְקָפַצְתָּ מִשָּׁם וְיָצָאתָ – וְהִנֵּה הָאָרֶץ כְּמִנְהָגָהּ,
וְהַשֶּׁמֶשׁ כִּתְמֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם תְּשַׁחֵת זָהֳרָהּ אָרְצָה.
וְיָרַדְתָּ מִשָּׁם וּבָאתָ אֶל-תּוֹךְ הַמַּרְתֵּפִים הָאֲפֵלִים,
מְקוֹם נִטְמְאוּ בְּנוֹת עַמְּךָ הַכְּשֵׁרוֹת בֵּין הַכֵּלִים,
אִשָּׁה אִשָּׁה אַחַת תַּחַת שִׁבְעָה שִׁבְעָה עֲרֵלִים,
הַבַּת לְעֵינֵי אִמָּהּ וְהָאֵם לְעֵינֵי בִּתָּהּ,
לִפְנֵי שְׁחִיטָה וּבִשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה וּלְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה;
וּבְיָדְךָ תְמַשֵּׁש אֶת-הַכֶּסֶת הַמְטֻנֶּפֶת וְאֶת-הַכָּר הַמְאָדָּם,
מִרְבַּץ חֲזִירֵי יַעַר וּמִרְבַּעַת סוּסֵי אָדָם
עִם-קַרְדֹּם מְטַפְטֵף דָּם רוֹתֵחַ בְּיָדָם.
וּרְאֵה גַּם-רְאֵה: בַּאֲפֵלַת אוֹתָהּ זָוִית,
תַּחַת מְדוֹכַת מַצָּה זוֹ וּמֵאֲחוֹרֵי אוֹתָהּ חָבִית,
שָׁכְבוּ בְעָלִים, חֲתָנִים, אַחִים, הֵצִיצוּ מִן-הַחוֹרִים
בְּפַרְפֵּר גְּוִיּוֹת קְדוֹשׁוֹת תַּחַת בְּשַׂר חֲמוֹרִים,
נֶחֱנָקוֹת בְּטֻמְאָתָן וּמְעַלְּעוֹת דַּם צַוָּארָן,
וּכְחַלֵּק אִישׁ פַּת-בָּגוֹ חִלֵּק מְתֹעָב גּוֹי בְּשָׂרָן –
שָׁכְבוּ בְּבָשְׁתָּן וַיִּרְאוּ – וְלֹא נָעוּ וְלֹא זָעוּ,
וְאֶת-עֵינֵיהֶם לֹא-נִקֵּרוּ וּמִדַּעְתָּם לֹא יָצָאוּ –
וְאוּלַי גַּם-אִישׁ לְנַפְשׁוֹ אָז הִתְפַּלֵּל בִּלְבָבוֹ:
רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל-עוֹלָם, עֲשֵׂה נֵס – וְאֵלַי הָרָעָה לֹא-תָבֹא.
וְאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר חָיוּ מִטֻּמְאָתָן וְהֵקִיצוּ מִדָּמָן –
וְהִנֵּה שֻׁקְּצוּ כָּל-חַיֵּיהֶן וְנִטְמָא אוֹר עוֹלָמָן
שִׁקּוּצֵי עוֹלָם, טֻמְאַת גּוּף וָנֶפֶשׁ, מִבַּחוּץ וּמִבִּפְנִים –
וְהֵגִיחוּ בַעֲלֵיהֶן מֵחוֹרָם וְרָצוּ בֵית-אֱלֹהִים
וּבֵרְכוּ עַל-הַנִּסִּים שֵׁם אֵל יִשְׁעָם וּמִשְׂגַּבָּם;
וְהַכֹּהֲנִים שֶׁבָּהֶם יֵצְאוּ וְיִשְׁאֲלוּ אֶת רַבָּם:
"רַבִּי! אִשְׁתִּי מָה הִיא? מֻתֶּרֶת אוֹ אֲסוּרָה?" –
וְהַכֹּל יָשׁוּב לְמִנְהָגוֹ, וְהַכֹּל יַחֲזֹר לְשׁוּרָה.
וְעַתָּה לֵךְ וְהֵבֵאתִיךָ אֶל-כָּל הַמַּחֲבוֹאִים:
בָּתֵּי מָחֳרָאוֹת, מִכְלְאוֹת חֲזִירִים וּשְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת צוֹאִים.
וְרָאִיתָ בְּעֵינֶיךָ אֵיפֹה הָיוּ מִתְחַבְּאִים
אַחֶיךָ, בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וּבְנֵי בְנֵיהֶם שֶׁל-הַמַּכַּבִּים,
נִינֵי הָאֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבְּ"אַב הָרַחֲמִים" וְזֶרַע הַ"קְּדוֹשִׁים".
עֶשְׂרִים נֶפֶשׁ בְּחוֹר אֶחָד וּשְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁלֹשִׁים,
וַיְגַדְּלוּ כְבוֹדִי בָּעוֹלָם וַיְקַדְּשׁוּ שְׁמִי בָּרַבִּים...
מְנוּסַת עַכְבָּרִים נָסוּ וּמַחֲבֵא פִשְׁפְּשִׁים הָחְבָּאוּ,
וַיָמוּתוּ מוֹת כְּלָבִים שָׁם בַּאֲשֶׁר נִמְצָאוּ,
וּמָחָר לַבֹּקֶר – וְיָצָא הַבֵּן הַפָּלִיט
וּמָצָא שָׁם פֶּגֶר אָבִיו מְגֹאָל וְנִמְאָס – – –
וְלָמָּה תֵבְךְּ, בֶּן-אָדָם, וְלָמָּה תָלִיט
אֶת-פָּנֶיךָ בְּכַפְּךָ? – חֲרֹק שִׁנַּיִם וְהִמָּס!
וְיָרַדְתָּ בְּמוֹרַד הָעִיר וּמָצָאתָ גִּנַּת יָרָק,
וַאֲוֵרָה גְדוֹלָה עִם הַגִּנָּה, הִיא אֲוֵרַת הֶהָרֶג.
וּכְמַחֲנֵה תִּנְשְׁמוֹת עֲנָק וְאֵימֵי עֲטַלֵּפִים
הַסְּרוּחִים עַל-חַלְלֵיהֶם שִׁכּוֹרֵי דָם וַעֲיֵפִים.
שָׁם עַל קַרְקַע הָאֲוֵרָה שָׁטְחוּ לָהֶם שֶׁטַח
אוֹפַנִּים מְפֻשְּׂקֵי יְתֵדוֹת כְּאֶצְבָּעוֹת שְׁלוּחוֹת לִרְצֹחַ,
וּפִיפִיּוֹתָם מְגֹאָלִים עוֹד בְּדַם אָדָם וָמֹחַ.
וְהָיָה בַּעֲרֹב הַיּוֹם, בִּנְטוֹת שֶׁמֶשׁ מַעֲרָבָה,
מְעֻטָּף בְּעַנְנֵי דָּם וְנֶאְפַּד אֵשׁ לֶהָבָה,
וּפָתַחְתָּ אֶת-הַשַּׁעַר, בַּלָּט וּבָאתָ אֶל-הָאֲוֵרָה
וְאֵימָה חֲשֵׁכָה תִּבְלָעֶךָּ, וּתְהֹם זְוָעָה נַעֲלָמָה:
מָגוֹר, מָגוֹר מִסָּבִיב... מְשׁוֹטֵט הוּא בַּאֲוֵרָהּ,
שׁוֹרֶה הוּא עַל הַכְּתָלִים וְכָבוּשׁ בְּתוֹךְ הַדְּמָמָה.
וּמִתַּחַת תִּלֵּי הָאוֹפַנִּים, מִבֵּין הַחוֹרִים וְהַסְּדָקִים,
עוֹר תַּרְגִּישׁ כְּעֵין פִּרְפּוּר שֶׁל-אֲבָרִים מְרֻסָּקִים,
מְזִיזִים אֶת הָאוֹפַנִּים הַתְּלוּלִים עַל-גַּבֵּיהֶם,
מִתְעַוְּתִים בִּגְסִיסָתָם וּמִתְבּוֹסְסִים בִּדְמֵיהֶם;
וְאֶנְקַת חֲשָׁאִים אַחֲרוֹנָה – קוֹל עֲנוֹת חֲלוּשָׁה
מִמַּעַל לְרֹאשְׁךָ עֲדַיִן תְּלוּיָה כְּמוֹ קְרוּשָׁה,
וּכְעֵין צַעַר נֶעְכָּר, צַעַר עוֹלָם, תּוֹסֵס שָׁם וְחָרֵד.
אֵין זֹאת כִּי אִם-רוּחַ דַּכָּא רַב-עֱנוּת וּגְדֹל-יִסּוּרִים
חָבַשׁ כָּאן אֶת-עַצְמוֹ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּית הָאֲסוּרִים,
נִתְקַע פֹּה בִּדְוֵי עוֹלָם וְלֹא-יֹאבֶה עוֹד הִפָּרֵד,
וּשְׁכִינָה שְׁחֹרָה אַחַת, עֲיֵפַת צַעַר וִיגֵעַת כֹּחַ,
מִתְלַבֶּטֶת פֹּה בְּכָל-זָוִית וְלֹא-תִמְצָא לָהּ מָנוֹחַ,
רוֹצָה לִבְכּוֹת – וְאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה, חֲפֵצָה לִנְהֹם – וְשׁוֹתֶקֶת,
וְדוּמָם תִּמַּק בְּאֶבְלָהּ וּבַחֲשָׁאִי הִיא נֶחֱנֶקֶת,
פּוֹרֶשֶׂת כְּנָפֶיהָ עַל צִלְלֵי הַקְּדוֹשִׁים וְרֹאשָׁהּ תַּחַת כְּנָפָהּ,
מַאֲפִילָה עַל-דִּמְעוֹתֶיהָ וּבוֹכִיָּה בְלִי שָׂפָה – – –
וְאַתָּה גַם-אַתָּה, בֶּן-אָדָם, סְגֹר בַּעַדְךָ הַשַּׁעַר,
וְנִסְגַּרְתָּ פֹּה בָּאֲפֵלָה וּבַקַּרְקַע תִּכְבֹּשׁ עֵינֶיךָ
וְנִצַּבְתָּ כֹּה עַד-בּוֹשׁ וְהִתְיַחַדְתָּ עִם-הַצַּעַר
וּמִלֵּאתָ בּוֹ אֶת-לְבָבְךָ לְכֹל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ,
וּבְיוֹם תְּרֻשַּׁשׁ נַפְשְּךָ וּבַאֲבֹד כָּל חֵילָהּ –
וְהָיָה הוּא לְךָ לִפְלֵיטָה וּלְמַעְיַן תַּרְעֵלָה,
וְרָבַץ בְּךָ כִּמְאֵרָה וִיבַעֶתְךָ כְּרוּחַ רָעָה,
וּלְפָתְךָ וְהֵעִיק עָלֶיךָ כְּהָעֵק חֲלוֹם זְוָעָה;
וּבְחֵיקְךָ תִשָּׂאֶנּוּ אֶל-אַרְבַּע רוּחוֹת הַשָּׁמַיִם,
וּבִקַּשְׁתָּ וְלֹא-תִמְצָא לוֹ נִיב שְׂפָתַיִם.
וְאֶל-מִחוּץ לָעִיר תֵּצֵא וּבָאתָ אֶל בֵּית-הָעוֹלָם,
וְאַל-יִרְאֲךָ אִישׁ בְּלֶכְתְּךָ וִיחִידִי תָּבֹא שָׁמָּה,
וּפָקַדְתָּ קִבְרוֹת הַקְּדוֹשִׁים לְמִקְּטַנָּם וְעַד-גְּדוֹלָם,
וְנִצַּבְתָּ עַל עֲפָרָם הַתָּחוּחַ וְהִשְׁלַטְתִּי עָלֶיךָ דְּמָמָה:
וּלְבָבְךָ יִמַּק בְּךָ מֵעֹצֶר כְּאֵב וּכְלִמָּה –
וְעָצַרְתִּי אֶת-עֵינֶיךָ וְלֹא-תִהְיֶה דִמְעָה,
וְיָדַעְתָּ כִּי עֵת לִגְעוֹת הִיא כְּשׁוֹר קוּד עַל הַמַּעֲרָכָה –
וְהִקְשַׁחְתִּי אֶת-לְבָבְךָ וְלֹא-תָבֹא אֲנָחָה.
הִנֵּה הֵם עֶגְלִֵי הַטִּבְחָה, הִנֵּה הֵם שׁוֹכְבִים כֻּלָּם –
וְאִם יֵשׁ שִׁלּוּמִים לְמוֹתָם – אֱמֹר, בַּמֶּה יְשֻׁלָּם?
סִלְחוּ לִי, עֲלוּבֵי עוֹלָם, אֱלֹהֵיכֶם עָנִי כְמוֹתְכֶם,
עָנִי הוּא בְחַיֵּיכֶם וְקַל וָחֹמֶר בְּמוֹתְכֶם,
כִּי תָבֹאוּ מָחָר עַל-שְׂכַרְכֶם וּדְפַקְתֶּם עַל-דְּלָתָי –
אֶפְתְּחָה לָכֶם, בֹּאוּ וּרְאוּ: יָרַדְתִּי מִנְּכָסָי!

וְצַר לִי עֲלֵיכֶם, בָּנַי, וְלִבִּי לִבִּי עֲלֵיכֶם:
חַלְלֵיכֶם – חַלְלֵי חִנָּם, וְגַם-אֲנִי וְגַם-אַתֶּם
לֹא-יָדַעְנוּ לָמָּה מַתֶּם וְעַל-מִי וְעַל-מָה מַתֶּם,
וְאֵין טַעַם לְמוֹתְכֶם כְּמוֹ אֵין טַעַם לְחַיֵּיכֶם.
וּשְׁכִינָה מָה אוֹמֶרֶת? – הִיא תִּכְבֹּש בֶּעָנָן אֶת רֹאשָׁהּ
וּמֵעֹצֶר כְּאֵב וּכְלִמָּה פּוֹרֶשֶׁת וּבוֹכָה...
וְגַם-אֲנִי בַּלַּיְלָה בַלַּיְלָה אֵרֵד עַל הַקְּבָרִים,
אֶעֱמֹד אַבִּיט אֶל-הַחֲלָלִים וְאֵבוֹשׁ בַּמִּסְתָּרִים –
וְאוּלָם, חַי אָנִי, נְאוּם יְיָ, אִם-אוֹרִיד דִּמְעָה.
וְגָדוֹל הַכְּאֵב מְאֹד וּגְדוֹלָה מְאֹד הַכְּלִמָּה –
וּמַה-מִּשְּׁנֵיהֶם גָּדוֹל? – אֱמֹר אַתָּה, בֶּן אָדָם!
אוֹ טוֹב מִזֶּה – שְׁתֹק! וְדוּמָם הֱיֵה עֵדִי,
כִּי-מְצָאתַנִי בִקְלוֹנִי וַתִּרְאֵנִי בְּיוֹם אֵידִי;
וּכְשׁוּבְךָ אֶל-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ – אַל-תָּשׁוּב אֲלֵיהֶם רֵיקָם,
כִּי מוּסַר כְּלִמָּתִי תִּשָּׂא וְהוֹרַדְתּוֹ עַל-קָדְקֳדָם,
וּמִכְּאֵבִי תִּקַּח עִמְּךָ וַהֲשֵׁבוֹתוֹ אֶל-חֵיקָם.
וּפָנִיתָ לָלֶכֶת מֵעִם קִבְרוֹת הַמֵּתִים, וְעִכְּבָה
רֶגַע אֶחָד אֶת-עֵינֶיךָ רְפִידַת הַדֶּשֶׁא מִסָּבִיב,
וְהַדֶּשֶׁא רַךְ וְרָטֹב, כַּאֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בִּתְחִלַּת הָאָבִיב:
נִצָּנֵי הַמָּוֶת וַחֲצִיר קְבָרִים אַתָּה רוֹאֶה בְעֵינֶיךָ;
וְתָלַשְׁתָּ מֵהֶם מְלֹא הַכַּף וְהִשְׁלַכְתָּם לַאֲחוֹרֶיךָ,
לֵאמֹר: חָצִיר תָּלוּשׁ הָעָם – וְאִם-יֵשׁ לַתָּלוּשׁ תִּקְוָה?
וְעָצַמְתָּ אֶת-עֵינֶיךָ מֵרְאוֹתָם, וּלְקַחְתִּיךָ וַאֲשִׁיבְךָ
מִבֵּית-הַקְּבָרוֹת אֶל-אַחֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר חָיוּ מִן-הַטִּבְחָה,
וּבָאתָ עִמָּם בְּיוֹם צוּמָם אֶל בָּתֵּי תְפִלָּתָם
וְשָׁמַעְתָּ זַעֲקַת שִׁבְרָם וְנִסְחַפְתָּ בְדִמְעָתָם;
וְהַבַּיִת יִמָּלֵא יְלָלָה, בְּכִי וְנַאֲקַת פֶּרֶא,
וְסָמְרָה שַׂעֲרַת בְּשָׂרְךָ וּפַחַד יִקְרָאֲךָ וּרְעָדָה –
כָּכָה תֶּאֱנֹק אֻמָּה אֲשֶׁר אָבְדָה אָבָדָה...
וְאֶל-לְבָבָם תַּבִּיט – וְהִנּוֹ מִדְבָּר וְצִיָּה,
וְכִי-תִצְמַח בּוֹ חֲמַת נָקָם – לֹא תְחַיֶּה זֶרַע,
וְאַף קְלָלָה נִמְרֶצֶת אַחַת לֹא-תוֹלִיד עַל-שִׂפְתֵיהֶם.
הַאֵין פִּצְעֵיהֶם נֶאֱמָנִים – – וְלמָה תְפִלָּתָם רְמִיָּה?
לָמָּה יֱכַחֲשׁוּ לִי בְּיוֹם אֵידָם, וּמַה-בֶּצַע בְּכַחֲשֵׁיהֶם?
וּרְאֵה גַם-רְאֵה: עוֹד הֵם נְמַקִּים בִּיגוֹנָם,
כֻּלָּם יוֹרְדִים בַּבֶּכִי, יִשְּׂאוּ קִינָה בְּנִיהֶם,
וְהִנֵּה הֵם מְתוֹפְפִים עַל-לִבְבֵיהֶם וּמִתְוַדִּים עַל-עֲוֹנָם
לֵאמֹר: "אָשַׁמְנוּ בָּגַדְנוּ" – וְלִבָּם לֹא-יַאֲמִין לְפִיהֶם.
הֲיֶחֱטָא עֶצֶב נָפוֹץ וְאִם-שִׁבְרֵי חֶרֶשׂ יֶאְשָמוּ?
וְלָמָּה זֶה יִתְחַנְּנוּ אֵלָי? – דַּבֵּר אֲלֵיהֶם וְיִרְעָמוּ!
יָרִימוּ-נָא אֶגְרֹף כְּנֶגְדִי וְיִתְבְּעוּ אֶת עֶלְבּוֹנָם,
אֶת-עֶלְבּוֹן כָּל-הַדּוֹרוֹת מֵרֹאשָׁם וְעַד-סוֹפָם,
וִיפוֹצְצוּ הַשָּׁמַיִם וְכִסְאִי בְּאֶגְרוֹפָם.
וְגַם-אַתָּה, בֶּן-אָדָם, אַל-תִּבָּדֵל מִתּוֹךְ עֲדָתָם,
הַאֲמֵן לְנִגְעֵי לִבָּם וְאַל-תַּאֲמֵן לִתְחִנָּתָם;
וּבְהָרֵם הַחַזָּן קוֹלוֹ: "עֲשֵׂה לְמַעַן הַטְּבוּחִים!
עֲשֵׂה לְמַעַן תִּינֹוקוֹת! עֲשֵׂה לְמַעַן עוֹלְלֵי טִפּוּחִים"!
וְעַמּוּדֵי הַבַּיִת יִתְפַּלְּצוּ בְּזַעֲקַת תַּאֲנִיָּה,
וְסָמְרָה שַׂעֲרַת בְּשָׂרְךָ וּפַחַד יִקְרָאֲךָ וּרְעָדָה –
וְהִתְאַכְזַרְתִּי אֲנִי אֵלֶיךָ – וְלֹא תִגְעֶה אִתָּם בִּבְכִיָּה
וְכִי תִפְרֹץ שַׁאֲגָתְךָ – אֲנִי בֵּין שִׁנֶּיךָ אֲמִיתֶנָּה;
יְחַלְּלוֹּ לְבַדָּם צָרָתָם – וְאַתָּה אַל תְּחַלְּלֶנָּה.
תַּעֲמֹד הַצָּרָה לְדוֹרוֹת – צָרָה לֹא-נִסְפָּדָה,
וְדִמְעָתְךָ אַתָּה תֵּאָצֵר דִּמְעָה בְלִי-שְׁפוּכָה,
וּבָנִיתָ עָלֶיהָ מִבְצַר בַּרְזֶל וְחוֹמַת נְחוּשָׁה
שֶׁל-חֲמַת מָוֶת, שִׂנְאַת שְׁאוֹל וּמַשְׂטֵמָה כְבוּשָׁה,
וְנֹאחֲזָה בִלְבָבְךָ וְגָדְלָה שָׁם כְּפֶתֶן בִּמְאוּרָתוֹ,
וִינַקְתֶּם זֶה מִזֶּה וְלֹא-תמְצְאוּ מְנוּחָה;
וְהִרְעַבְתָּ וְהִצְמֵאתָ אוֹתוֹ – וְאַחַר תַּהֲרֹס חוֹמָתוֹ
וּבְרֹאשׁ פְּתָנִים אַכְזָר לַחָפְשִׁי תְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ
וְעַל-עַם עֶבְרָתְךָ וְחֶמְלָתְךָ בְּיוֹם רַעַם תְּצַוֶּנּוּ.
עַתָּה צֵא מִזֶּה וְשׁוּב הֵנָּה בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת
וְרָאִיתָ אַחֲרִית אֵבֶל עָם: וְהִנֵּה כָּל-אֵלֶּה הַנְּפָשׁוֹת
אֲשֶׁר-חָרְדוּ וְהֵקִיצוּ בֹקֶר – שָׁבוּ לָעֶרֶב וַתֵּרָדַמְנָה,
ִויגֵעֵי בֶכִי וְדַכֵּי רוּחַ הִנָּם עוֹמְדִים עַתָּה בַּחֲשֵׁכָה,
עוֹד הַשְּׂפָתַיִם נָעוֹת, מְפַלְּלוֹת – אַךְ הַלֵּב נָחַר תּוֹכוֹ,
וּבְלֹא נִיצוֹץ תִּקְוָה בַּלֵּב וּבְלִי שְׁבִיב אוֹר בָּעָיִן
הַיָּד תְּגַשֵּׁשׁ בָּאֲפֵלָה, תְּבַקֵּשׁ מִשְׁעָן – וָאִָיִן...
כָּכָה תֶּעְשַׁן עוֹד הַפְּתִילָה אַחֲרֵי כְלוֹת שַּמְנָהּ,
כָּךְ יִמְשֹׁךְ סוּס זָקֵן אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּר כֹּחוֹ.
לוּ אַגָּדַת תַּנְחוּמִים אַחַת הִנִּיחָה לָהֶם צָרָתָם,
לִהְיוֹת לָהֶם לִמְשִׁיבַת נֶפֶשׁ וּלְכַלְכֵּל שֵׂיבָתָם!
הִנֵּה כָלָה הַצּוֹם, קָרְאוּ "וַיְחַל", אָמְרוּ "עֲנֵנוּ" – וְלָמָּה
עוֹד הַצִּבּוּר מִתְמַהְמֵהַּ? – הַיִקְרְאוּ גַּם "אֵיכָה? –
לֹא! הִנֵּה דַרְשָׁן עוֹלֶה עַל-הַבָּמָה,
הִנֵּה הוּא פוֹתֵחַ פִּיו, מְגַמְגֵּם וּמְפִיחַ אֲמָרָיו,
טָח תָּפֵל וְלוֹחֵשׁ פְּסוּקִים עַל מַכָּתָם הַטְּרִיָּה,
וְאַף קוֹל אֱלֹהִים אֶחָד לֹא-יַצִּיל מִפִּיהוּ ,
גַּם-נִיצוֹץ קָטָן אֶחָד לֹא-יַדְלִיק בִּלְבָבָם;
וְעֵדֶר אֲדֹנָי עוֹמֵד בִּזְקֵנָיו וּבִנְעָרָיו,
אֵלֶּה שׁוֹמְעִים וּמְפַהֲקִים וְאֵלֶּה רֹאשׁ יָנִיעוּ;
תַּו הַמָּוֶת עַל-מִצְחָם וּלְבָבָם יֻכַּת שְׁאִיָּה.
מֵת רוּחָם, נָס לֵחָם, וֵאלֹהֵיהֶם עֲזָבָם.
וְגַם אַתָּה אַל-תָּנֹד לָהֶם, אַל-תְּזַעְזַע חִנָּם פִּצְעֵיהֶם,
אַל-תִּגְדֹּשׁ עוֹד לַשָּׁוְא סְאַת צָרָתָם הַגְּדוּשָׁה;
בַּאֲשֶׁר תִּגַּע אֶצְבָּעֲךָ – שָׁמָּה מַכָּה אֲנוּשָׁה,
כָּל-בְּשָׂרָם עֲלֵיהֶם יִכְאַב – אֲבָל נוֹשְׁנוּ בְּמַכְאוֹבֵיהֶם
וַיַּשְׁלִימוּ עִם חַיֵּי בָשְׁתָּם, וּמַה-בֶּצַע כִּי תְנַחֲמֵם?
עֲלוּבִים הֵם מִקְּצֹף עֲלֵיהֶם וְאוֹבְדִים הֵם מֵרַחֲמֵם;
הַנַּח לָהֶם וְיֵלֵכוּ – הִנֵּה יָצְאוּ הַכּוֹכָבִים,
וַאֲבֵלִים וַחֲפוּיֵי רֹאשׁ וּבְבֹשֶׁת גַּנָּבִים
אִישׁ אִישׁ עִם-נִגְעֵי לִבּוֹ יָשׁוּב הַבָּיְתָה,
וְגֵווֹ כָּפוּף מִשֶּׁהָיָה וְנַפְשׁוֹ רֵיקָה מִשֶּׁהָיְתָה,
וְאִישׁ אִישׁ עִם נִגְעֵי לִבּוֹ יַעֲלֶה עַל-מִשְׁכָּבוֹ
וְהַחֲלֻדָּה עַל-עֲצָמָיו וְהָרָקָב בִּלְבָבוֹ...
וְהָיָה כִּי-תַשְׁכִּים מָחָר וְיָצָאתָ בְּרֹאשׁ דְּרָכִים –
וְרָאִיתָ הֲמוֹן שִׁבְרֵי אָדָם נֶאֱנָקִים וְנֶאֱנָחִים,
צוֹבְאִים עַל חַלּוֹנוֹת גְּבִירִים וְחוֹנִים עַל הַפְּתָחִים,
מַכְרִיזִים בְּפֻמְבֵּי עַל-פִּצְעֵיהֶם כְּרוֹכֵל עַל-מַרְכֹּלֶת,
לְמִי גֻּלְגֹּלֶת רְצוּצָה וּלְמִי פֶּצַע יָד וְחַבּוּרָה,
וְכֻלָּם פּוֹשְׁטִים יָד כֵּהָה וְחוֹשְׂפִים זְרוֹעַ שְׁבוּרָה,
וְעֵינֵיהֶם, עֵינֵי עֲבָדִים מֻכִּים, אֶל יַד גְּבִירֵיהֶם
לֵאמֹר: "גֻּלְגֹּלֶת רְצוּצָה לִי, אָב "קָדוֹשׁ" לִי –תְּנָה אֶת תַּשְׁלוֹמֵיהֶם!"
וּגְבִירִים בְּנֵי רַחֲמָנִים מִתְמַלְּאִים עֲלֵיהֶם רַחֲמִים
וּמוֹשִׁיטִים לָהֶם מִבִּפְנִים מַקֵּל וְתַרְמִיל לַגֻּלְגֹּלֶת
אוֹמְרִים "בָּרוּךְ שֶׁפְּטָרָנוּ" – וְהַקַּבְּצָנִים מִתְנַחֲמִים.
לְבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת, קַבְּצָנִים! וַחֲפַרְתֶּם עַצְמוֹת אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם
וְעַצְמוֹת אַחֵיכֶם הַקְּדוֹשִׁים וּמִלֵּאתֶם תַּרְמִילֵיכֶם
וַעֲמַסְתֶּם אוֹתָם עַל-שֶׁכֶם וִיצָאתֶם לַדֶּרֶךְ, עֲתִידִים
לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּהֶם סְחוֹרָה בְּכָל-הַיְרִידִים;
וּרְאִיתֶם לָכֶם יָד בְּרֹאשׁ דְּרָכִים, לְעֵין רוֹאִים,
וּשְׁטַחְתֶּם אוֹתָם לַשֶּׁמֶשׁ עַל-סְמַרְטוּטֵיכֶם הַצֹּאִים,
וּבְגָרוֹן נִחָר שִׁירָה קַבְּצָנִית עֲלֵיהֶם תְּשׁוֹרְרוּ,
וּקְרָאתֶם לְחֶסֶד לְאֻמִּים וְהִתְפַּלַּלְתֶּם לְרַחֲמֵי גוֹיִם
וְכַאֲשֶׁר פְּשַׁטְתֶּם יָד תִּפְשֹׁטוּ, וְכַאֲשֶׁר שְׁנוֹרַרְתֶּם תִּשְׁנוֹרְרוּ.
וְעַתָּה מַה-לְךָ פֹּה, בֶּן-אָדָם, קוּם בְּרַח הַמִּדְבָּרָה
וְנָשָׂאתָ עִמְּךָ שָׁמָּה אֶת-כּוֹס הַיְגוֹנִים,
וְקָרַעְתָּ שָׁם אֶת-נַפְשְׁךָ לַעֲשָׂרָה קְרָעִים
וְאֶת-לְבָבְךָ תִּתֵּן מַאֲכָל לַחֲרוֹן אֵין-אוֹנִים,
וְדִמְעָתְךָ הַגְּדוֹלָה הוֹרֵד שָׁם עַל קָדְקֹד הַסְּלָעִים
וְשַׁאֲגָתְךָ הַמָּרָה שַׁלַּח – וְתֹאבַד בִּסְעָרָה.

Ki Tisa and the Nation

2011-02-16T23:15:00.000-08:00

(A short דבר תורה written for this week. For a more philosophical view on מחצית השקל and the dialectic discussed, see previous posts on the subject.)

In general, the world sees society as a way to find the maximum good for the largest number of individuals. Plato's Republic, Rousseu's Social Contract, all of these see unity and nationhood as means to the end of individual success and happiness. Even Christianity does so, in seeing the salvation of the individual as the greatest good, the highest completion of an individual.

Not so the Jewish Torah. Judaism sees a dialectic -- two interdependent, complementing, and at times, competing values: the individual, and the nation. On the one hand, the individual is seen throughout chassidut (especially Chabad) as a microcosm of the universe. Our personal avodas hashem, service of God, and responsibility for our actions are unquestioned.

However, in Torah thought, the Nation occupies its own unique and important role. Judaism sees the completion of the individual only through his contribution to, and building of, the nation -- the society. The Shulchan Aruch rules that one may keep all the laws, but if he separates himself from the community, for example by not fasting with them, he is incomplete as an individual. The teleological goal of Torah and Mitzvos is to bring about a just, complete society, which will be a light unto the nations, such that the nations will look to it, see utopia, and remark that "רק עם חכם ונבון הגוי הגדול הזה", and this immediately brings them to a recognition of God -- as the pasuk continues: ומי גוי גדול אשר לו חוקים ומשפטים צדיקים, the Torah God gave us.

The nation occupies a central place in Jewish philosophy, such that it can define halachik reality, for example, קידוש החדש, and setting the calendar, as we bless מקדש ישראל והזמנים, God sanctifies Isarael, who defines the calendar.

However, in our day to day lives, it is easy to forget this crucial element of our existence. We may easily fall into the trap of thinking that our individual lives are the only important thing, that our individual service of God can be complete in and of itself. Partly to counter this mistaken notion, and to remind us of our completion only through the nation, Hashem instituted the commandment of מחצית השקל. We give a half Shekel. Why not a whole one? As the commentators explain, this half is to remind us that without the nation, whithout counting our brothers and sisters as ourselves, without seeing our completion in the nation of Israel, we are only half. We are incomplete.

May we be spurred, by reading of the מחצית השקל,to find our way to synthesize the dialectic of individual and community, and arrive at a greater level of service of God and personal, and national, completion.

בשאלת מהות איסור חזרה בשבת

2010-11-24T09:24:00.000-08:00

במשנה בריש פרק כירה, דף לו: מח' ב"ש נוטלים אבל לא מחזירים (רש"י אומר כי מחזי כמבשל), וב"ה מתירים אף להחזיר. לח: ר' ששת אומר לב"ה, מחזירין אפילו בשבת.מח' בגמ' אם צריך עודו בידו ודעתו להחזיר, או מותר אף עם אחד מן התנאים. מיחם למיחם, תלה במקל, על מטה, תיקו.

- לרש"י, המשנה מדבר בליל שבת, וזה עיקר המח', ולכן דברי ר' ששת שמחזירין אפילו בשבת, מדובר ביום המחרת.הייתי חושב שבליל שבת מותר כי מוכח שאדעתה לאהדורי בשביל מחרת, אבל בשבת לא מוכחא מילתא, קמ"ל שאף ביום השבת מותר.לרש"י, לב"ש, מה שאסור זה ליל שבת.

- אבל תוס' אומר שפשטות המשנה מורה על עובדה שעיקר המח' זה בחול, לא בשבת. כל המשנה מובן יותר בקלות (במיוחד חלק הראשון) בערב שבת. לכן דברי ר' ששת "אפילו בשבת" מוסבים על ליל שבת. לתוס', מה שאסור לב"ש זה ערב שבת אם לא יוכל להרתיחו מבעוד יום. זה בעייתי לי, למה שיהיה אסור בע"ש, אף אם לא יוכל להרתיח מבעוד יום? איך זה שונה משהייה שמותר לפני שבת כדי שייגמר בישולו בשבת עצמו? איך חזרה זה אסור בגלל מחזי כמבשל אבל שהייה מותר?

- לענות על שאלתי, עיין רא"ש שמסביר. כמו תוס' הוא שואל כמה זמן קודם שבת אסור להחזיר? ועונה, 1 אסור היכא דנתקרר ואין שהות להרתיח מבעוד יום. אבל לא שמח עם זה, כי אז יש הבדל בין איסור חזרה בשבת לבע"ש, שבשבת אסור אף אם רותח, אבל בע"ש מותר אם כבר רותח. אז מסיק רא"ש וגם תוס' ש2 בע"ש אף אם רותח אסור כל היכא דאם היה קר לא היה יכול להרתיח עד שבת. ואיסור חול של חזרה זה כמו של שבת. בשבת כבר נתבשל ורק נמצא על הכירה להשהותה שם, כן נמי בע"ש, אסור להחזיר היינו אחר שנגמר הבישול ומניחה עומדת על הכירה להחזיק החום. ואם נטלה אז מן הכירה, אסור להחזירה, אטו שבת (אטו מחזי כמבשל שזה הסיבה שחזרה אסורה בשבת עצמה). וכולה חדא גזרה, כיון שלא מתבשלת עוד על הכירה זה כתחילת שהייה, ואם שרינן להחזיר מבעוד יום, יבוא לעשות כן בשבת. אבל כל זמן שלא נתבשלה כל צרכה וודאי נוטל ומחזיר כל הזמן, כי זה שהייה ולא חזרה. כל זמן שהוא עומד על האש בלא הפרעה ברציפות, זה שהייה שמותר. מיד כשמוריד מהאש, זה שובר את השהייה, ומייד כשיחזיר, זה ממש מחזי כמבשל, זה נראה כמו הפעולה של מבשל.

Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind, A Summary

2010-11-10T11:29:00.000-08:00

I have almost finished reading Bloom's Closing of the American Mind and, while I am sure I will have more to say in way of criticism and discussion in the future, for now I feel the need to summarize what he has written. The book is heavier reading than I expected, and I anticipate that the finer points may become blunted with the passage of time unless I commit his general thesis to writing while it is still fresh in my mind. Any corrections or comments are welcome.

Bloom argues that in modern culture, people have become homogenized; differences are shallow and culture presently contains only the most superficial elements of what culture used to mean.

Parents have lost control over their children's moral discipline with television and music replacing an anchored morality with relativistic moral theories. There are new morals for new times, and the old generation might get out of the way if they refuse to lend a hand.

Modern American interest in music, other people, relationships, religion, and love, lacks that which gave these things meaning and value. They are now immediate and appreciated for the most superficial elements they possess: love and Eros are really just sex; musical complexity, shades of meaning and passion are really just the heavy, brutish sexualized beat of rock. Making these sublime aspects of life immediately tangible and attainable by everyone, we have robbed them of their height; the ascent to the pinnacle of the mountain has been plowed to a plateau that is the lowest common demoninator.

American democracy has led to an egalitarian push to say that every child is creative, exceptional and genius. As soon as someone develops truly into these things, as a Beethoven or a Shakespeare, democracy pushes them back into the pack, because everyone standing out means no one really can.

In modern society's greatest success, the Enlightenment, Locke and his compatriots cast off the shackles of a social order led by a monarch (the type of society which put Socrates to death) who endangered the scientist/philosopher by trying to fit him into the social system and control his thoughts. They deliberately replaced monarchy with liberal democracy, which saw as the most protected, and the most sacred, the untouchable, the scientists and philosophers, who ultimately ran the society as puppeteers. However, natural science went its own way with its freedom, leaving the unifying meta-system, philosophy, in the cold. While Kant bridged the gap, giving natural science and reason its limits and providing a framework for everything else, Rousseau, and, later Nietzsche and Heidegger, saw the weakness of reason and the contemplative life. They saw action as superior to thought. Thus, in a backlash against the contemplative side of the scientist/philosopher, and against the Enlightenment in fact, they took advantage of the natural sciences and eschewed the historical consciousness called for by the Enlightenment (a prime example is the philosophical climate of the Soviet Union). Viva Activa was better than Viva Contemplativa. Values are relative, and there is no way for one to pass judgment other than action. It is this reaction that ushered in the collapse of the University as an independent, sacred ground for thinkers with true academic freedom. It is here that the University became simply another arena in which the cultural and political theories and parties acted out their battles.

And it is precisely this backlash against the Enlightenment that has come to the shores of America, decades after Heidegger's capitulation of the German University. In the American sixties, as in the twenties in Germany, the University has lost its sacred status as the source of contemplative thought and open, free discourse. The Black Power movement is only a powerful example of what is happening and continues to happen. Bloom quotes Marx, that "History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." In Germany, it was the right, here, it is the left, but it is the same dismantling of the University and the contemplative life in both cases. The professors are unable to defend the University because they have lost vision of its purpose. They try to give the public what it wants, because they have forgotten what it means to educate, to raise above the mundane and create a beacon of academic freedom and honesty. They strip core classes of languages, history, philosophy, and they thus turn their schools into vocational schools, not meant to educate and ennoble, but meant to give economical and political power to their charges.

In addition, a new interest in morality rose in the student body (which was indicative of general society). This was not the quiet morality of doing no evil, telling the truth and respecting elders -- the brand of morality that makes sacrifice every day, which Kant claimed is understood by the child but takes a lifetime of humble goodness to achieve. Rather, this new morality was the morality not of keeping laws, but of breaking them in the name of a higher law. It was a constant crisis, not acknowledging true morality, and seeing the moral struggle only in the epic, they type of struggle which in reality is truly rare. (We can see this today with University students championing the major moral causes as their own, while living personally amoral lives.) Aside from its own problems, this morality had the unfortunate result of allowing students to blithely equate morally between the Beast of Belsen and the secretaries of the War Draft Board. (To my mind comes immediately the ridiculous assertion held on many University campuses and in society as a whole that Israel is as apartheid South Africa was, or that IDF commanders are Nazis. When we see things so starkly, and see our moral banners as the apex of moral struggles, we tend to blur the distinctions between situations, and judge passionately instead of rationally.)

The loss of purpose in the American university is mirrored by the inability of the students to see anything in life as worth striving for, as of higher moral or cultural value than anything else they see around them. The High Culture of society, embodied in the University has become lost and that institution simply reflects now the low culture of society.

The University has excelled at pigeon-holeing increasingly specific fields of knowledge, demonstrating an ability to split the atom, cure cancer, aggregate lexicons of lost languages, collate and study massive amounts of data in psychological studes. It remains, however, unable to define a basic path to a general education of its students. This path, Bloom states, is the concept of the Great Books. Reading these works without the historicism of the humanities, rather as living documents that speak to modern society, is the only way to provide a passion and interest in a holistic application of education to the students. However, most faculties ignore this method, or despise it.

The fact is that natural science sees itself as the sole posessor of true knowledge. It handles empirical fields, the ones that see matter as unified and humans as matter. They see the Great Books as a spiritual quest, but not immediately impactive of their study. On the other hand, the study of that which makes a human human, what is known in religion as the soul, this study is split into humanites, viewing it as an art (Rosseau), and the social sciences, which prefer to view it as a science (and itself as the next rung on the ladder after biology), and qunatifiable (Locke). These two disciplines disagree over their very subject matter. The latter views the Great Books as inapplicable to itself as they are in essence a science (desiring to attain the status of the natural sciences), while the former is embarrassed by what is exposed in the Great Books, rascism, elitsm and sexism.

The destruction of the University and the cheapening of the human experience is what America must struggle with. History will judge her, and we must act to provide the University with a reason for existence, and the student a true depth resultant from a true education. (I believe Bloom's statement here may be reflective of his feeling toward modern humanity in general, not just America.)

A Hauntingly Beautiful Song

2010-10-05T00:51:00.000-07:00

השקט שוב צונח כאן משמי הערב

כדאיית דיה מעל התהומות

ושמש אדומה נושקת להט חרב

את הפסגות, המגדלים והחומות.

ראיתי עיר עוטפת אור

והיא עולה בשלל צבעי הקשת

והיא נוגנת בי כנבל העשור

ראיתי עיר עוטפת אור.

הנה זוחל הצל מבין גבעות האורן

קרב בסתר כאוהב אל השכונות.

ומול פניו קריצות, ריבוא עיני האור הן,

לפתע נפקחו אליו כנפעמות.

ראיתי עיר עוטפת אור...

בדממת אשמורת אחרונה נושמת,

ובקטיפת שחקים רסיס אחרון מחויר,

אך שחר כבר כיפת זהב שלה אודמת

למגעו החם, הרך של אור צעיר.

ראיתי עיר עוטפת אור...

(Words from here.) Yossi Sarig was born in 1944. After serving in the IDF, he studied music, which he taught and wrote until the Yom Kippur War. During this war (arguably the greatest threat to Israel's existence of all Arab-Israeli Wars), Yossi served as commander of a unit of tanks in the Golan Heights. It is there that he fell on 10 Oct, 1973.

One year before his death, Yossi was asked to write a song to celebrate five years of Jerusalem's re-unification. His song אור וירושלים, Light and Jerusalem, is performed above by הפרברים.

Tearing "K'ri'ah" At the Kotel

2010-09-28T00:04:00.000-07:00

Disclaimer: As in all halachik discussions, what appears below is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.

The Talmud (מו"ק כו:א) discusses the commandment of rending one's clothing in three distinct situations: the first is when learning of a relative's (or, under specific circumstances, even non-relatives) death. This is a commonly known law. However, less known is the law to 2) tear "קריעה" (rending) upon various pieces of bad news. An additional category of קריעה is 3) upon the desolate cities of Judea, and the remains of the Temple:

"אמר ר' אלעזר: הרואה ערי יהודה בחורבנן אומר ערי קדשך היו מדבר וקורע. ירושלים בחורבנה, אומר ציון מדבר היתה ירושלים שממה וקורע. בית המקדש בחורבנו, אומר בית קדשינו ותפארתינו אשר הללוך אבותינו היה לשריפת אש וכל מחמדינו היה לחרבה וקורע."

Cities that are under Jewish control would no longer be subject to this law (see שו"ע או"ח תקס"א -- it seems הכל תלוי בשלטון) -- such that we would no longer tear קריעה on Jerusalem, but we would on Bethlehem which, while given to us in the Six Day War by God, was handed over to our enemies by our own government later on. However, even while under Jewish sovereignty, the Temple Mount would still be subject to קריעה, as the tragedy is not so much its control by others, as its desolation and absence of the בית המקדש.

Codified by the Shulchan Aruch (יו"ד ש"מ ל"ח-ל"ט), the law is that one who visits the Temple Mount after longer than 30 days of absence tears his garment. (If one finds this law difficult to observe, he can give his shirt to a friend as a gift, and even while he still wears it, would be exempt from tearing it, since one may not tear a shirt owned by another. This gift must be true, and Rabbi Eliezer Melamed comments that one should at least tear a shirt over the desolation of the Temple Mount once in his life.)

The question that came up yesterday was, what if a person visits the Kotel for the first time in 30 days on חול המועד? On the Sabbath or full-fledged holiday, it is clear that קריעה is not done (שו"ע סע' ל"א). What of חול המועד?

As with the other two categories of קריעה, this would be subject to a rishonic dispute. According to the Mordechai and Ramban, one would tear as usual during חול המועד, but according to the T'rumat Hadeshen, one would refrain, as one does on a full-fledged holiday, unless the קריעה is on parents. The Shulchan Aruch declares that one would tear on חול המועד. The Rema rules as the T'rumat Hadeshen, and yet, in a place with no standard tradition, he rules as the Shulchan Aruch.

It would seem from this that the S'faradim would tear on Chol Hamoed, while the Ashkenazim would refrain. However, Rabbi Melamed mentions that in general, the מנהג is that on Chol Hamoed, one does not tear. (This combined with the especially festive atmosphere at the Kotel during Chol Hamoed make it seem particularly out of place for a person to tear קריעה in front of others at a time when even the laws of אבילות are only observed in private.)

The question that remains is, if one arrived at the Kotel on חול המועד and therefore did not tear, but then re-visits within 30 days, after the holiday, would he be required to tear since he did not fulfill his obligation on the holiday? Is the obligation to tear one that is simply נדחה, pushed off, during the holiday, and re-devolves upon a person immediately afterwards (as is the case in tearing over a death), or is the nature of the obligation different?

The answer can be inferred from the מגן אברהם in או"ח סי' תקס"א, where the law of tearing for the Temple is discussed again. He deals with a case where a person was raised in Jerusalem. As a child, he does not have a requirement to tear. However, upon reaching the age of Bar Mitzvah, although he has an obligation to tear, he is not in a position to tear, since he has seen the Temple area within thirty days! Such a person would never be required to tear, unless he were to leave Jerusalem for longer than thirty days. The ערוך השולחן rules so, as well.

It seems clear from this discussion that the requirement to tear is fundamentally one which requires the "newness" of not having seen the Temple area for thirty days. Only if this requirement is fulfilled would one tear. If one has seen the Temple Mount during a time of פטור, when he is younger than thirteen, it seems clear that he has nonetheless seen the area and is thus no longer obligated in tearing קריעה. Tearing over the Temple Mount is fundamentally different in its parameters from tearing over a dead relative.

It seems to me that this reasoning applies in completely the same way to seeing the Kotel on חול המועד. Thus, one who sees the Kotel on חול המועד and then returns to the site afterwards, would not tear on חול המועד, and would also not tear after the holiday, until having been absent from the Temple area for longer than thirty days. (I was pleased to see that Rabbi Melamed comes to the same conclusion as I do.)

May God help us rebuild his Holy Temple quickly. May these laws become theoretical discussions, and no longer practical, with the pilgrimage of the nation to the בית המקדש.

Again, the above is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.

Basics of Music

2010-09-06T23:38:00.000-07:00

Apropos of not much, here is an outline sketch of what is colloquially called "Classical Music":

Early Period: Voice, Gregorian chant, Choral church music. until about 1400.

Medieval Period: More instrumentation, Renaissance period -- introduction of bass instruments and musical transcription. 1400 - 1600.

Common Practice Period:

Baroque Period: 1600 - 18th C. Continuous bass line, use of counterpoint (independent musical voices enunciated together that are harmonically interrelated), distinction of maj/minor motifs. More ensemble, chamber music. eg Bach, Handel.

Classical Period: 18th C - 1820's. Symphonies. More order to music, use of single reed instruments. eg. WA Mozart, Haydn.

Romantic Period: 1820 - 1910. Nationalist (eg Wagner, Dvorak). Less order, even as orchestras began forming for classical period music. Nocturnes, preludes -- free-form. Piano in present form. Romantic, emotional motives and themes. Grand opera. Eg. Beethoven (really straddles Classical and Romantic), Shubert.

Universal Kindness

2010-08-06T07:22:00.000-07:00

In parashat Re'eh, the Jewish nation is poised on the banks of the Jordan, ready to enter the Promised Land. Here, at the threshold of their national destiny, Moshe their leader delivers an epic farewell oratory. The speech is more than a review of their past; it is a vision of their future. Moshe focuses upon the laws that have particular relevance to the national and civil aspects of communal life. It comes as no surprise that Moshe exhorts the Jews regarding laws such as charity. However, he also reviews the foods Jews may eat, and those from which they must abstain. How do the laws of kashrut relate to the nation as a whole?

The food we ingest becomes part of our bodies. In the most literal way possible, what we intake is the source of our energy. Every word spoken, every lifted finger, is powered by what we have eaten. And so, a Jew is careful of what he eats and how he eats it. The commentators discuss many kosher and non-kosher animals, pointing out traits that are desirable or undesirable, to help explain their kosher status.

However, Rabbi Wollenberg from England points out in an article on this week's parsha, one non-kosher animal seems to have a positive trait. The Talmud explains that the stork, called chasidah, is so named for its propensity to do chesed, kindness towards its own kind. This seems like an emulable trait; why is the stork forbidden?

The Kotzker Rebbe explains: the stork engages in acts of kindness towards its own kind. However, this kindness does not extend to those outside the stork's family. The rabbi from Kotzk says that it is not enough, and we may not ignore those outside our circles.

On the face of things, this answer seems like quite a beautiful lesson. However, if we examine the laws of charity, we find that (ב"מ ע"א) "aniyei ircha kodmim": when giving tzedaka, we are responsible first for our own families, then for our own town, then our own city. The laws of charity seem to agree with the kindness of the stork! How can the Kotzker call kindness directed towards one's own kind "unkosher", when that is precisely what the halacha seems to require?

The answer to this question can be found in a subtle distinction between the two. In the laws of charity, the closer circles to a person take precedence. It is not that one may cease to give charity after his own are satisfied. The halacha simply informs us of the proper order. Loving-kindness begins at home, but in no way does it stop there. The light and benificence of the Torah emenates forth and eventually envelops the world. This is in stark contrast to the stork, who the Talmud tells us, limits its kindness exclusively to its own.

It is one of the hardest tasks in our lives not only to do good, but to do ordered good. Order, seder, gives structure to our actions, and allows them to be, not only good now, or in an hour, but in twenty years. My father-in-law often tells me that this is a lesson he received from Rabbi Tessler, of blessed memory: ensure that the good you do is true good, not superficial good. When we order our priorities, we are able to ensure that no good goes undone, while at the same time, none is decayed by exaggeration or neglect.

In one of Rav Kook's pieces of poetry, his 'שיר מרובע', he describes the passage of a man from his concern over his personal redemption, to an interest in Jewish National redemption. From there, the protagonist finds a higher plane of redemption, that of all Mankind. Finally, he ends by finding the ultimate redemption, the redemption of the Universe, and the validation of Creation.

Rav Kook in this poem is not describing layers of consciousness that replace each other. He is rather speaking about maintaining four discrete views in harmony, allowing each to influence and vitalize the other properly. The song is of wisely choosing from a blending of the four perspectives that which best suits whatever situation one experiences.

In Moshe's time and today as well, the transition from desert to Israel is one in which the Jews are tasked with taking the physical and spiritual midbar and converting it to a gan Hashem. Upon entry to Israel, a group of individuals begin the task of building a healthy national home. The rights of the individual and the needs of the community will come into conflict more and more. How are we to properly provide each with their just desserts?

The only way to do this correctly is to maintain different perspectives, individual, national, global and universal. We may not stop at any point, as the stork does. We must recognize the priorities set, but not lose ourselves within their details and waypoints. Thus the chasidah gives way to true chesed, and the individual finds his place not by being erased or lost in the group, but by being given his proper place within the community.

Kashrut, then, provides deep lessons for a nation building a state. The teachings imparted certainly are relevant to the Jews at the doorway to Israel.

בענין שהייה מטעם הטמנה

2010-06-17T13:04:00.000-07:00

במס' שבת, לו: - לח. משנה: כירה (יש לו מקום שתיפת שתי קדרות ופיו למעלה) שהוסקה בקש וגבבא (שעושים אש חלש) מותר לשים עליו תבשיל. בגפת ועצים (שעושים אש חזק) חייבים לגרוף או לשים אפר על הגחלים קודם. (רמב"ם וטור: גריפה זה להוציא את כל הגחלים, ר"ן בשם רז"ה: להזיז גחלים לצד.)

- למה צריכים גריפה או קטימה? לרש"י זה משום תוספת הבל, וגו"ק ממעטת את החום. רעיון זה של תוספת הבל מובא ע"י רש"י מכד: שם מדובר בהטמנה. שם מבואר שאם ההטמנה מוסיפה הבל, אסור שמא יחתה. משמע מפה שרש"י אוחז שהטמנה ושהייה/חזרה הם אותו ענין. רש"י אומר בפירוש שזה אותו ענין, ואף שגו"ק מהני אף בהטמנה: "וגזרו אף בבישלה כל צרכה עד שיגרוף או שיקטום, והכי מסקינן בפרק כירה דאמר רבי: קטמה והובערה - משהין עליה חמין שהוחמו מבעוד יום כל צרכן." אבל תוס' מצטט ר"י שאף בגו"ק של שהייה עדיין מוסיף הבל אלא הסיבה לגו"ק הוא "דילמא אתי לחתויי". תוס' במז: מביא ר"ת שמסביר שיש הבדל בסיסי בין הטמנה לשהייה. בשהייה, שליט ביה אוירא, וחתוי מעט לא משנה הרבה. אבל בהטמנה, כל חתוי עלול לעזור לתהליך הבישול אם טומן בדבר המוסיף הבל (ואסרו כל דבר המוסיף הבל כגזירה שמא יסיק ברמץ, שזה מאוד חם – חשוב לזכור שמדובר בגזירה לגזירה לד:). זה מבואר בפירוש בתוס' שלנו, שבו ר"י אומר שדוקא בהטמנה רעיון "מוסיף הבל" מביא לידי איסור שמא יחתה. אבל בשהייה, לא תלוי במוסיף הבל כלל, אלא בהיכר לעצרו מלחתות.

- לרש"י, חשוב לציין שדין הטמנה כדין שהייה בזה שביז: מוסק שרק אסור שהייה במשהו "בשיל ולא בשיל". אבל אם בושל כל צרכו או נע, מותר

- ב"ש: כל ההיתר זה בחמין אבל לא תבשיל (רש"י: כי חמין לא צריכין בישול עוד ואין גזירה שמא יחתה, אבל תבשיל, ניחא בישולו ואתי לחתויי, או נתקיימה מחשבו, ומחזי כמבשל.) , וב"ה: גם בתבשיל.

- ב"ש: נוטלין אבל לא מחזירין לכירה, אפילו גו"ק, ב"ה: אף מחזירין.

- תנור (מקום לקדרה אחת) שהוסק בקש וגבבא אסור ליתן בו או עליו, כי התנור חומו יתרה הרבה. כופח, זה באמצע, חומו יותר מכירה ופחות מתנור, לכן אם הוסק בקש וגבבא, דינו ככירה, בגפת ועצים דינו כתנור.

- בגמ', שקלינן ותרינן אם המשנה מדברת על שהייה או החזרה. כחנניה, שרק בהחזרה בעי גו"ק, אבל בשהייה, מותר אף בלי גו"ק, וכל שהוא כמאכל בן דרוסאי מותר לשהות, או דילמא המשנה מדברת בשהייה, אבל החזרה, אסור.

- רש"י ותוס' (בשם ר"י): יש סתמא משנה של נותנים חררה על גבי גחלים אם קרמו פניה, וזה משמע כחנניה, ועל זה סומכים אנו דמשהינן קדרה על גבי כירה. משמע מהם שהם לא חולקים על הסבר הרא"ש מהי מסקנת הסוגיא, אלא מתגברים על מסקנת סוגייתינו ע"י להביא סתם משנה שמשמע כחנניה. רא"ש: מסקנת הסוגייא היא לחומרא, שמדובר בשהייה, וההוכחה היא שהמשך הגמ' מניה ש"תוכה וגבה הוא דאסיר", משמע שהגמ' לוקחת כנתון ששהייה על גבה אסור בלא גו"ק. הרא"ש מסיים שרבו הדיעות בזה וישראל אדוקים במצוות עונג שבת, ולא ישמעו להחמיר, הנח להם כמנהג שנהגו על פי הפוסקים כחנניה. רי"ף מביא ראיות לחומרא.

- רמות בישול: 1) נע 2) התחיל לבשל 3) מאכל בן דרוסאי 4) מצטמק ויפה לו 5) מצטמק ורע לו. 5 נחשב מבושל כל צרכו. 4, טור אומר שלא נחשב מבושל כל צרכו. יש מח' אם 3 נחשב מבושל כל צרכו.

Hirsch and the Categorical Imperative

2010-06-08T09:09:00.000-07:00

"It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our sense. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them; that manner...not necessarily shared by every being, though, no doubt, by every human being." (Critique 37)

With this revolution in epistemology, Immanuel Kant forever changes the direction of philosophy. After ensuring that all noumena are permanently and fundamentally hidden behind the veil of human perception and sense in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant finds religion and morality in quite a precarious position. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he discusses the saving grace, in his thought, of morality, an a priori and innate morality not derived from experience. Kant calls this objective foundation of "good", the categorical imperative. A necessary corollary of such an innate drive is a God. Thus, Kant, in his own mind, provides for the necessity of a God, and a general inborn human drive to be moral. This far comes Kant.

The purpose of this short post is not to point out the weaknesses in this theory. Kant's ideas were the turning point of philosophy, and the percussions of his ground-breaking theory of the ultimate reality, conceivable by thought and yet un-perceivable in experience, were felt everywhere. So, it is valuable to see how a Jewish philosopher might respond to this theory that rejects absolute knowledge of Godly command.

And indeed, Rabbi SR Hirsch praised Kant. He considered him one who reached the doorstep of Judaism, and by tragedy of ignorance, came no further. For Hirsch, the categorical imperative is not morality, for the moral universe is not what is, but what must be (Grunfeld LXXV). (Rabbi Hirsch makes this point in discussion of the Golden Calf: that the sin immediately after revelation is yet another indication of the Divine origin of the Law, a Law that is hoisted upon people by God who are not yet morally ready for it, as opposed to an organic moral progressive process of wise men in the life of the people.)The innate moral voice in Man is not the voice of morality, it is the yearning for morality. Man's sense of good and evil is not perfect, too much variation exists to be able to call it that. What is constant however, is the desire, the striving to a moral structure. Kant confused the homonomy (self-commanded law) with the desire for a formulated heteronomy.

By making this simple but crucial adjustment in Kant's theory of Practical Reason, Rabbi Hirsch supremely empowers the categorical imperative. No longer does morality hinge upon the sparse commonality of Man's inner moral voice. Hirsch's innate desire for a moral structure, as Kant's innate morality, posits a God. However, Hirsch's conception of the imperative also posits a revelation of Divine Will -- the definition of the heteronomous morality towards which the yearning innate in Man strives. For if humanity is to strive towards an ideal of morality, and if this yearning presupposes a God, then, taken together, these two ideas require a God-given moral code for Man to work towards. The categorical imperative then, for Rabbi Hirsch, is not the oracle of "good" carried personally in every man's breast. Rather, each man carries within him a piece of the morality puzzle, an innate reminder that there is a moral law that must be attained in this world, and that it must be available somehow.

Of course, this leads in to a discussion of the Torah and the scientific necessity to study it from within instead of from without. Perhaps more on that some other time.

Gaza Flotilla

2010-06-01T00:50:00.000-07:00

The international media and world governments have reacted to Israel's boarding of the Gaza flotilla. The almost universal reaction has been the condemnation of Israel's boarding of a peacefully intentioned vessel in international waters.

I am not so naive as to believe that the truth will change the minds of the media and global leaders. I have seen enough to know that the world has lost its patience with the truth in Israel's case. The media and world organs have provided the Arab world with a mouthpiece, and have repeated the lies so often that they trump truth. The word "occupation" has been used so much, that the world forgets the armistance agreements in '67 and '73, agreements which define Israel's legally binding international frontiers, and provide the West Bank and Gaza as Israeli territory until Israel, Egypt and Jordan, draw up new agreements otherwise. The word "apartheid" is bandied about so that the true racial oppression of actual citizens in South Africa is forgotten. Israeli treatment of non-citizen terrorists is viewed as the mistreatment of law-abiding citizens. Israel's equality and democracy for its diverse citizenry is ignored. The terms "illegal settlement" and "illegal blockade" twist morally and legally acceptable actions into evil practices. And the final, perfect irony, the use of the term "Nazi", calling to memory the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians, is used to describe the limited actions of a state surrounded and attacked on two sides, to handle actual terrorists intent on the murder of non-combatants.

However, I know that in the end, the truth matters. It matters to us, as we deal with attacks from every side. It matters to Jews world over who know not what to say when confronted by enemies of the truth, who use lies and propoganda to veil their new anti-semitism, called anti-zionism. And the truth will matter when the world once again, for however short a period of time, considers the facts instead of the screams of the mob.

So what is the truth?

1) Hamas is an internationally recognized terrorist organization. (Many may feel that Hamas is a freedom-fighting organization, and not terrorists. In a moment of honesty, however, the free world has named them terrorists because they attack civilians and utilize tactics to induce the population of Israel to fear. Those who choose to label Hamas as anything other than terrorists will have to redefine the word terror.)
2) Hamas is in control of Gaza not through democratic means; rather, they wrested control from the ruling party through violence, bloodshed and intimidation directed towards the residents of Gaza.
3) Since the violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel and Egypt, with the support of most western Governments, have effected a blockade of Gaza.
4) The sole purpose of this blockade is to prevent arms from reaching the terrorists. Literally hundreds of tons of food reach Gaza from Israel weekly. Gazans are routinely brought to Israeli hospitals for treatment that is beyond the ken of Gazan doctors.
5) The flotilla's express purpose is not to bring food and relief to Gaza. If that was their purpose, they would have agreed to Israel's offer to take the supplies in to Gaza after inspection. The expressed purpose of the flotilla was to break the blockade in place to prevent weaponse from reaching terrorists.
6) According to international agreements regarding running of blockades (see the San Remo Manual, article 67), a ship is boardable even on the high seas if it intends to run a blockade. It is considered in violation of a blockade the moment it sets out from port with the purpose of running the blockade. Israel acted within international law. The use of force is permitted as a last resort.
7) Some say Israel should have allowed the ship through. They say that this would have been less damaging to Israel. However, this is far from true. Israel had three choices: 1) allow the ship through, 2) physically block the ship and reach a standoff situation, 3) take the ships to Israel after boarding them. The third option was the best choice in a sitation that contained only bad choices. (1) would have presented Israel as a paper tiger, unable or unwilling to enforce its own blockade. Further, it would have allowed in potential weaponry and terrorists to Gaza. (2) would have resulted in a standoff situation in which the flotilla members would have used the media to their advantage: imagine the flotilla members going on a hunger strike until being allowed to run the blockade! Or the flotilla ships may have rammed Navy vessels, requiring the use of much more force. Israel really had no choice but to board.
7) The flotilla members claimed the would be non-violent and resist passively. Video and images from the boats reveal these verbal assurances to be lies. The soldiers of Israel's Navy, carrying out legally sanctioned actions, were beaten and thrown overboard, stabbed and shot, by the 'non-violent' protestors. The fact that the feeling around the world is that Israel opened fire on unarmed civilians shows just how powerfully the flotilla members are in control of the media surrounding this event, and/or how biased the world is against Israel.

In conclusion, the Israelis acted within their legal rights and responsibilities towards their citizens. The flotilla was made up of provocateurs whose purpose was to score a big PR win for their side. The state of Israel's image in a world that is tired of the truth and just wants Israel to go away is such that Israel lost the PR battle before it began. Anything Israel did would be reported gleefully, either as a weakness in blockade, or cruelty in boarding.

And to counter all the disinformation, here is a picture of a 'peaceful flotilla member' describing his plans for the Israeli soldiers:

And here is a video documenting the violence met by the Israelis in enforcing their internationally-recognized blockade:

Good Neighbors

2010-05-14T14:12:00.000-07:00

In the description of the encampment of the different tribes around the mishkan, the Torah (Bamidbar 3:29) tells us that the tribe of Reuven was in the vicinity of the family of Korach. The Rabbis learn from this that, "Woe is to the wicked, and woe to his neighbor," while "good befalls the righteous, and also his neighbor."

This teaching is mentioned in three different rabbinic sources, and each one delivers it utilizing slightly different diction. In Likutei Sichot, the Lubavitcher Rebbe examines each one in depth. The changes are nuanced, but reflect more than one would think at first glance. By examining each variation, one in Midrash Tanchuma, one in Bamidbar Rabah, and the final one in Rashi's commentary, we can come to a deeper understanding of the power and meaning behind being judged by the company we keep.

In the Tanchuma, it states that the tree tribes bordering on Korach and his compatriots, "avdu imo b'machlok'to", they were destroyed with Korach on account of his divisiveness. This describes the most superficial result of proximity to the wicked: when they get punished, those who dwell beside them are affected, as well.

Rashi's commentary changes the language: "l'kach laku mehem Datan V'Aviram...shenimsh'chu imahem b'machl'kotam", because they joined in the clash with Korach against Moshe, Datan and Aviram were punished. Clearly, Rashi implicates the non-Levites who died with Korach in his sin. It is not mere proximity that doomed them; rather, their proximity led them to join in the sins of the wicked, and thus, deserve punishment. This is a second way that neighboring with evil people brings disaster: there is a palpable danger that one will learn from their ways.

Finally, Bamidbar Rabah puts forth a third variation upon the midrash. "mi hayu ba'alei machloket? Korach...ul'fi shehayu s'muchim kahem R'uven, Shimon v'Gad, hayu kulam ba'alei machloket." Who were the ones in dispute with Moshe? Korach. However, the tribes who lived beside them were all parties to dispute. Likutei Sichot notices the use of the past tense verb here, and therefore understands that this is yet a third dimension to the teaching of chazal: one who ends up dwelling with the wicked reveals a latent tendency within himself to negative influences and behaviors. This is reminiscient of Lot, whose greed and desire for importance led him to the decedance of S'dom, where he became "head to jackals", rather than remain the tail of Avraham's lion (Avot 4:20).

The three aspects of neighblorly effect on one's life also seem to be present in those who choose to live in the vicinity of the righteous. One who makes himself close to tzadikim can benefit from their blessings, as well as learn from their ways. Also, it seems that the impulse to be close to good people is, in itself, fulfillment of an ethical imperative. Rabbi Yose ben Kisma summed this up in 6:9 of Avot.

In modern times, we do not have as much choice as we may like in who our neighbors are. We have limited control over who our children play with, as well. Furthermore, we have a responsibility to help fellow Jews who have lost the path of Torah back to orthodoxy. In light of these realities, how are we to assure ourselves that these aspects of peer pressure are kept in check?

In the past, the book of Job has been quite boring for me. More than forty chapters of long-winded speeches, alternatively complaining about and defending God's ways seem almost like a literary attempt at redundancy. However, I am reading Job's Path to Enlightenment, by Ethan Dor-Shav. By reading the text of Job closely, he comes up with some fascinating insights into the psychology and foundations of faith and religion that apply not only to people in pain and suffering, but to anyone who finds value in a real relationship with Hashem. One of his points, I believe, may perhaps shed light on how we can defend ourselves against the concept of "woe to the wicked's neighbor."

It is generally assumed that Job was a model of virtue before his test from Satan. However, if we pay closer attention, he is only described as lacking the negative: "innocent and straight, and one who feared God and turned away from evil." Indeed, tamim carries a connotation throughout the Bible of naivete. The fourth son at the seder would hardly be considered a tzaddik because of his "innocence"; it is rather a fundamental simplicity that is to be removed by the father and replaced with knowledge and sophistication. Also, Job is described as turning away from evil, but not at all as one who embraces good. He is a model of "virtue devoid of awareness." He is good by rote, by mechanical practice of duty, without developing that spark of interest and passion that marks individuals who engage in a search for closeness to God, "kirvat elokim li tov." Indeed, the essay goes on to demonstrate how Job's suffering bring him to a renewed interest in authentic communion with the Divine, which is only possible when blind routine is expunged from his life.

Most of us live with elements of Job-ness every day. Even when we are passionate and feel close to God, we find ourselves fulfilling the letter of the laws of prayer, tefillin, shabbat-observance and kashrut with an atmosphere of dissociation. In this type of situation, we are in danger of all three elements of neighborly influence. Our very passivity leads us to associate with like people, and we influence each other. The general level of communal observance and passion towards spiritual endeavors may fall, and ultimately, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. So, the lowest common denominator can be reached.

By learning a lesson from the book of Job, we can infuse our duties towards God and our desire for an intimate bond with Him with a sense of true longing and active, authentic growth. With a sense of purpose and awareness of our position, we can overcome the problems of Korach and Reuven. Instead of being influenced by those who are less than perfect, we can develop ourselves as strong role-models for them, and bring them up, rather than be dragged down.

Independence Day

2010-04-19T10:33:00.000-07:00

הלא זה אוד מצל מאש -- זכריה ג:ב
"Is this not a remnant saved from the inferno?"

וקבצתי אתכם מכל הארצות והבאתי אתכם אל אדמתכם -- יחזקאל לו:כד
"I shall gather you from all the lands, and bring you back to your land!"

והשבותי אתכם אל המקום אשר הגליתי אתכם משם -- ירמיהו כט:יד
"I will return you to the place from where I exiled you."

ואספתי אתכם מן הארצות אשר נפוצותם בהם ונתתי לכם את אדמת ישראל -- יחזקאל יא:יז
"I will gather you from the lands of your dispersion and bring you to Israel."

ויש תקוה לאחריתיך ושבו בנים לגבולם -- ירמיהו לא:טז
"There is yet hope for your future, sons shall return to their borders."

ובנו ערים נשמות וישבו -- עמוס ט:יד
"...they will build desolate cities and dwell in them."

עוד יקנו בתים ושדות וכרמים בארץ הזאת -- ירמיהו לב:טו
"Houses, fields and vineyards will yet be sold in this land."

ואתם הרי ישראל ענפכם תתנו ופריכם תשאו לעמי ישראל כי קרבו לבא -- יחזקאל לו:ח
"Now you hills of Israel, bring forth your leaves and carry forth fruit for my nation Israel, for they are coming!"

כשתתן א"י פריה בעין יפה אז יקרב הקץ ואין לך קץ מגולה יותר -- פרש"י סנהדרין צח עמ' ב
"When the land of Israel gives forth its fruits freely, the redemption is near, and there is no clearer sign of the redemption than this..."

עוד ישבו זקנים וזקנות ברחובות ירושלים -- זכריה ז:ד
"There will yet come a day when old men and women sit in the streets of Jerusalem..."

והטיפו ההרים עסיס -- עמוס ט:יג
"The mountains will drip sweet wine..."

יום "תחילת קיום דברי הנביאים" שמח!
Happy Yom Ha'atzma'ut!

Pay Attention, Obama!

2010-03-15T05:40:00.000-07:00

Obama and Clinton, over the past few days, seem to have fallen into the fantasy so common to presidents of the US -- the belief that they control the world. It seems that Obama has chosen to take out the anger he feels from his impotent obsessions with domestic issues such as health care reform and the struggling economy. He has decided upon the classic, historical whipping boy, the scapegoat of every raging leader: the Jew and, lately, his State. The vehemence and acerbity of Obama's and Clinton's anger at Israel concerning an issue that is well beyond their domain is astounding; the world is stunned, and the evil revel.

What is amazing is the extent and distance Obama and Clinton have been willing to go in publicly embarrassing an ally. They explicitly agreed months ago with Israel that the "ten month building freeze" would apply to the West Bank and not Jerusalem. Indeed, on Thursday, the US admitted that the announcement of 1,600 new housing units in Israel's capitol did not consist of Israel reneging on any agreement, and that it would simply be prudent to be careful when dealing with matters of such a sensitive nature. Days later, Obama and Clinton decided to make this a public international incident. In order to do that, they have lied, and taken offense where none was present. They are manufacturing an Israeli-US crisis to serve their other interests. It is absolutely shameful that a US president and secretary of state would act in such an unprofessional, eminently dishonest manner.

Obama had better think carefully about the danger of publicly alienating an ally in public view, allowing the true enemy (Islamic terror including Iran) to believe that the coalition of good is fragmented and weak. Far from Israel "insulting" the US, Obama and Clinton have chosen to insult Israel, trying to demonstrate to the world the power they wield over the Jewish State. They are choosing to side with evil and terror against democracy and good. Obama is walking a very damaging road, one which will not aid his failing domestic policies, and one that will only hurt the concepts of justice and good in the world over.

I received a timely and relevant quote by email I would like to share with Israel and America, and Obama, Clinton and Netanyahu in particular (originally written on Yaakov Kirschen's blog called Dry Bones) :

'In December 1981, the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Law extending Israeli law to the Golan Heights. In reaction the American administration declared that it would "punish Israel". Prime Minister Begin then issued a statement that he read to the US Ambassador to Israel and released to the public. It reads, in part:

"A week ago, at the instance of the Government, the Knesset passed on all three readings by an overwhelming majority of two-thirds, the "Golan Heights Law."

Now you once again declare that you are punishing Israel.
What kind of expression is this – "punishing Israel"? Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic? Are we youths of fourteen who, if they don't behave properly, are slapped across the fingers?

Let me tell you who this government is composed of. It is composed of people whose lives were spent in resistance, in fighting and in suffering. You will not frighten us with "punishments." He who threatens us will find us deaf to his threats. We are only prepared to listen to rational arguments."'

Obama, you have lied to the world, and used Hilary Clinton as your messenger girl. Why don't you both face up to the real problem in the Israeli - Arab problem -- the unwillingness of Hamas, Hizbollah, Iran and most of the Arab world to admit Israel's right to exist? Why don't you face the increasing problem in the Western world -- the emergence of the belief that the Jews have no right to defend their population from onslaughts from those who deny their right to exist?

While Obama and Clinton choose to find "insult" in Israel's announcement to build houses, they ignore the true colors of the Arabs: in the same week, the 'Palestinians' honored a female terrorist who committed one of the worst acts of terror in Israel. They also called for the Arab public to arrive at the Temple Mount and stage riots there. A double standard of epic proportions -- truly the "change" we all hoped for from Obama. (For a sane editorial from CNN regarding the underlying issues, see here. Important quote: "The most dangerous cause of instability in the Middle East is the so-called peace process itself.")

I am disgusted with the US president and his lap-dog secretary of state.

UPDATE: Netanyahu seems to realize the moment of truth in his premiership, and has announced (in decidedly less hot-headedness than Clinton's and Obama's announcements) unequivocally that building in all of Israel's capitol, Jerusalem, will continue despite Obama and Clinton's hysterical fits of frustration. Further, at the end of ten months, building will continue in the West Bank, as well.

Refresher Course on Your Enemy

2010-02-09T08:26:00.000-08:00

We all need a reminder every now and again why we cannot let our Jewish (and non-Jewish) mercy take over regarding our enemies. They understand their religion as requiring them to take over the world by sword, and freedom or democracy are of no value.

Here are some photos from a recent Arab demonstration in England:

Deeply Moving

2009-12-29T01:45:00.000-08:00

I haven't written in a while, but I just came across something that moved me. A Jew named Ronen Levi Yitzchak Segal, a commenter on various blogs, has a large number of Youtube videos that he made. In these videos, he looks into the webcam and answers questions posed to him by email. His answers contain a certain simplicity and heartfelt property that I think all rabbis would do well to cultivate, though Ronen is not a rabbi. I have watched a few of these videos, and his calm, quiet manner and gentle responses (though I do not agree with all he says) leave a deep impression on me. From the comments there and on his Facebook page, it seems that he touched many people.

Ronen died in April, and when I read that, I was shocked. It is a call to action for me and all of us still alive, that this gentle, kind man was able to make such a mark on this world with a few videos on Youtube. I learned many things from him.

Check his pages out if you have an interest: http://www.youtube.com/user/ronennachman770

חבל על דאבדין -- It is such a shame to have lost such a powerful voice for God. May our world learn from him, and may we all merit soon the coming of the redemption.

Coming of Age in Avraham's Tent

2009-11-09T10:04:00.000-08:00

The book of Bereishit is a book of family. The subjects of father, mother and child, filial responsibility, parenthood and inheritance -- spiritual and physical -- are featured as central themes of the first fifth of the Torah. At the end of Vayera, the Torah presents its reader with two clearly connected stories, which, through subtlety and hints, reveal the roots of geo-political realities for centuries to come. The two stories are separated only by the flimsiest of pretexts; the episodes are the story of Yishmael's deportation, and the tale of Yitzchak's near sacrifice.

The parallels between the two episodes are many and multi-layered, found in both the language the Torah employs, as well as the imagery and details of each story:

In both events, a cherished and beloved son is sent out of Avraham's tent, seemingly never to return.
Both include a seemingly completely passive actor (a son), and an active parent.
In each (21:14, 22:3), וישכם אברהם בבקר, Avraham rises in the early morning to dispense with a distasteful task.
In both tales, the passive child is literally about to die.
In both passages (21:17, 22:11, 16), a מלאך, a heavenly angel, protests the death.
Both stories have the angel of heaven revealing to the active parent something which he did not see before, but now sees (a well for Hagar in chapter 21, and a ram for Avraham in 22).
Each episode ends with a blessing of the child as the source of a great and numerous nation.
Both end with hints at a suitable marriage for the passive child (now a man), and thus a way for the blessing to be actualized.

Clearly, the Torah wanted these two passages to be read together, to be compared, and most importantly, to be contrasted. So, what differences are evident in the tales?

In the Yishmael story (ch. 21), Avraham protests Sarah's demand of deportation initially, and only agrees when God commands it. In the Yitzchak episode (ch. 22), there is no scriptural evidence of Avraham's protest.
In ch. 21, it is the women who take active roles in the events, while in ch. 22, Avraham does so.
In ch. 21, Hagar, in her anguish over the deterioration of her son's situation, shows selfishness in casting him away so that she "not see the death of the boy". In stark contrast, even in the most trying time for the father-son relationship, Avraham and Yitzchak's relationship is twice described as the most intimate, filial, loving relationship, יחדיו -- they are sublimely, simply, "together".
The word גוי, "nation" is used in ch. 21 to refer to Yishmael's future nation-offspring, while in ch. 22 the word is used only to describe the other nations, those not from the seed of Avraham.
The angel in ch. 21 is a מלאך אלקים. The name of God used here traditionally signifies Lord of judgment, strictness and nature. In ch. 22, it is מלאך ה' -- the name of God is the personal God, That of mercy, loving-kindness and intimacy.
In ch. 21, the ending blessing is given directly to Yishmael. However, in ch. 22, Yitzchak does not receive any direct blessing. Rather, it is given to Avraham.

What are we to make of these two events? The following theory is not an exhaustive explanation of the above comparisons. There are certainly endless themes and points of contrast here that may be plumbed. However, I would like to present my first thoughts, and leave the comparisons and contrasts as food for further thought.
It first strikes the reader that these episodes are really coming-of-age stories. In both, a passive child is transformed into a man with a divinely-mandated destiny. It is important, therefore, that the two children be passive initially. However, by the end of the story, each child is prepared for marriage. Marriage is the threshold of majority; when Yishmael's mother chooses a wife for him (21:21), he is invested as a grown man, ready to fulfill his destiny. And at the end of the Yitzchak tale, the lineage of Betuel, and Rivka his daughter, is seen by the Rashi as the oblique reference to Yitzchak's being mature for marriage. Finding appropriate wives, Yishmael and Yitzchak are ready to begin their Godly destinies.
However, these destinies are widely divergent. One will become the unique vessel through which God fulfills His promise to His beloved Avraham. The other will bring forth twelve princes of the desert (17:20), living and dying by the ethos of the sword (16:12). This point is brought to light by the difference in the stories regarding the final blessings (difference #6). Yitzchak's blessing is given to him indirectly; Avraham receives the blessing from God, and this blessing as a matter of course devolves upon Yitzchak. This is evident because the blessing is immediately followed by the marriage of Yitzchak. כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע -- In Yitzchak you will have "seed" (21:12). The Torah is quite exact in its choice of terms in the blessing of ch. 22: "כי ברך אברכך והרבה ארבה את זרעך ...וירש זרעך...והתברכו בזרעך". In this blessing (22:17-18), the term for the progeny is "seed", reflecting the fact that the blessing currently being given to Avraham will only be fulfilled through his "seed" -- previously identified exclusively as Yitzchak.
On the other hand, Yishmael's blessing is given directly to him, through no intermediary. Indeed, in the eyes of destiny, Yishmael is a new man, a man without a father, a man who carries no previous tradition into his future.
This distinction is evident in the diction of both blessings. Whereas Yishmael is blessed to be a גוי גדול, Yitzchak's blessing (through Avraham) states that through him, גויי הארץ, the nations of the land, will be blessed. The word for "nation" that tells what Yishmael will become is precisely the same word used to tell Avraham and Yitzchak who will be blessed by them, and who is considered outside of their chosen group. Yishmael is a גוי, he is a nation amongst the nations of the world, and set apart from the זרע הנבחר.
In the same vein, the God that saves Yishmael is אלקים -- God of strict, natural justice. It is the God that does not judge Yishmael on future actions, but באשר הוא שם, in what he is now. This is quite different from being saved by the loving, intimate and merciful ה', who saves Yitzchak. Indeed, the blessings and methods of salvation continue to delineate between the divergent futures of these two sons of Avraham.
Perhaps these divergent futures are necessary products of the parenting exhibited during the coming-of-age crises. Yishmael is fatherless in his story -- he has been exiled by his father. (Indeed, he returns (according to the midrash) only to bury his father with his brother, and to demonstrate that he has no part as a chosen son.) His mother exhibits callousness and selfishness. The pain of watching her son wither away is too much for her, and she casts him away from her, the distance of an arrow's flight (21:16). Her callousness develops her son and his descendents into men who place themselves at odds with other men, and at odds with the Jewish spark (Yishmael is seen by Rashi (commenting on Zecharia 6:1) as the final exiler and oppressor of Israel). Perhaps to underscore how deeply the parental instinct of Hagar has impressed itself upon Yishmael, a mere four verses after she casts him away, the same bow and arrow is employed in 20:20 to describe Yishmael's weapon of choice. Yishmael's mother and her persona make him unfit as a son of Avraham.
On the other hand, Yitzchak, as pointed out earlier, is imbued by Avraham, his parent, with tremendous love and kindness, even when obeying God's most seemingly harsh commands. Together, intimately, father and son scale a mountain, and together, just as intimately, they descend it, and the son is invested not only with his destiny, but with his inner character.
(To further drive home this dual, inter-generational relationship, a parallel can be found in the fact that this is not Hagar's first exile from Avraham's home. In ch. 16, she leaves leaves to escape Sarah's abuse. The cycle seems to be repeated in Yishmael, although in his case, the exile is divinely justified, whereas in Hagar's case, it is not. On the other hand, Avraham is also commanded to self-exile himself (parallel to Hagar) from his father's home. He does so, and thus provides prental precedent for Yitzchak's sacrifice event.
Ultimately, in a social setting where birthright and inheritance are of extreme importance and fought over vehemently, it was important for God's plan to leave no uncertainty as to which son bore the noble title of "Son of Avraham". The coming-of-age denouements related in our parasha show how God defined each child with their destiny, and set them on their often-opposing paths for subsequent history. In this light, we understand well the Torah's decision to tell, in 25:6, of the sending away of Avraham's subsequent children. As with Yishmael, they needed to be unequivocally denied the option of supplanting or even joining Yitzchak as the physical or spiritual inheritor of Avraham.

Vayera and Providence

2009-11-03T23:26:00.000-08:00

The Ralbag (late-13^th C - mid-14^th C) was a great talmudist and halachist. He is perhaps remembered best, however, for his commentary on the Torah. To the modern and traditionalist views, the Ralbag's commentary is quirky; he believed in astrology, and yet had non-conventional views on Heavenly omniscience, because of philosophical considerations. His commentary to the Chumash is a very interesting read, for its diversity of thought and divergence from other Jewish thinkers.

It is the Ralbag's habit, after explaining the story verse by verse and conceptually, to list a number of "benefits" that are to be reaped from the passage. Some are character-building, and some are philosophical lessons. In the story of Lot and Sodom, Ralbag finds a philosophical lesson regarding the nature of Divine Providence. This lesson explains the method through which God affects providential salvation¹ of humans.

The Ralbag states (עמ' קלח בהוצאת מוסד הרב קוק): "It is unbecoming of Man to neglect his own safety, [and rely] exclusively on the protection of God. Rather, he should be very diligent, for God causes his deliverance through man utilizing the best method available to protect himself. This is one of the tools with which God's providnece is completed: when a person is notified of the evil that will befall him...God provides salvation when [the man] tries to distance that evil in any possible way. And for this reason, Lot was commanded to quickly run, not look back or rest, until reaching the place where his salvation would be completed. If he did this, he would escape; if not, the evil would befall him."

Essentially, Man's own efforts to insightfully and wisely defend himself against danger through the natural means at his disposal is a part of the providence through which God protects those deserving of protection. This idea is crystallized by the Ran in his eighth essay (דרשות הר"ן, עמ' שיט בהוצאת מוסד הרב קוק). In discussing one method through which God protects people from dangers that crop up in life, he writes: "God places in the hearts of those who do His will the idea to do actions which by their nature protect them from damage from the system of the universe [luck, chance, uncertainty, call it what you will]." (This is also the view of the Ibn Ezra, as mentioned in a footnote to this page.)

In other words, the very insights we often have in a time of danger -- which path to take, what to say -- these ways that we extricate ourselves from perilous situations, are part of God's providential protection. What we see as our proactive stance and willingness to do our utmost to help ourselves are, in reality, a critical element of Divine assistance. (Perhaps this is what Rambam meant when he wrote (in his Letter on Astrology, translated here) that the destruction of the Jewish State around 70 CE was a result of the Israelites spending time learning astrology, instead of focusing their efforts the study on war- and states-craft. In the light of the above discussion, perhaps this missallocation of intellectual resources was God's providence removing its protective shield from Judea, leaving them open to attack and destruction.)

It is interesting to see how our sages of centuries past viewed the philosophical issues with which we still grapple. I am not sure that Ralbag would see God's Providence in only the terms set out by the above-quoted passage, and am certainly not sure that I see it only in these terms. Part of religious life is to experience God and His providence personally. This leads away from the "how" of Divine providence, which is an abstract philosophical challange, to the concrete affirmation of our lives as a part of the Divine plan, no matter the exact mechanism we can envisage that God used to alter the course of events. To experience the latter is life changing, to say the least.

And so this short post is not at all meant to limit the "acceptable" answers to this and other philosophical questions, but to widen the scope. Considering these issues will, I hope, motivate us to think deeply about modern Man and God -- to reference our intellectual history (which often had different philosophical assumptions than we do today), and blaze trails where novel ideas can be of assistance. I pray that this ultimately allow us to see God's interest and intimate involvement in our lives more clearly each day.

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¹ For other discussions of Divine providence that we have had here, search the blog for the term 'Providence'.

Public Service Announcement

2009-11-03T22:55:00.000-08:00

Please view this short video to help find a missing child, Madeline.

False and True Leadership

2009-10-29T11:26:00.000-07:00

I wish to juxtapose two passages, from two very different leaders that the Jewish nation has produced. Suffice it to say, one demonstrates false leadership, while the other demonstrated honor, bravery and dignity, dying for the Jewish cause. Let us mourn for him who has been lost, and learn from the failures of him who remains. חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין...

Ehud Olmert, former PM of Israel (currently defendant in a number of criminal suits):

"We are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies, we want that we will be able to live in an entirely different environment of relations with our enemies. We want them to be our friends, our partners, our good neighbors. "

Rabbi Kahane (God avenge his blood), approximately 15 years earlier:

"We are weary? We are weary of having to serve in the army each year to defend our state? How much would a Jew in Auschwitz have given for the opportunity to see a Jewish army, a Jewish tank, a Jewish plane – and with what joy he would have agreed to serve each year in a Jewish army of a Jewish State, created so as to help guarantee that never again will there be an Auschwitz for its Jewish citizens!

Peace? Of course we want peace. Who does not want peace? It is not the monopoly of the guilt-ridden and self-hating hypocrites, the artists and intellectuals (sic) of the left. We all wish peace; we all fervently pray for peace. We all look for the day when the nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares. But, meanwhile, as they continue to have swords with which to destroy us, let us not be so mad as to wave ploughshares.

Give up land. For “peace” that the “poor Palestinian” is prepared to grant us? The ultimate peace of the dead? Are we mad? The ones who launched four wars of aggression against Israel and lost for wars of aggression, dictate terms to us? The ones who launched four wars of aggression and a thousand terrorist attacks, who slew thousands of Jews, and who lost – now present us with demands? They insist that we, who won, give up land? Let the Arab aggressors and murderers learn a very basic rule of life: Losers lose. Winners win. Losers and especially losers who launched wars of murderous aggression, do not dictate terms. Aggression is not a game in which one attempts to wipe out innocent people, loses and then returns to “Go”. No, aggression is a gamble and if the aggressor loses – let him know the full bitterness of his reality – that he has lost. Then, perhaps, he will think deeply and carefully before embarking on another adventure. For let the “poor Palestinian” know in every fiber of his body, that he had best leave well enough alone. Let him accept a peace that will see him establish a state of his own in Jordan, if he can do it. For should he be so foolish as to begin another murderous war of aggression, let him be certain that that which he still possess in Jordan will be ours too.

Land for peace? By all means. The Jews who were the victims of countless efforts to destroy them and who are the rightful owners, will keep the land and be prepared to graciously give the murderous Arabs, peace."

Noah and Self-Control

2009-10-22T08:54:00.000-07:00

When Adam and Chava sinned in their first hours in the garden of Eden, it was a sin of passion. The allure and promise of a fruit that would make them into gods was something that they could not resist. And with this sin, the seeds of mankind's ultimate failure are sown. Cain kills Hevel in a fit of passion, and history spirals downward. Humanity seems controlled by its baser instincts, with desire and passion in control.

On Noah's release from the ark, the Torah talks of God's resolution to never destroy all of mankind again. "ויאמר ה' אל לבו..." "God said to his heart...." The sages (quoted by Rabbi Hirsch) point out that whenever a biblical figure who is a model of virtue speaks in his heart, it is in this mode 'to his heart'. In contrast, when evil men do so, it is בליבו, in his heart. In this first post-diluvian proclamation by God, the very wording is a lesson to humanity: make sure that your heart-seated passions are not the decisors of your actions. Let your emotions be subservient to the intellect.

This lesson is repeated in the three brothers. Shem, model of intellect, and Yaphet, representing aesthetics and beauty, the noble elements of our passions, are told by Cham, symbolic of the base passions, that their father has shamed himself. Noah's reaction is to curse Cham and make him the slave to Shem. Yaphet is blessed, but dwells only within the tent (the parameters and limits) of Shem.

The three brothers are embodied in every human being. We all have base passions, noble desires, and an intellect and spirit. It is our task in life to enslave our base passion to our intellect. Even our noble aesthetics must be tempered and used only within the limits that our intellect must set; otherwise, it is easy for the Yaphet that is within us to lead us to Cham. Our intellect is subservient to God's will, and allows us to use it to bring out the good and decent in all our other attributes.

This idea was articulated by Plato as well, in book four of the Republic. The soul, says Plato, is triumverate, composed of three parts: the appetitive, the rational, and the spirited. The appetitive is the source of the base desires of mankind and society. The rational is the seat of wisdom and drives towards truth. The spirited is the source of "higher" desires, such as (platonic) love, honor, and victory. The ideal man has the rational controlling the appetitive with input from the spirited. The platonic republic contains these on a macro level: the king-philosopher is the rational, the auxiliary class (made up of soldiers and enforcers) is the spirited, and the worker class is the appetitive. By correctly applying the mastery of the one over the other, with the assistance of the third, individual and society can find the best way forward for private and public life.

(One distinction between the Republic and the Jewish ideal is the the purpose of society. According to Plato, society is a necessary tool to find the best result for each individual. Society is not an end in and of itself. However, the Jewish ideal is a nation, a כלל, serving God, in which the individual and the collective each have purposes and importance in and of themselves. Humanity is of a dual nature, as an individual and as a group, and each purpose provides sustenance to the other, and allows the completion of the other within itself. A Jewish society is nothing without individuals, but a Jewish individual is very little without his כלל.
)
There is nothing more noble than a person whose intellect controls his urges. In contrast, there is nothing more ignoble and pathetic than the opposite. And, looking back at a life mis-spent, nothing seems easier than to have lived it correctly. In The Power and the Glory, Graham Greene (an English playwright) tells the tale of a priest who lives a life guided by his passions. As he stands before a firing squad, "He felt only an immense disappointment because he had to go to God empty-handed, with nothing done at all. It seemed to him, at that moment, that it would have been quite easy to have been a saint. It would only have needed a little self-restraint and a little courage. He felt like someone who has missed happiness by seconds. He knew now that at the end there was only one thing that counted - to be a saint."

As we look back at our actions, it seems so petty, a little self restraint and a bit of courage were all that it would have taken to turn a sinner into a saint. This sentiment is an echo of the talmud (Sukah 52a): לעתיד לבוא מביאו הקב"ה ליצר הרע ושוחטו בפני הצדיקים ובפני הרשעים, צדיקים" נדמה להם כהר גבוה ורשעים נדמה להם כחוט השערה, הללו בוכין והללו בוכין, צדיקים בוכין ואומרים היאך יכולנו לכבוש הר גבוה כזה, ורשעים בוכין ואומרים היאך לא יכולנו לכבוש את חוט השערה הזה" At the end of days, God will slaughter the evil inclination before the righteous and sinners. It will seem to the saints as a high mountain, and they will cry [in joy] and marvel how they were able to conquer such a mountain. On the other hand, it will seem like a hairs-breadth to the wicked, who will lament that such a small distance they were unable to go in order to be good.

Those who place their desires and passions at the service of their intellect will ultimately see how easy it would have been to do good. On the other hand, the righteous will remember the hardships over which they prevailed to control their urges.

Self-restraint is something that seems easy to have in retrospect, and yet, at the point of struggle, can be the hardest thing to attain. It may be even harder to maintain the belief that we can repent and re-arrange our lives after years of sin. However, every breath we breathe is testament to the fact that Hashem has not given up on us, and we have no right to resign ourselves, either. May we all succeed in our individual and national struggles against the evil inclination.

There's a Fly in my Soup!

2009-10-16T00:00:00.000-07:00

Disclaimer: As in all halachik discussions on the internet, what appears below should not be taken as a ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.

In honor of my fifth rabbanut bechina in about 10 days:

In the halachot of food, insects are particularly hard to defend against, since they are small they often show up in the most unexpected places. Insects furthermore carry the distinction that if eaten whole, they encompass multiple infractions, or לאוין.

If an insect falls into a cup of juice, one may immediately remove it, and may continue to drink (although practically, one may wonder where the insect may have been, and what disease it may carry). This is because the taste of the forbidden insect did not transfer into the food or drink. However, in a situation where the offending insect falls into cooking liquid, or is steeped in liquid for 24 hours (see SA YD 105:1), the situation is more complex. Here, we assume that taste has transferred (as happens during cooking), and therefore, the taste of the forbidden insect has been diffused throughout the cooking. In a case like this, one may only eat the food once the insect is removed if there is sixty times the forbidden taste (approximated by volume of the offending insect) in the food (ששים כנגדו). However, there is a more subtle case, where the food is hot but not cooking on the fire. This discussion will center around a fly in soup, and the worm that is often placed in a bottle of tequila.

Normally, an item is considered cooked with another item if it is brought to a temperature at which a hand is burnt, or if it steeps (כבישה) in it for 24 hours. The later authorities discuss the temperature "at which a hand is burnt" or יד סולדת בו. The פתחי תשובה brings two opinions (105:2), that it is either heat that would burn a baby's stomach, or that which makes it impossible to hold a vessel. He says that the practical reality is that people rely on the second opinion, which is approximated at 120^o F (see the Star-K site).

Once the soup is placed in a bowl, however, it is considered in a כלי שני and thus not capable of cooking. However, the Rashba posits that even though it does not cook, it still transfers taste (מפליט ומבליע) and so it can still create forbidden mixtures. In this case, the soup with the fly may be forbidden even after the fly is removed, since the taste of the fly is considered by Rashba to have transferred into the soup (כדי קליפה, only into a thin layer surrounding the food). However, the Shulchan Aruch (105:2) only rules stringently as the Rashba in an ideal situation (לכתחילה); practically, if the accident has already occured, he allows one to behave as if a second vessel, a כלי שני does not pose the problem of flavor transferral. The ש"כ goes further and says that most authorities rule that כלי שני presents no problem whatsoever.

In addition to this reasoning permitting the soup in a bowl after the removal of a fly, even a pot on the fire could be permitted in the case of a fly falling in. In YD 104:1 (which rules like Rava in ע"ז סח:), we read that mice, flies, ants and other things that are disgusting to everyone, would be considered in essence things that give off a bad flavor (נותן טעם לפגם). In this sistuation, the requirement of sixty times the forbidden amount is unneeded, since that is in place only to ensure that the benefit from the forbidden part is imperceptible. So, you could remove the fly and eat the rest of the soup, even if the fly fell in while the pot was on the fire.

(This reasoning is restricted by a caveat: if we are dealing with beer or vinegar into which the forbidden item fell, even if the item is something that is essentially disgusting, they may, in these media, somehow enhance the flavor. In this case, we would need sixty times the forbidden item after it is removed in order to permit the soup.)

At the end of 104:3, the Shulchan Aruch rules thus, and permits these disgusting things, even if they are dissolved and mixed so completely as to make it impossible to remove them. However, we are required to do the best we can to remove them, like straining the soup before serving it. This issue is brought up again in 107:2. While the Rema there permits as did the Shulchan Aruch, the Bach quotes the שערי דורא who is strict and forbids it. The ש"כ mentions there are many who forbid.

And so, if the fly is visible or locatable, remove it. Otherwise, the Shulchan Aruch and Rema both would permit the soup. If the item is removed, and the soup has more than 60 times the forbidden item, everyone would permit.

The Aruch Hashulchan says its not reasonable to assume that a fly would be so mashed and dissolved by regular cooking as to permit it simply by being lost, according to the Shulchan Aruch and Rema. Therefore, how can we allow eating the soup? The same question applied in their days when the flour was full of bugs (as opposed to today, when there are so few bugs in our packaged, expiry dated flour, that you do not have to sift if the flour is not passed its expiration date and it has been stored safely).

The Aruch Hashulchan says that when something is completely lost in the soup, and is bad-tasting, it is completely unimportant, and therefore you can eat it. Otherwise, one might still say that the cooking according to Shulchan Aruch does dissolve even ants(which most would disagree with), or that it is only permitted if one sees a wing or something, to ascertain that it has been mashed.

Thus in the final analysis, a fly in soup (on the fire) must be removed. If it is, or it is mashed and dissolved (or even just lost according to the Aruch Hashulchan), it is permitted even without sixty times the forbidden item's volume of permitted matter (ששים כנגדו). According to the Bach's stringency, we would still require sixty. And if the fly has fallen into a כלי שני, then the circumstance is one of בדיעבד, and it is permitted after the fly is removed.

Now, in the case of a worm in liquor (as is common in bottles of tequila), the question is, what is the worm's purpose? Is it there to add flavor or coloring? Chardal, my resident alcohol expert, claims that the worm in tequila is simply for show. He says that "while it does not harm the taste of the liquer, it also does not enhance it. Frankly, no one can tell the difference between tequila with a worm or without one (assuming it is the same quality base tequila)."

If the worm had been there to enhance the flavor or look of the drink, certainly, we would need sixty units of permitted matter for each unit of forbidden matter, after removing the worm. However, we may be sure that the taste is still there, since the worm is in the bottle to demonstrate that the liquor is flavored (as is traditional) with that worm. Therefore, even if there is sixty in the bottle, it would not help, because either 1) the one worm is enough to give its taste to that bottle or (more likely) 2) the liquor was steeped in enough worms to make it taste, and the worm in this bottle is just for show. Either way, the liquor certainly has the taste of the worm. (This ignores the possibly relavent fact that if the worm is מעמיד, that it makes up an integral part of the liquor making process, then a מעמיד of איסור is not ever בטל (See end of YD 87).

However, in light of Chardal's insight into alcoholic bevarages, the worm does not add flavor. However, even in this situation, the Shach (based on the הגהות אשרי) forbids the mixture even when the forbidden does not add taste, unless there is a measure of sixty units of permitted volume for each unit of forbidden volume, and of course, requires the forbidden item to be removed. Thus, if the tequila can be proven to never have been in a situation where the tequila was less than sixty times more in volume than the number of worms, the tequila may be allowed if the worm is removed. (See the Rama, who may be lenient and allow something of neutral taste contribution to be removed and בטל without ששים כנגדו.) Of course, all this applies only if the tequila itself is kosher. The only issue under discussion here is if the worm forbids otherwise kosher tequila.

Again, the above is not meant as ruling, but as discussion only. Please discuss any practical applications with an orthodox rabbi.

The Kohanic Gene

2009-10-05T23:45:00.000-07:00

A number of years ago, researchers delighted the Jewish world by discovering that the Y-chromosome of Jewish kohanim points to one unique ancestor. The Y-chromosome is, of course, passed patralinially, and thus can serve as proof of familial relation for males.

The science is fascinating. However, I never felt that the purported religous implications claimed by some were strong at all. Throughout history, there were undoubtedly families who were priestly who, over years of secularism and the pressures of the exile, forgot their lofty status. Certainly, there were also families that accidentally or not, took on the kohanic traditions mistakenly. It seemed too pat, and worked out only too well, that all kohanim tested seemed to point to one ancestor. Support for this reservation can be found in the mishna Midot 5:4, where the Oral Law records the fact that the Jewish High Court had to sometimes sit in judgement on questions of priestly lineage, and would attempt to clarify a family's status: a man who was found to be an authentic Kohen would wear white, and one found to be unpriestly wore black. Furthermore, in Eduyot, 8:7, Rabbi Yehoshua states that in the times of the redemption, Eliyahu the prophet will not come to confirm or deny the legitimacy of families accidentally mixed, but only to do so regarding families that attempted to mix themselves in with higher station willfully. (See Kehati's commentary here that expressly includes the kohanic honor as one of the items that this statement includes.) For all these reasons, the kohanic Y-chromosome was never much more than a curiosity to me. I found the underlying science much more compelling and fascinating than the religous implications.

Today, I have learned that my reasoning to be less than impressed was well-guided. New research seems to agree that there was not one ancestor for the kohanim, but a number of ancestors. Those who feel this to be a blow to the authenticity of the Torah's narrative would do well to remember the line of thought I mentioned in the previous paragraph. For if in 2008, a (for example, reubenic) family is erroneously assumed to be kohanic, they would be, in the eyes of the study, full kohanim, just as authentic kohanim would be. Thus, when the study looks at the Y-chromosomes of true kohanim and faux kohanim that they assume to be true kohanim, they would find that some of these Y-chromosomes trace back 3000 years ago to kohanic roots, and some to reubenic roots. However, because the study in 2008 does not know that the reubenic Y-chromosome is being mistaken for kohanic, it will assume that both Y-chromosomes have equal claim to kehuna, and thus conclude that there are multiple ancestors for the kohanic tribe. This is not a deficiency in the genetics or the science, but an epistemological deficiency; we simply cannot guarantee that everyone who claims (even in good faith) to be a kohen, is indeed a kohen!

Of course, it does not matter when the error was introduced; whenever this occurred, the Y-chromosome of the "new kohen" would automatically join the genetic pool of "known kohanim" and wait patiently to be discovered.

(It is important to note that people who are halachikally Jewish can still come from differring Y-chromosome branches, since Judaism has always accepted converts, even at the time of the Exodus. However, converts could never become kohanim, as this was strictly a birthright.)

Thus, the new study should not at all be seen in any way as denying or disproving the Torah traditions. It is however interesting to note that, "Cohanim Y chromosomes from both Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi Jewish communities, is virtually absent in non-Jews..."

Fascinating Find

2009-09-24T23:13:00.000-07:00

Coins depicting the image of a man with the name "Joseph" have been found in Egypt, according to a Cairo newspaper. While the Jerusalem Post quotes the significance of this find as "countering the claim held by some historians that coins were not used for trade in ancient Egypt, and that this was done through barter instead," it seems that this find has another dimension of significance: it is further outside confirmation of the Biblical narrative.

Shabbat shalom and G'mar Chatima Tovah!

Vayelech: Personal and National Teshuva

2009-09-11T02:19:00.000-07:00

In this week's haftarah for Vayelech, Hoshea exhorts the Jewish people to return to God. "שובה ישראל, עד ה' אלקיך כי כשלת בעווניך...אשור לא יושיעינו" Return, O Israel, to God, for you have failed in sin...[say] Assyria will not save us..." (Hoshea 14:2) The prophet tells the Jewish nation how to repent: say that the great powers of the world will not save us, and abandon idolatry, and return to God. What is the connection between Jewish return to God and an admission that we have no one else to rely on?

Perhaps the answer lies in the psychology of repentance. Throughout our lives, we encase ourselves in protective layers of posessions and alliances. As social beings, we find protection from the elements and from enemies in the comforting warmth of the Group. We have amassed great wealth, prestige and honor, and these things serve us as security blankets. It is a poor man who finds himself penniless, and even worse indeed is one who finds himself without friends and a social position to rely on.

While these things are a normal and healty part of the human condition, they can become a person's worst enemy. One may allow his possessions and position to shift his understanding of his own vulnerability. When we have nothing, we realize quickly that it is God upon whom we must ultimately rely. However, the things we surround ourselves with and the social positions we attain make it very easy to hide this truth from ourselves. We become enamoured by ourselves, and feel that our position dictates that we are untouchable, protected by our peers, and so forth. This makes it very hard for a person to see God in his own life. The religious experience of knowing God as the beginning and end can be dimmed. This makes it very hard, indeed, for a person to repent sins. Sins may become permitted (as the Talmud says) in our own minds, after committing them, and seeing no immediate reprecussions. An aura of invincability can easily descend, making us rely on our stature as a sign we are always (and perhaps by definition) doing good. Teshuva and true closeness to God is a forgotten relic of a less prosperous time.

Into this atmosphere, Hoshea speaks: In order to cleave to God, we must first divest ourselves emotionally from the things and positions we rely on. We must come before God in a kittel, in a burial shroud. We must remember that we carry none of our prestige and wealth with us to the court of God, but our good deeds and our bad deeds. This divistement allows us to realize who we really are, and is the first step to repentance. Viewing ourselves truly, and not through the rose colored glasses of our own egos, is foundational to Teshuva. And so, Hoshea tells us to admit that nothing we rely on is really reliable -- we come before God with ourselves, plain and simple. We can only rely on Him.

In a larger sense, the message of Hoshea is aimed not at the individual alone, but at the nation of Israel. For each year, we repent as a nation. What is the first step to re-build the fractured relationship our nation has with God? Admission of reliance. Reject the nations you rely on for support, alliances and economic prosperity. Internalize that it is from God that Israel succeeds or fails, and based on our fulfillment of our national obligations to Him. Understand that, אשור לא יושיעינו, the superpowers will not save us, but God will. (In an interesting twist of history, the letters of אשור correspond to the Latin letters of A-S-U-R, which make up the letters of both the USA and the USSR, driving home the poin doubly, that the world powers, the superpowers, are not to be relied upon by Israel.)

The flip-side of this message can be found in our parasha: if we cannot rely on them, who can we rely upon? "Be strong and brave, do not fear or balk before them, for Hashem, your God, it is He that accompanies you, he will not forsake you!" (Deut. 31:6) When we rely on God, we will find victory, security and happiness.

The message is clear: on an individual and on a national level, we are to divest ourselves of perceived external protection and support, for these things only allow us to grow distant from God, and sell us the lie that we can rely on others, not only on Him. By renewing our covanent with Him, personally and nationally, may we merit a year which is better, a year in which the safety, happiness and security of each Jew and the nation as a whole is clearly, obviously, unmistakeably, in the hands of God.

The Concept of War

2009-08-27T03:26:00.001-07:00

When we read the beginning of כי תצא, we may find ourselves asking a very basic question: What is the purpose of war? Though they are obviously towards the bottom of the preferred list of ways to resolve conflicts, the Torah teaches that there are wars which are actually required, מלחמות מצווה. The understanding that war is not something that can always be avoided is one which demonstrates to us truths about the pragmatism of the Torah, and the way in which we are to navigate our imperfect world.

In an imagined perfect world, it can be reasonably assumed that the violence and horrors of war would be absent. Idealized attempts at utopia-building, such as Marx's Communist Manifesto, commonly included the cessation of war as part of their vision. Why does the Torah not outlaw war? The answer to this question can be found in a letter written by Rabbi Kook (אגרות הראי"ה חלק א' אגרת פט עמוד ק pointed out at Rav Kook Torah), where he wrote that it would have been impossible that, at a time when the surrounding nations were wolves, the Jews would unilaterally abstain. The nations would quickly form an axis that would destroy the Hebrew people. On the contrary, says Rabbi Kook, it was imperative that the Jews act mercilessly, to deter the threats around them.

Rabbi Kook here makes an important point: the Torah is not some abstract ideal which has little relation to the world in which it is placed. Rather, its purpose is to teach humanity how, from within the realia of that world, to slowly, step by step, bring about its perfection. It would be disastrous for humanity if any nation chosen to bear the Torah's truths were to be extinguished immediately upon observance of those truths. And so, the Jews are to make use of war, as bad as it is, when necessary to survive, and continue in their task of bettering the world.

The Torah, however, has a different view of what war morality is. There are five values which the Torah supports that may come in conflict with general western ideas. 1) Mercilessness: As Rav Kook writes above, a war must be fought with ferocity. Mercy has no place on the battlefield. As Rashi states on the words כי תצא למלחמה על אויבך, it is not on our brothers that we go to war, who would have mercy upon us. It is rather on enemies, who will not have any mercy. In order to win, we must be willing to be the same. 2) Motivation: Warriors need to be ready to do what is necessary with willingness and resolve. Ehud Olmert is quoted as saying, "we are tired of fighting, we are tired of winning". As Rambam makes clear in הלכות מלכים, this attitude is defeatist, giving the strong and victorious the attitude of the defeated. The Olmertian attitude is described in Yeats' The Second Coming: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity." This is no way for good to triumph. Good must be more motivated, filled with more intensity than evil. 3) Civilian losses: We must be willing to allow enemy civillians to die. The enemy civilian in a time of war is not differentiated from the enemy combatant. Jewish morality sees the value of life in Jewish soldiers. The '90's concept of טוהר הנשק, purity of arms, resulted in numerous Israeli casualties in Lebanon because terrorists dressed as women to fight, throwing the Israelis off guard. 4) Independence: Jewish war must be fought with faith in God and our own right, not with reliance upon external powers. As the prophet exhorted Egypt, יען הייתם משענת קנה, since Egypt provided Israel with an ostensible ally (who later abandonded the Jews), she is cursed. While alliances upon equal footing are sometimes beneficial, total reliance on anyone but ourselves and God is wrong and will only lead to failure. 5) Enemy population: The enemy population may not be allowed to remain in areas that are Israeli territory. Those that do, become thorns in our eyes and sides.

When Israel maintains these Jewish values of war, peace can prevail. However, when Israel neglects them, two things immediately happen: 1) Israel, by being merciful to the evil, ends up being evil to those who are merciful. Nothing is more clearly and example of this than the permissive attitude of the Israeli Government in the years before 2005 towards rocket attacks from Gaza, which led to the criminal Gaza Evacuation. 2) Israel teases its enemies by allowing them to think that they have never been fully beaten. Thus, the enemies continue conflicts for decades that should really last weeks. The Biblical story of Shaul and Amalek is a perfect example of this, in that Haman came from the Amalek King's union the night before he was killed by Sh'muel.

The sixth Jewish value in war is that of purity: once the battlefield is left, the warriors spend 7 days outside normal society to divest themselves of the negative traits needed in war. Mercilessness is replaced again by mercy, might by flexibility, gentility and empathetic kindness.

Today, we may feel that we find ourselves no nearer to the goal of world perfection and peace. I once read a book review in the New York Times, in which the author claimed that twentieth century was the bloodiest ever. Indeed, the greek term for a perfect world, 'utopia' (coined by Thomas More), also derives from οὐ, "not", and τόπος, "place", in other words, a place that is imaginary, and will never exist. In light of this, what is our job? The answer of the Torah is a pragmatic one: accepting the need for the grime and blood of war, maintain our morality while within it. The laws of אשת יפת תואר and beseiging an enemy city are some examples of this. In holiness, we go out to the camp of war.

We also ensure that the negative traits of character needed in war such as cruelty, anger and hatred never become naturalized characteristics. Kindness, empathy, love, gentleness, these are the characteristics that make up our persona. The others are like armor that is put on in times of need and removed at the earliest opportunity. In holiness we wage war, and in holiness we leave the field of battle, immediately divesting ourselves of the negative traits.

In a larger sense, this view of "war as clean as practically possible", is one which guides our path throughout our lives. For as Rav Neriyah has said, "we live in a world of בדיעבד." From the moment we are born to the moment we die, from morning to night, we are met by constant choices. We often must choose between two unappetizing options. It is in these situations where we often demonstrate our committment to the abstract ideals of Torah. In frustration at something, do we react calmly at the child who has just tracked mud into the house, or do we lose it? These kinds of questions are also applications of מלחמת מצווה. By fighting our baser desires and knee-jerk reactions, we conquer ourselves, and go to personal mini-war in holiness, as it were.

(Rav Soloveitchik makes another point in a similar vein. He says that, as a people constantly surrounded by other cultures, we often bring home יפת תואר, beautiful things and concepts from outside. Our job, as Rav Hirsch writes in his essays on education, is not to reject them out of hand, but to sublimate that which is good into our service of God. We take good, after studying it and assuring ourselves that it is indeed good, from any source.)

However, another aspect of war is that it fulfills an important purpose in our world. Rabbi Kook in Orot (המלחמה א) writes that war stirs the powers of Messiah. Just as a pressure cooker can cook in a short time things that would take hours in a conventional oven, so does war produce unnatural pressure in the world which allows change and upheavals at a faster rate than under normal circumstances. Borders shift and nations wrest from one another victory and status. God utilizes these changes to re-position geo-political realities that further the process of global redemption. When the general shake-up and pandemonium settles down, the stillness of punch-drunk adversaries leads to a renewed interest in true peace.

Thus, military upheavals may move the world in the direction God desires. As opposed to the greek "utopia", Judaism sees world harmony not only as possible, but as an inevitable teleological event. Yeshaya prophesies that in the end of days, the nations of the world will recognize God. The Temple will be a focal point for world spiritual strivings, and the inhabitants of our globe will beat their swords and spears to agricultural implements. At this time, the perfection of the general world and individuals will be accomplished slowly and incrementally, without the need for war.

So war is inevitable in our imperfect world, and it can even serve an important positive purpose. We may hear in today's headlines the drumbeats of tomorrow's war; we are quite cognizant of the dangers. We may wonder, how will the redemption ever be completed?

We can be strengthened in our faith in God's ultimate game-plan as was Rabbi Akiva. While his friends wept at the destruction of the Temple, he rejoiced and saw the fulfillment of the negative prophecies as a guarantee that God would eventually fulfill the fortellings of good. While danger still exists, we know that there is, in the not-distant future, a time when the world will, indeed, live in peace, with no need for the ravages of war. God and truth will reign supreme, and Man will serve Him in unity. It will be a time when the most destructive of forces will be used to build, when swords will be used to till the soil. Through the present haze of the battlefield upon which we still struggle, we hear the voice of God, promising that the redemption is no pipe-dream. Work towards it; wait for it; expect it. In the words of our הפטרה, "Though the mountains crumble and the valleys disintegrate, my loving-kindness for you, Israel, will never falter, says the Merciful One."

Response to Neve Gordon's Op-Ed

2009-08-24T04:59:00.000-07:00

I am planning to begin blogging regularly again this week. However, I felt so outraged after reading an op-ed in the LA Times, that I composed this as a response:

In Response to Neve Gordon's Op-Ed piece, here.

It is tragic and dangerous when a member of Israel's supposed intellectual elite joins forces with the Jewish State's enemies. It is painful for Jews around the world to witness such overt self-hate. And yet, readers of the Los Angeles Times were treated to such a display in the above-mentioned op-ed. As a Jew who sees the situation through less simplistic lenses, I offer this response to Neve Gordon.

1) Your article ignores the history that led to Israel's control over the West Bank. As you know, Israel accepted the UN Partition Plan in 1947 and declared Statehood over a land they had returned to after 2000 years. The Jews accepted a severely reduced amount of land than what had been promised by the British, and it excluded the West Bank. Israel was immediately attacked by more than 5 Arab armies, and over the next decades, was attacked three more times. In each of these wars publicly planned by the Arabs to "throw the Jews into the sea", Israel beat back their aggressors. Israel came to control the West Bank (historically part of ancient Israel) after the Six Day War.

In ignoring the way in which Israel came to the West Bank, you erase any moral highground that belongs to the defensive victor in a war. Israel's old "Aushwitz borders" (to quote Abba Eban, a leftist who, unlike you, had some sense) were redrawn to provide the fledgling State reasonable natural frontiers across which to defend itself. Israel's wars have all been defensive, and this is an important point which you neglect. There is no moral equivalence between the Israeli assumption of the West Bank and an offensive land-grab. To imply that there is is a dishonest play into the hands of Israel's enemies.

2) Your article states that there are only two options, one is a one-state solution with Arabs and Jews granted full and equal rights, and the second is a two-state solution. I am sorry that a university professor is victim to such a fallacy as the false dilemma you present. In reality, there are other options, many of which are part of a vigorous discussion within Israel today. As was the case in the separation of India and Pakistan, a transfer of populations is only one of a number of other options, in which the Jews transferred from Arab lands in the past 6 decades would be traded for a future transfer of Arabs to those lands. An important point to mention is that all suggestions of transfer voiced in Israel include fair renumeration to Arab families for property left in Israel. This is something which was not done when Jews were forcibly transferred from their homes in Arab lands.

3) Finally, the climax of your op-ed piece is a subscription to a Palestinian initiative to isolate Israel by way of boycott. This odious suggestion from a Jew to the world, to marginalize and isolate the Jewish State does indeed, as you point out, smack of anti-semitism, and in your case, self-hate. However, I wish to point out the hypocrisy of your position. You do not call for boycott of Hamas or Fatah or the PA, all of which routinely, as you know, in their own broadcasts to their population, advocate armed terror against the Israeli civillian population. It is common for PA television to broadcast children speaking of their desire to be "martyrs" (Arab double-talk for "terrorists"). You do not call for a boycott of Iran or Syria. You do not speak out against any other world evils. You choose, rather, to focus all your public, international voice against your own country and people, who are defending themselves against increasingly deadly and existential dangers including terrorism and nuclear annihalation.

You have turned the victim into the aggressor, ignoring history and morality. In doing so, you have weakened the State of Israel and the the Jewish People. You have opened a door for other anti-semites by joining forces with the Palestinian boycott anti-semites; after all, they gleefully reason, if a Jewish University Professor from Israel can agree with it, it must be acceptable.

And so, shame on you. In a fit of emotional frenzy, you have sold your pen and your soul to your enemy.

Thank God Israel and the free world do not rely on the likes of you to fight evil.

In light of the above, I call for another, Israeli initiative, and I hope it is more successful than yours will be. I call for your ouster as a tenured professor at Ben Gurion University. The people of Israel should not have to pay your salary, as you poison the minds of students with your self-loathing.

Blessing on the Sun

2009-03-31T21:03:00.000-07:00

In Sh'mot (24), the Torah tells us of the Jewish people's preparation for the revalation at Sinai. The midrash states that the Jews were not content with the plan that God transmit to Moshe the teachings, and he in turn teach them. "רצונינו לראות את מלכנו," we desire to "see" God, as it were. Indeed, the revelation took place with God speaking to the people directly. The midrash describes the mass expiration of the nation, and only after God ceases to speak do they become re-animated.

This event stands distinct from the midrashic interpretations at the end of parashat Tzav. The Torah says (8:36), "Aharon and his sons did all the things that God commanded by the hand of Moshe." Torat Kohanim notes on this: "ששים ושמחים לקבל מפי משה כשומעים מפי הקדוש ברוך הוא," they were happy to receive the teachings from Moshe as if they had heard them directly from God.

What changed? Why is it that the Jews are suddenly satisfied, indeed, joyful, over hearing the teachings through Moshe? By examining a rare occurence that is coming up this year, perhaps we can come to a deeper understanding of these midrashim.

This ערב פסח is special, because it coincides with the day that, according to tradition, the Sun is aligned with earth in exactly the same way it was on the day it was created in Genesis. This happens, according to the Jewish calendar, every twenty-eight years, and we say the blessing of עושה מעשה בראשית to commemorate it. However, it is a fact that this twenty-eight year cycle does not truly describe the astronomical reality. So why is it that we celebrate this, essentially a non-event?

Rabbi Eisen, in a class delivered in Jerusalem this year, explained that the mysteries of creation and the Divine manner of running the world are hidden from us. He gives an analogy: one may look inside a pot, and see precious stones and other treasures shimmering before him. He may then be told that what he is admiring is nothing other than the intricately painted lid of the pot. So the Torah shows us not necessarily an ontological truth, but a working-reality truth. It is truth in that it is the foundation of the way that God expects us to interact with the world around us. As the midrash states regarding the story of creation, we are unable to plumb the depths of God's infinite wisdom in creation, and so the Torah concealed with, "In the beginning". The very narrative of creation is a screen behind which the ontological truth hides, inaccessible to us.

Taking Rabbi Eisen's point further, the precision and truth of the twenty-eight year cycle is the precision and truth that the Torah chooses to reveal to us: it is a working truth, and is eminently valuable to us -- for it describes the way God wants us to interface with creation. Ontological truth is not what we need (or can even attain in many circumstances).^[1]

This is the strength of the Oral Torah. The Yerushalmi (Pe'ah 2:4) states that "the words of the Sages are preferred to the Written Torah". This is because the Torah of the Sages is the practical concretization of the abstract Written Law in this world. And since Man is finite, he is unable to perfectly undestand many actual truths; however, he is able to come to a working truth, and it is this truth that God cherishes, for it represents Man coming forth, struggling against the darkness, closer to Him. And thus, when we bless on the sun this coming Wednesday, we are in essense celebrating the value, validity and importance of the Torah of the Sages.

Perhaps now we can better understand the two midrashim with which we began. At the foot of Sinai, the people naiively believed that they could plumb the depths of ontological truth: they wanted to "see" God. However, after experiencing the life-ending combustion that results from such an interaction with the Divine, they understand that for this world, the Torah of the Sages (represented by Moshe's transmission of God's word), the working truth, is sufficient, and to be cherished. It is then that, at the consecration of the Tabernacle in our parasha, they joyfully accept the words of God through Moshe, as if they had heard these words from God himself. The lesson of Sinai is internalized.

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^[1] In truth, this is taken further: Halacha concerns itself with scientific accuracy, but only as one of many considerations when rendering a decision. Far greater weight is given to social concerns, and the ease of perpetuation of a specific halacha (the whole idea of גזרה שאין הציבור יכולה לעמוד בה, that some otherwise valuable rabbinic enactments are abandoned when it is clear that the public would be unduly stressed to keep them, is a demonstration of this point). The calendar created around a 28 year cycle is the best possible calendar for human beings: it is accurate enough to not impact the correct seasons of the festivals for many millenia, and yet it is short enough to be remembered by human beings. A halacha that falls out once every 150 years is not practical. And yet, ברכת החמה, the blessing on the sun, would become just such a halacha if any greater accuracy were attempted by the creators of the Hebrew calendar. In short, for finite Man, halacha creates a realistic, practical framework, and that trumps ontological truth. For finite Man, the twenty-eight year calendar is the best possible calendar. And this is the aim and focus of the Torah.

Fate and Destiny

2009-03-25T02:04:00.000-07:00

In Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck describes the depression-era migration of Eastern share-croppers and their families to the West. Beset by troubles, the Joad family breaks a connection-rod in their truck, and visit a scrapyard to find a replacement. There, they meet an unkempt man who has only one eye. He does not even try to cover up the socket of the missing eye with a patch. He bemoans his situation: he cannot find a wife, for, who could like someone like him? he cannot find a better job, for, "Ain't so easy to get a job --not for a one-eye' man." The junkyard man presents a totally miserable life, with no hope for rehabilitation.

On the other hand, Tom Joad has undertaken the obligation to see his family to California to find work. The Joad farm was foreclosed, and they were cheated out of many of their expensive farming implements. Grandfather died on the road, and they buried him themselves. However, hope does not die. The Joads actively work towards a better future for themselves.

When Tom meets the man at the junkyard, he listens. Finally, he says, "Now, look-a-here, fella. You got that eye wide open...Ya just asking for it. Ya like it. Lets ya feel sorry for yaself. 'Course you can't get no woman with that empty eye flappin' aroun'...I knowed a hump-back...Make his whole livin' lettin' folks rub his hump for luck...an' all you got is one eye gone."

In קול דודי דופק, Rabbi Soloveitchik details two possible modes of the human condition. Man can either exist in the mode of fate, or he can rise to that of destiny. Fateful Man is one who lives in depressing reaction to the things that occur around him. He is an object -- events happen to him, and he does not initiate them. He lives trapped in the reality of "It is against your own will that you live." (Avot 4:29) When tragedy strikes, he cries out in pain and anguish, at the edge of the dark abyss of human reason. He cannot undestand the "why", and so retreats into a shell of pain and loneliness.[1]

The second possible dimension of life is that of a Man of Destiny. This Man is a subject -- and active initiator of events in the world around him. While it is true that "It is against his will that he is born and dies" (ibid.), Man of Destiny changes the interlude between those two events to, "By your own free will do you live". Although life may serve hardships and suffering, this Man chooses to overcome everything, and knows that what does not kill him will only succeed in making him stronger. Life is transformed from forced to motivated, from muted to resplendent with purpose.[2]

In brilliant color and authenticity, Steinbeck's characters fulfill these two opposite roles. The junkyard man is Rav Soloveitchik's classic Man of Fate. He as been dealt an ugly hand. What does he do with it? Nothing. He does not even attempt to hide his disfigurement, or keep himself clean. He wallows in his own filth and misery, taking perverse delight in how repulsive, rejected and lonely this makes him. He sees the happiness of others not as an offer of hope for himself, but as a teasing mockery of what he has become.

Tom, on the other hand, has his share of troubles as well. However, he views them as stepping stones on a path to a better life. He hears of the jobs out West, and decisively acts to bring himself that success. He takes the things that life doles out, and does his best to build for those around him, and for himself. He even remarks on other cripples, and how they use their disability to their advantage! Tom berates the junk-man for not following in their paths.

At one point, the junk-man seems to see the glimmer of destiny through his goggles of fate. He asks, "ya think a fella like me could get work? Black patch on my eye?" He sees the power of Tom's way, and wishes to come along. Tom calls, as he leaves the scrap-yard, "See ya maybe in California." The Man of Fate has been brought to the sweet waters of Destiny and has been given permission to drink. And yet, the junk-man is a tragic figure, for he is not able to lift himself out of his fateful misery. He "watched them go, and then he went through the iron shed to his shack behind. It was dark inside. He felt his way to his mattress on the floor, and he stretched out and cried in his bed, and the cars whizzing by on the highway only strengthened the walls of his loneliness." Steinbeck demonstrates how hard it can be to rise out of darkness of fate and into the breaking dawn of destiny.

And it is hard, indeed. However, precisely during the month of Nissan, our Torah teaches that each of us is ennobled with the ability to live a life of purpose and destiny, and we must actively choose to do so. As Rabbi Hirsch points out, the whole exodus story is a monumental lesson that fate does not have power over us. By any normal course of events, a nation of slaves that has been subjected to such ordeals as the Jews in Egypt would have remained in bondage, perhaps disappearing as the centuries passed. The story of the plagues and the subsequent redemption, demonstrate clearly that God is actively and immanently involved in human events. Fate was no match for God's active shift of human history. In the same way, fate is no match for the free will God has embedded within each of us. Only because we have free will, and Man's activities are not predetermined, can positive and negative commandments be binding, and can one be moral or immoral. Mired in sin or sadness, pain or depression, there is no situation in which the free will of humans cannot find a way to be active, to grow from suffering and promote a closer relationship with Hashem.

The Exodus which we re-live each year is a foundational message that our actions and reactions are not pre-determined, but fully controllable by our free will. May we, this Pesach, continue to transform our lot from slavery to our passions and fate, to the happy freedom of those who live motivated, free-willed lives, physically and spiritually.

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[1] In truth, there seem to be two modalities to the Man of Fate: 1) Man needs to understand the whole of the divine calculus that encompasses theodicy. It is impossible for finite man to fathom the intricacies and complexity of the ways of God, and so this modality is destined to failure. Man cannot completely fathom God, and so he will come away unsatisfied and unrequited. 2) Man rejects the fundamental theory that there is sense to the occurrences in the universe. In the face of pain and suffering, this modality throws up its hands in anguish, sensing a cold, unfeeling universe, instead of a loving, immanent Creator. Both of these relate to Man of Fate, for their conclusion is the same: there is no Divine calculus, and nothing is balanced; justice is a cloud of smoke, and dissipates in the face of reality.

[2] Also here, there exist two streams that reinforce each other: 1) Man understands that although a full reckoning of Divine calculus is beyond his ken, he can understand the “why” as it relates to his field of activity: he can search his ways and return to God. “נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד ה'.” He may not understand all of the complexity, but what relates to him, he can fathom, and act to stem. 2) By divine order, Man also fights suffering and evil, to root out evil. This second halachik response to suffering is, paradoxically, the attempt to uproot it from the world. Man sees as his imperative, after gleaning purpose and lessons from suffering, to alleviate the evil of this world, and thus participate in God’s work.

Awe from Afar

2009-03-17T09:55:00.000-07:00

The mishkan seems to contain a paradox. On the one hand, its purpose is ultimately, "that I may dwell in them". God establishes the reason of the mishkan not for Him, rather, as a conduit through which the Divine presence may permeate the settlement of the Jewish people. Each home, each heart, is filled with the sublime shechina when the mishkan is in service. The Holy of Holies contained keruvim, a visual metaphor of God's love for the Jewish nation. On the other hand, as the holiest place on earth, the mishkan (and Temple after it) had very strict rules which made it a fearful place to be. Touching the holy Ark was forbidden, and the high level of formality forbade sitting when visiting. Even a well-intentioned deviation from the prescribed method of service would warrant death, as Aharon's own sons demonstrated. The paradox of intimacy and formality, love and awe, fills our understanding of the mishkan with tension.

This paradox exists in our relationship with God in general. The first building block of Jewish thought is God's absolute infinite oneness. However, as finite, complex beings, our understanding of Him and the attributes we perceive, as it were, are varied. A fundamental dialectic in our relationship with God is his distant glory on the one hand, and his intimate nearness on the other. Not only are these two philosophic modes, but, at times, individuals can feel the warmth of his nearness, "ואני קרבת אלקים לי טוב" (Tehilim 73:28), and at other times, we recognize the infinite gulf between us, "ואלקינו בשּמים". Who has not felt Hashem as near as a father at some times, setting things up just so, in times of joy, and ennabling us to continue in the face of tremendous suffering, when things are hard? Who has not turned to Him in tears, as to a parent? And yet, we all know the awe of a King, and tremble in trepidation when the chazzan sings the un'tane tokef, of God's judgement, on Rosh Hashanna. We are constantly in a state of flux between the two poles of immanence and transcendence.

But how are we to interact with these distinct human realities vis-a-vis God? The Kedushat Levi relates them to the two primary modalities of feeling, those of love and awe. Awe (yirat Hashem) is active when we consider our relationship to the transcendent Creator of the world. Awe is our reaction to Hashem's Kingship, His distance. It is this mode that produces fear and respect towards the all-powerful, all-knowing, extra-temporal Source of all being. Rav Levi Yitzchak sees an expression of this in God's command to Moshe and the elders to come closer, and yet, "prostrate yourselves from afar" (Sh'mot 24:1). There is a limit to our ability to approach, and we kneel before God's glory.

On the other hand, love (ahavat Hashem) is in mind when we consider the animating spirit that God's breath instills in His creations. He is our father, the one we go to for help and comfort. That intimacy bourne of an immanent, parental bond is one which inspires us to dependency, reliance, and ultimately, to love of God.

Love and awe are different aspects of the same God. Hashem does not change, and yet our perception of Him at various moments does. Because our minds are finite, they see things in a compartmentalized way. However, Love and awe are not mutually exclusive. Our service of Hashem takes the dialictic and merges it. The very act of prostration from afar that Moshe and the elders do is preceeded by "ascending towards God". In the mishkan, closeness and distance rule together. We must, to the best of our abilities, strive to relate to God at once as our most intimate relationship, and yet, still, understand that this closeness cannot begin to bridge the abyss between us and our Creator. Even in our closeness, our ascension onto the mountain, we are still insurmountably far from Him, and bow meekly before that glory which we cannot begin to understand.

The way we relate to the mishkan mirrors the way we relate to God Himself. Perhaps this is part of the lesson the mishkan teaches. We know that each shul, indeed, each Jewish home, is a מקדש מעט, a small Temple. By taking the lessons from the Temple and mishkan, and applying them to our communal and private resting places for the shechina, we can bring the immanence and transcendence of the shechina into our every-day lives.

חקירת סוגיא בשבת ה.: זריקה

2009-03-05T04:01:00.000-08:00

ה. ר' יוחנן בענין זריקה והנחתה: הגדרה

הקדמה:
זריקה יותר מד' אמות ברה"ר הינה תולדה דהוצאה. לכן, כמו אביה, היא צריכה עקירה והנחה המיוחסות לאדם הפועל, העושה את המלאכה. כמובן, זריקה שונה מהוצאה, כי אע"פ שהעקירה נעשתה בפועל, ההנחה מתבצעת ממילא, בלי הנחה פועלת (אקטיבית). על אף זאת, נחשבת הנחה זו הנחה המיוחסת לאדם הפועל מספיק כדי להחשב להנחה שמחייבת אותו במלאכה. (דבר זה מוכח מלשון הגמ' ורמב"ם, עיי' ניסוחו בהל' שבת, פרק י"ג הלכה י"ג.)

עוד דבר שחשוב לזכור: ד' על ד' זה נחשב מקום אחד בהלכות שבת, ולכן, אולי כאשר אנו מדברים על מקום והנחה במקום, סטייה של פחות מד' לא נחשב מקום אחר, אלא נחשב אותו מקום.

הגמרא:
יש גרסא אחרת, אבל קודם נתעסק בגירסא שלפנינו.
ר' יוחנן אומר ה' מימרות בה. בחצי השני של העמוד:

1) ידו של אדם חשובה כד' על ד' אפילו היכא דלא אחשביה.
2) זרק חפץ ונח בתוך ידו של חבירו, חייב הראשון (בגלל 1).
3) עמד במקומו וקיבל החפץ, חייב הראשון.
4) עקר ממקומו וקיבל, פטור הראשון.
5) אדם אחד זרק, עקר וקיבל החפץ, ר' יוחנן שואל אם הוי כאדם אחד (וחייב) או שני בני אדם (ופטור). השאלה היא האם שני כחות באדם אחד כאדם אחד או שני בני אדם.

אפשרויות בהגדרת המקרים שבגמרא:
מקרים 2, 3 ו4 לא מדוייקים, וצריכים ביאור. מה בדיוק קורא במקרים? יש כמה אפשרויות:

א) אדם המקבל עמד עם כף יד פתוח ונפל החפץ עליו, ולא סגר את ידו.
ב) אדם המקבל עמד עם כף יד פתוח ונפל החפץ עליו, וסגר ידו לשמרה.
ג) אדם המקבל עמד במקומו, והושיט ידו ולקח את החפץ מהאוויר.
ד) אדם המקבל עקר ממקומו ולקח את החפץ מהאוויר.

כמובן, א' מתייחס ל2, וד' מתייחס ל4. אבל האם 3 מתאמת דרך אפשרות ב' (ואז ג' זה כבר כמו 4) או ג' (ובמקרה זה ב' כמו 2)?

כדי לענות על שאלה זו, צריכים אנו להבין מה החילוק המדוייקת המחלקת בין 3 ל4.

אפשרויות בהבנת החילוק המחלק בין 3 ל4:
a) זה ענין של אחשביה: אתה צריך להחשיב את היד למקום הנחה, ואם לא תעשה כן לא יהיה הנחה. זה ענין מיוחד ליד, וזה למה שב3 אתה חייב, כי החפץ נח (תוך ד' או) במקום שהחשבת שיהיה מקום להנחתו. אבל ב4, אין אחשביה ולכן לא חייב. אפשרות זו לא עובדת, כי כל חידוש 2 בגמרא זה שלפי רבא ור' יוחנן, אע"פ שלא אחשביה, עדיין יד נחשב ד' על ד'!
b) זה שאלה של הנחה השייכת לאותו אדם שעשה את העקירה. כאשר ההנחה מיוחסת לעוקר, יש לנו מלאכה שלמה הנעשית ע"י אדם אחד. אבל אם נחשב ההנחה לשל המקבל, אז לא יהיה חייב הראשון. וב3, החפץ מונח ממניע ומכוח הראשון (אולי כי נח תוך ד' ממקום שנתכוין) ולכן חייב, משא"כ במקרה 4.
c) השאלה היא האם החפץ סוף סוף נח במקום (או תוך ד') שהתכוון הזורק מקודם. הנקודה המכריעה פה זה כוונת הזורק. בגלל שההנחה לא כ"כ מיוחסת לעקירה בכלל בזריקה, כי זה פאסיבי, לכן צריכים שהיתה מחשבתו, דהיינו, כוונתו, למסלול (trajectory) הזה.
d) אפשר להגיד שונה מc, שזה רק שאלה של פוטנציל בזריקה, שלא קשור לכוונת הזורק. אם נעשתה הפוטנציל אז חייב, ואם לא, פטור. זה מאוד דומה לb ולדעתי זהה לזה.

עתה נבדק את שיטות הראשונים ונגלה אם אפשר להחליט על האפשרויות האלה מדבריהם המדוייקים.

שיטת רש"י:
ב4, רש"י מסביר שפטור בגלל ש"לא עביד הנחה". על אף שדבר זה אולי משמע שאין הנחה בכלל, מיד בא הד"ה (שמפרש את הסיבה לחייב ב5) הבא לבאר: "הא עבד עקירה והנחה". במקרה שאדם אחד זורק ורץ ותופס, וודאי שיהיה חייב (זה ההווא אמינא של הגמ'), כי הוא עשה עקירה והנחה. מוכח משורה זו שוודאי וודאי, אע"פ שנעקר ממקומו ותופס, עדיין נחשב הנחה. לכן, מה שאמר רש"י בהסבר לפרש ב4 זה וודאי בא לומר שלא עביד הזורק הנחה, אלא ההנחה מתייחסת לאדם השני.

עכשיו, בד"ה הבא, שמבאר למה יש הו"א שיהיה פטור אדם אחד אם זה כשני בני אדם, כותב רש"י:
i) דהוו להו שנים שעשאוה,
ii) דכיון שלא הניח החפץ לילך עד מקום הילוכו ולנוח, אלא רץ אחריו ועכבו,
iii) הויא ליה עקירה קמייתא בלא הנחה.

למה רש"י מתעקש לומר שרץ אחריו ועכבו?

הסיבה היא שכאשר אנו מתעסקים במלאכה אחת שיכולה להיעשות ע"י אדם אחד, ועשאוה שניים, הם פטורים (עיי' ג.). לכן רש"י צריך להסביר למה אדם אחד שרץ ותופס מעצמו יהיה פטור, הלא זה אדם אחד! לכן רש"י מסביר שכאשר יש לאדם אחד שני מעשים, שני כוחות, והמעשה השני (כוח השני) היא סותרת למעשה הראשון, אז זה כשני בני אדם, ופטור, כי העקירה קמייתא שהתבצעת ע"י האדם היתה בלא הנחה שיכולה להתייחס לעקירה. ההנחה מתייחסת לכח השני ולא הראשון! ולכן צריך רשֲ"י להגדיר את מקרה 5 כיירוט, כדי שיהיה הו"א של פטור – כי אם לא, ההנחה נובע ישירות מהעקירה, וזה וודאי חייב.[1]

הסבר זה ברש"י עובד יפה עם הסבר b שלנו מקודם, ואז החילוק בין חייב לפטור יהיה בין ג' לד'.

(בעייה עם רש"י זה שהגמ' מתעקשת לומר הוי כשני בני אדם דמי ופטור, והרי רש"י אומר בלי כל הכינויים, שזה זהה לשניים שעשאוה, לא כשניים שעשאוה. אבל תוס' עוזר לנו להבין גם ברש"י שההשוואה היא לא במקרה, אלא בדין, הדין זה של שניים שעשאוה.)

שיטת רבינו חננאל:
תוספות מזכירים את שיטת ר"ח, ומצביע לגירסא אחרת שיש לו. לר"ח, מקרה 5 זה מנוסח כך: אדם אחד זרק, עקר וקיבל החפץ, ר' יוחנן שואל אם הוי כאדם אחד (ופטור) או שני בני אדם (וחייב). השאלה היא האם שני כחות באדם אחד כאדם אחד או שני בני אדם.

גירסא זו קשה, כי בהבנות שלנו עד כה, "כשני בני אדם" היה תמיד סיבה לפטור, כי המלאכה מיוחסת לשניים, וזה סיבה לפטור! לכן, ר"ח (לפחות לפי מהלכו של תוס' תוך דברי ר"ח -- ברמב"ן נראה שזה לא כ"כ פשוט) רואה את מקרה 5 כמקביל לא ל4 (כמו שתמיד הבננו בפשטות מהגמ' וגם בבירור משיטת רש"י), אלא 3[2]! דהיינו: אם זה כשני בני אדם, זה זהה למקרה שבו אדם אחד זורק, ואדם שני עומד במקומו ומקבל את החפץ. (רעיון זה בר"ח ברור מדברי תוס' אשר כתבו ש"הכא נמי, כי קבלה הוא עצמו ולא חטפה מהילוכו -- ליחייב.") לא כמו שהבהיר רש"י, שהזורק עצר את החפץ תוך אווירו (ii), אלא שהגיע למקום ששם ינוח החפץ מבחינת המסלול, ועמד שם לקבלו. במקרה כזה, הראשון חייב. למה? הבה נבדק בלשון ר"ח ונראה.

על 3, ר"ח אומר: "כגון שזרק לחבירו, חייב, בזה שנעשית מחשבתו." ברור שלר"ח, סיבת ההלכה במקרה 3 היא שנתקיימה מחשבתו של הזורק. דהיינו, אנחנו לא מעוניינים בהנחה עצמה (b), וגם לא בפוטנציל של הזריקה (d, אם אכן d שונה מb), אלא בכוונת, במחשבת הזורק והגשמת רצונו.

לפי זה, יוצא שהנחה אולי אפילו לא דין בכלל בזורק! אלא זה היכי תימצא שכוונת הזורק יתגשם. (ובאמת, בנקודותיו על פירוש הרמב"ן, אומר כן הרב פישר.)[3]

אז לפי כל האמור, במקרה 5, צד החיוב סיבתה, לר"ח, היא שנעשתה כוונתו. אע"פ שנעשה ע"י שני בני אדם, זה לא פוגם בכוונה שהתגשמה, וזהו עיקר החיוב במלאכת זורק. ועל צד הפטור, אם הוי כאדם אחד, ר"ח מסביר שזה סתם כמושיט מידו אחת לידו אחרת, אע"פ שעבר ברה"ר, לא משנה לנו. עכשיו נבאר את עניין זה.

בהסבר ר"ח למה אם הוי כאדם אחד, יהיה פטור, ר"ח אומר: "לא נעקר ממקום זה והונח במקום אחר, אלא מקום העקירה הוא מקום ההנחה." כל המעשה של הזזת חפץ נעשית באותו מקום[4]. איך אפשר להבין רעיון כזה שאע"פ שחפץ נזרק ועובר למקום אחר, עדיין נחשב כאילו שהוא באותו מקום אשר ממנו נזרק?

החתם סופר נתפס בשאלה זו. הוא שואל למה בעירובין צח:, תוס' מצטטים ר"ח שאומר שאדם שעומד במקום אחד, ומעביר חפץ מצד אחד לצד שני, ומניחו מחוץ לד' אמות שהיה החפץ קודם, חייב. תוס' עונים, אתה חייב כי היד עובר וזז ומניח חפץ חוץ מד' אמות, לכן היד לא נחשב מונח כל הזמן אגב הגוף שלא זז. חת"ס אומר שברור שתוס' רואים הבדל בין המקרה שם למקרה שלנו, אבל מה ההבדל בין שם לכאן?

להסבר לשאלה המרכזית הזו בשיטת ר"ח, יש שני זרמים שבאמת מורים על אותו ענין. אבאר את שניהם:

דרך א': ברה"ר, אדם יש לו כעין רשות שלעצמו, וזה, ד' אמות, שהם "מקומו" של אדם. מחוץ לעירוב תחומין, יש לאדם ד' אמות לשימוש גופו, ידיו ורגליו. בתוך רה"ר, עדיין יש ד' אמות לאדם שהם שייכים לו, ואם אדם מוליך ומביא חפצים תוך ד' אמות שלו כל היום כולו, לא עשה מלאכה. כאשר עובר אדם את הקו האדום ומעביר דבר חוץ לד' אמות שלו, הוא כאילו מעביר מרשות לרשות, וחייב משום מעביר ד' אמות ברה"ר.

כמובן, אנו לא סופרים את ד' אמותיו של אדם כל הזמן, כי הם תמיד משתנים. אדם המהלך ברה"ר, יש לו כמין עיגול של ד' אמות הזזות בתמידיות אתו, והוא עומד בנקודה המרכזית בה. אבל, כאשר אדם מתחיל לטלטל משהו, עכשיו הוא הגדיר את תחילת מקום ד' אמותיו. עכשיו שנושא משהו, כאילו שהקצה של ד' אמותיו נהדקות ארצה, והוא מהלך מקצה ד' אמותיו עד תחילת רה"ר (קצה הסופי של ד' אמותיו). הד' אמות קובעו ע"י מעשה זה של העברה שהוא עושה, וכשהוא עובר את הסף של ד' אמות, עבר על איסור דאו'.

אבל, כאשר אדם זורק חפץ באויר, אז כשהוא מהלך ברה"ר, הד' אמות לא נהדקות ארצה, כי אין לו חפץ ביד, ואין סיבה שהד' אמות לא ימשיכו לזוז בתמידיות איתו. כאשר עומד שוב במקום השני, הד' אמות הם אותם ד' אמות אשר היו כאשר הוא זרק ועקר את החפץ. אע"פ שמבחינת הקרקע, הם אמות שונות, לגבי הגברא, לגבי מלאכת הזורק השייכת לו, הם אותם הד' אמות. וזה בדיוק השאלה, האם הד' אמות זזים אתו, וזהים לאיפה שהתחיל לזרוק, או לא? זה ספק ר' יוחנן.

ליתר ביאור, נסביר בדרך אחר, עם מילים קצת שונות, אבל הרעיון הוא שווה. כאשר חפץ נמצא בידו של אדם, יש לו מציאות דוּאַלְית:
א) נחשב מונח על הגוף/יד הזה, ו
ב) נחשב מונח ברשות אשר בו נמצא הגוף/יד.
מעשה זריקה מקיימת עקירה מן הגוף ותחילת ההולכה מקיימת עקירה מן הרשות בו נמצא הגוף.

במקרה שלנו, החפץ נזרק מן היד ונתפס ביד אחר. כיוון ששני הידיים שייכים לאותו אדם, אפשר להתעלם מן העובדא שהאדם זז, כי החפץ נעקר מן הגוף ואח"כ נח שוב על הגוף. החפץ למעשה נשאר באותו יד ממנו יצא. לכן זה כאילו לא זז. לעומת זו, כאשר האדם זז בעצמו, ועובר ברה"ר, אי אפשר לחלק את היד מן ההעברה ברה"ר, ולכן, זה עבר ד' אמות ברה"ר וחייב. העקירה עוקרת מן הקרקע ומניחה שוב על הקרקע.

שיטת חכמי ספרד:
כאשר למדנו את שיטת ר"ח, היה ברור מתוס' וגם היה הגיוני שר"ח משווה בין מקרה 5 למקרה 3. אבל דבר זה לא מוסכם לכל הראשונים.

הרמב"ן בפירושו לדברי ר"ח מזכיר את המהלך בה נקט תוס', ולא דאיק לו. הוא מתקשה כי אם החפץ עבר עד מקום אשר היה הולך להיות נח על פי הזריקה הראשונה, איך אפשר להגדיר את זה כשני כוחות? הרי הכח המעשי אשר ביצע את כל המלאכה, כח אחד היא! נכון שחייב הזורק, אבל איך אפשר בכלל להגדיר את זה כשני כחות באדם אחד? זה כח אחד באדם אחד!

על כן מביא הרמב"ן אפשרות שנייה בהסבר המקרה לפי ר"ח, דחוקה מאוד: "כגון שקיבל בעקירה ממקומו", שהחפץ נעצר על ידו קודם שהגיע למקום אשר היה מגיע על ידי המעשה הראשון. עכשיו מובן היטב איך אפשר להיות הוא אמינא שהמעשה מוגדר כ"שני כוחות". ושאלת ר' יוחנן היא: האם המקרה הזה למקרה של (בלשון הרמב"ן) "שני בני אדם דמי, בעומד ומקבל"? דהיינו, בצד זה של שאלת הגמ', הרמב"ן משווה את 5 למקרה של אי-יירוט (מקרה 3), "דהא, עקירה והנחה תרוייהו מכחו אתו". סיבת החיוב במקרה 3 זה שההנחה נובעת ישירות מן מעשה העקירה, אז הם כנעשו ע"י הזורק , ולכן חייב. במקרה 5, בגלל שיש רק אדם הפועֵל אחד, זה רק יכול להיות שני כחות אם מדובר ביירוט. לכן מדובר ביירוט, וזה שני כחות, והם נעשו ע"י אדם אחד, ולכן חייב. מורם מכל זה, שיש שני מוצרכים לחייב: 1) שהמעשה ייעשה ע"י שני כחות (וזה נותן הוא אמינא של פטור), וגם ש2) שני הכחות הללו ייעשו ע"י אדם אחד. עד כאן דעת הרמב"ן, ורשב"א גם כן כותב כמעט אותם המילים.

עכשיו, לצד השני של שאלת ר' יוחנן: "או דילמא, כאדם אחד דמי", ואומר הרמב"ן: "שעשה עקירה ולא הניחה במקום אחר דפטור, והכא נמי, ההנחה לא נעשית מכחו הראשון". רמב"ן בפירוש מתנגד לדברי ר"ח, שהוי כמושיט מימינו לשמאלו, או עקירה זוהי מקום ההנחה. הרמב"ן מסביר שבגלל שההנחה לא נעשית מכח העקירה, שמא זה שווה למקרה בו עשה אדם עקירה ולא עשה הנחה, כי ההנחה באה מכח אחר לגמרי. ע"י זה, מצרף הרמב"ן עוד תנאי לחיוב בזריקה, 3) שההנחה תהיה תוצאה ישירה של העקירה. ושאלת הר' יוחנן בגמ' היא: האם תנאי 3, זה רק במקרה בו מדובר בשני בני אדם, ולכן יש סיבה טובה לחלק את המלאכה, אבל במקרה 5 שמדובר באותו זורק לאורך כל המלאכה, אין צורך בתנאי 3, ולכן הוי כשני בני אדם וחייב, או דילמא, אפילו במקרה 5, יש צורך בתנאי 3 ולכן הוי כאדם אחד ופטור.[5]

כמובן, הבנה זו בגמ' דחוקה. לכן מסיים רמב"ן ב"יש לרש"י ז"ל פירוש אחר טוב מזה [הפירוש שהסברנו באריכות לעיל], אבל אין הגירסא מודה לו." רמב"ן מתאבל על זה שאין בידו גירסא שיכולה לכלכל את שיטת רש"י, ולכן עומד בדוחקו. לעומת זו, הרשב"א, אחרי כל הענין, מוכן לקבל את שיטת רש"י כיותר נכונה, ואומר בפשטות, "רש"י פירש...וכן עיקר."

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[1] המורם מנקודה זו, שרש"י לפי צד "כשני בני אדם", מצריך הנחה הנובע ישירות מן העקירה כדי לחייב. זה מייצר מלאכה או מעשה אחת.
[2] ברור מהרשב"א שכך הוא קורא את תוס', כי הוא (ואריאל העלה קושי זה לפני שראינו את זה ברשב"א) מעלה כקושי בשיטה זו שלפי הסבר זה, המילה "עקר" ב4 שונה במשמעותה מכוונת המילה ב5. ב4, הכוונה ליירוט (interception), ובמקרה 5, הכוונה זה לתפיסה במקום אשר היה מגיע החפץ מלכתחילה. זה לא כ"כ קשה, כי במקרה 5 יש צורך בריצה כי מדובר באותו פועֳל, והמילה היחידה שהגמ' יכולה להשתמש זה "עקירה", שהוא זז ממקומו, ולכן המילה לא מתכוונת ליירוט. אבל ב4, יש שני בני אדם, והמילה "עקר" משומשת במובן מנוגד ל"עמד במקומו" שבמקרה 3.
על אף זאת, הבאנו לדיון אפשרות נוספת בהבנת תוס' בשיטת ר"ח (ואולי אפשרות זו היא תהווה תשובת תוס' עצמו לטענת הרשב"א), שלא כרוכה באי-עקביות במובן המילים: תוס' משנה בהבנת מקרה 4 ולפי ר"ח, מבין את המקרה כמקרה אשר בו אין יירוט. אם כן, למה הדין שונה מ3 ל4? ההסבר הוא ש3 זה מקרה אשר בו התכוון הזורק שהתופס יתפס, ולכן חייב כי נעשית מחשבתו. אבל ב4, מדובר איך שהזורק התכוון שהדבר יגיע לקרקע במקום מסויים, וקדם התופס ועשה שהחפץ ינוח באותו מקום, אבל במקום להיות נח על הקרקע, נח החפץ על ידו, ולכן לא נעשית מחשבתו של הזורק, ופטור הזורק. המורם מכל האמור הוא שבמקרה 5, צד "כשני בני אדם" חייב כי אדם שזורק לעצמו, בוודאי מתכוון שהחפץ יגיע למקום אשר בו תפס, ושיגיע לידו. לכן, חייב הזורק אי הוי כשני בני אדם (כי אם כאדם אחד דמי, אז זה כמעביר מימינו לשמאלו, כמו שנפרש להלן).
[3] באמת, יש שלש דרכים להבין את מקרה 5 בדברי ר"ח, ורק הראשון מוכח שאין הנחה ענין בדין זורק.
1) זרק החפץ לאדם מסויים, והוא עקר, קידם וקיבל את החפץ במקום מוקדם יותר מאיפה שהיה החפץ נח טבעית. לפי אפשרות זו, אכן אין הנחה חשובה במקרה זורק לר"ח, כי הראשון לא עשה הנחה כלל, ועדיין חייב.
2) התכוון שהחפץ ינוח במקום מסויים, והתופס בא ומגיע למקום המסויים הזה, וקבל. כל מה שהשתנה ממחשבתו של הזורק זה שעכשיו במקום להיות נח על הקרקע, החפץ בידו של אחר. ובגלל שנח במקום שהתכוון, חייב, כי נעשת מחשבתו, וגם הנחה שלו נעשתה, כי התופס לא עשה מעשה יותר מלהיות כמו קרקע, וההנחה מתייחסת לזורק. זה לא כ"כ נראה מדברי ר"ח, במיוחד ש ר"ח משמע (בדבריו ש"כגון שזרק לחבירו חייב בזה שנעשית מחשבתו") שזריקה ליד מישהו שונה מזריקה לקרקע, וכל סיבת חיוב של ר"ח זה שנעשית מחשבתו, ולא שהיה פה הנחה (שזה רק היכי תמצא שיהיה מלאכה).
3) הצהיר על כוונתו לזרוק לראובן, אבל חטא, וראובן נעקר כדי שמחשבת הזורק תיעשה. גם לזה שייך השאלה ששייכת לעיל.
למעשה, בגלל גירסת ר"ח, שאם 5 זה כשני בני אדם, זה סיבה לחייב, נאלצים אנו ללכת על דרך הבנה הראשונה, כי אם באמת נאמר שהנחה זה חשוב למלאכת הזורק, אז קשה עד מאד להסביר למה השוואה לשני בני אדם יהווה סיבה לחייב. אולי זה הסיבה שבאפשרות השנייה שלו, הרמב"ן מודה שהמהלך של רש"י זורמת ביותר נחת, אבל מה יעשה, הגירסא שלפניו (שהיתה גירסת ר"ח) לא משתלבת כלל עם שיטה כמו שיטת רש"י.
[4] אע"פ שר"ח משמע מפה שחשוב הנחה, וכמובן, צריכים הנחה כהיכי תמצא שיהיה פה מעשה מלאכה (כי בלי זה, אין מלאכה שמחייבת בשבת). אבל ההנחה זה לא העניין המחייב, החשוב כאן, כי מוכח מלשונו קודם שלא, וההנחה פה זה משמש דרך להסביר שכל המעשה נעשית במקום אחד. לא הכוונ ה שיש צורך הלכתי להנחה לר"ח. נדגיש פה בלי להתמקד על זה, שיש שינוי בין ר"ח לתוס' שמצטטו. לעומת ר"ח, תוס' אומר "ופטור, דהוי כמו שנותן מימינו לשמאלו -- דאע"פ שהעבירה ד' אמות, פטור."
[5] המילים של הרמב"ן, "שעשה עקירה ולא הניחה במקום אחר", אם לא היינו יודעים את המשך דברי הרמב"ן, היו מורים על שיטתינו בדברי ר"ח מלעיל, שלא היה הנחה במקום חיוב, אלא באותו מקום בו עקר הזורק את החפץ, ולכן פטור. רשב"א באמת משמע כן, ואין לו המשך כמו שיש לרמב"ן שהורס הבנה כזו. דברי הרשב"א: "באותו מקום שנעקר – ממנו חזר ונח, הלכך פטור." מכח זה, נאלצים אנו להניח שהיה שיטה מוקדמת ממנו גם הרמב"ן וגם הרשב"א שאבו את דבריהם, ושיטה זו הזכירה את דברים אלו ש"עשה עקירה ולא הניחה במקום אחר". (כמעט מוכח מדבריו של הרשב"א שהיה שיטה מוקדמת שהרמב"ן ורשב"א מצטטים, מזה שרשב"א מצטט את הרמב"ן בתחילת דבריו, ואז אומר את הדברים החשובים האלו בשם יש מי שאומר.) רשב"א (וגם תוס' ור"ח) היו מוכנים לקבל חידוש מחודש זה כמו שהוא (וכמו שהסברנו לעיל), אבל רמב"ן לא היה מוכן לקבל זו, ולכן נאלץ להסביר כמו שדחק במשך דבריו, ש"הכא נמי ההנחה לא נעשית מכחו הראשון".

Purim Torah and Hebrew Slang

2009-03-01T23:12:00.000-08:00

There is a relatively recent vernacular occurrence that I have noticed Israelis use. It has annoyed me as a distortion of the Hebrew language. Often, I hear Israelis (especially work-men and repair-men) say, "אני יעשה את זה" or "אני יתקן את זה". Of course, the proper grammatical construction would be "אני אעשה" or "אני אתקן". It assails the ear to hear the third person being used instead of the first!

However, I believe that I have found a valid source for this seeming linguistic malformation. The fathers of modern Hebrew made sure to use Biblical Hebrew as their guide as much as possible. It must be that the slang of modern Hebrew is also rooted in the Bible. After an exhaustive search, I found the source and root of this alleged grammatical inconsistency! The book of Tehilim 38:14 says, "ואני כחרש לא אשמע, וכאילם לא יפתח פיו". The parallel structure of this pasuk implies an equation between אשמע and יפתח. This demonstrates to us that one can use the third person as a valid reformulation of the first.

(Of course, during any month but Adar, I would simply say that this perversion of correct Hebrew is a result of the yud sound of אני blending into the alef sound of future tense first person and, over time, becoming future tense third person.)

Keruvim and Fear of Heaven

2009-02-24T14:33:00.000-08:00

Aside from the k'ruvim that were formed upon the holy ark, there were another set found in the mishkan. On the screen that seperated between the heichal and the holy of holies, exquisitely woven images of k'ruvim faced outwards, towards the ark, menorah and shulchan, comprising Man's domain within the house of God. What is the significance of these k'ruvim? Whereas the golden k'ruvim intently protect the aron (as discussed in a previous essay, they represent the Jewish people bearing and guarding the Law throughout history), the woven ones do not. Why do they direct their gaze outward instead of in, towards the holy of holies? Finally, the tapestry is made of the high cloths that are common in the mishkan: White, red, purple and sky blue. However, the gold thread that is so common in the clothes of the Kohen Gadol is missing. Why?

Rav Hirsch provides the key to the secret of these k'ruvim. If one were to stand within the heichal, he would see the table of show-bread to the north. This symbolizes the material success that arises naturally for a nation which, with brotherly love and care for one another, faithfully keep the laws of God. On the south, the menorah casts the light of Torah and intellectual success. In the direct center, the holy ark contains the source of these national and individual benefits, the word of God. When the Jewish people take the lesson of the golden k'ruvim seriously, truly bearing and preserving the word of God throughout the generations, they find themselves possessing all the spiritual and material blessings that flow from it. It is over all this good that the woven k'ruvim guard.

The colors of thread that are used in the weaving of the tapestry are also meaningful. The white is the pure vegetative element of the world. The red wool, dyed from the blood of worms, represents the animal element, while the regal purple wool represents the highest callings and elements of mankind as humans. The sky blue wool represents as it does in the tzitzit the Godly spark that was placed in humanity. Man contains all of these elements within his personality, and their use together represents the harmonious use of all our faculties for the higher purpose within the ark. When humanity uses its strengths thus, Heaven showers upon it the riches of the menorah and the table, the spiritual and physical successes. Thus, these k'ruvim which look out over Man's domain within the heichal represent Divine Providence, the hashgacha of God, bestowing the multi-faceted reward upon a nation that uses all its faculties for Divine commands.

However, one golden thread is left out. Heaven showers all blessings forth, including the blessing of continued use of vegetative, animal, human and Godly facets in God's service. The only thing left out is the golden thread, that most noble moral force of Man: fear of Heaven. "All is in the hands of Heaven, except fear of Heaven." The grace of God leaves this fear of God and awe of his commands as a constant test, a constant labor, left only for Man. This constant free-willed re-affirmation to this foundation of foundations ensures that Man continues to reap reward for a task that is still in his domain alone to choose.

And so, the k'ruvim, the heavenly bestowers of grace and kindness upon this earth, leave the final touch, the golden thread, constanly in our hands. Our success or failure is our decision, to enter the house of God on earth, or to turn away at the last minute. This missing gold thread is that which we constantly, each day anew, provide.

Is Spiritual Height a Measure of Piety?

2009-02-24T07:36:00.000-08:00

It is second nature for most religious people to assume that when one does G-d's will, he becomes more spiritual, i.e., he rises in spiritual attainment (מדרגה). We usually assume that spiritual height is a measure of our closeness to G-d, and thus, of our fulfillment of His will. This seems to hold in many areas of life. However, in the extremes, this thesis seems to unravel, and our tasks in this world become uncomfortably subjective.

In Megilla 16b, the talmud relates two conflicting enumerations of those men who left Bavel to found the second state of Israel. In the first, Mordechai is counted fifth. Twenty-four years later, he is mentioned sixth in the list. The talmud finds this puzzling, and Rav Yosef posits the reason for Mordechai's demotion: "the study of torah is greater than life-saving..."

This passage does not sit right. Mordechai was seen as less spiritually complete because he occupied himslef with protecting Jewish lives while he could have been learning? We know that anyone who saves a Jewish life, is as if he saved an entire world (Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:9). Also, we are commanded not to stand by our brother's blood (Lev. 19:16). So how can it be that Mordechai was lower spiritually after seemingly fulfilling G-d's will on a large scale?

On this troubling passage, Rashi says that "...because of this [his work on behalf of the Jewish People], Mordechai's status was lowered in the eyes of the sages." (Emphasis mine.) Perhaps this is the key. In the eyes of the sages, in the eyes of Man, Mordechai was on a lower spiritual level¹. In the simplistic calculus of humanity, he spent less time concerning himself with the study of torah (which, after all, is כנגד כולם), and dealt with the nitty gritty aspects of the world around us. He dealt, in the parlance of the בית מדרש, with חיי שעה, temporal concerns, and neglected חיי עולם, the eternal torah (see Shabbos 10a). Thus he lost ground to his study partners, who did not leave the study hall, and who thus reached high spiritual levels.

A person, it turns out, can be a צדיק חוטא. One can constantly concern himself with the spiritual climax of Torah, and while developing himself spiritually, miss (חטא) his actual job in this world. To use an analogy, one can cheat on his taxes, and become more wealthy. Similarly, one can cheat on his tasks in this world (for example, by not saving lives when he can), and dishonestly gather for himself higher spiritual attainment (by studying torah during the time he saved).

In Pesachim 50a, (the same?) Rav Yosef visits the next world. When he returns, his father asks him to describe what he saw. He answers, "I saw an upside-down world, those who are high here, are low there, and vice-versa." His father said, "You saw the true world, and this one is inverted." Perhaps his statement from Megilla is an example of what Rav Yosef saw in Pesachim. Not only are the rich here sometimes lowly there, and the poor here, on a high level there, but Rav Yosef is making a deeper point, as well. Spiritual giants that we see in our world, may have gained their spiritual height deceitfully, and thus, they will be made low in the world of truth. That is a world where G-d, who insight and knowledge is perfect, judges people not only by how much spiritual currency they have, but, more importantly, by how (and why) they attained it.

(This idea is further supported by the Talmud (Menachos 98b) where Reish Lakish derives from Moshe's breaking of the לוחות that, "פעמים שביטולה של תורה זוהי קיומה", sometimes in order to uphold the Torah, we must neglect it.)

It is relatively simple to know what G-d wants us not to do. סור מרע, keep from evil, is pretty straightforward. It is the עשה טוב, the 'actively do good' that is so tricky. We must be self aware and cognizant of the totality of our situation in this world, in order to choose the right action instead of simply a good action. We must realize that right is subjective, and what is right for everyone else may not be right for me. We must not allow herd mentality to affect our service of G-d in this world. May we resolve to follow the path of Mordechai and do right, not just good.

Update (18, April 2010): See the Maharal in Derech Chaim page 66, where he says something very similar: Derech Chaim.

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¹ See Taz, YD 251, note 6.

B'shalach: Past Essays

2009-02-03T02:15:00.000-08:00

מה תצעק אלי: Redemption Through Action

The Complaint Against the Manna

Moshe Striking the Rock

The Ethics of מחיית עמלק

The Haftara: Yael's Sacrifice

Between the Rationalist and Mystical Viewpoints

2009-02-02T00:55:00.000-08:00

After a regularly scheduled study session on דרשות הר"ן this past Saturday night, I felt the need to clarify my positions regarding the spiritual world. First, of course, I believe there is one. I believe that there is a God, and that we are all possessed of a soul. This is not the discussion. However, as a tangent to our discussion that night regarding prayer to dead souls, one of our group touched on the question: do I believe that the souls of dead people can hear or see or relate to the goings on earth-side. The answer that I may not have made clear enough is: "I do not know."

Allow me to explain in just a few lines what I mean. There are real philosophical issues that, throughout history, have been brought up, and different streams of philosophical thought answer them in various ways. There is the more rationalistic stream, and the more mystical, kabbalistic one. I see great benefit to aspects of each stream, and also drawbacks to each stream. I see questions that are answered more satisfactorily by the rationalists, and some that are more acceptable when answered by the mystics. To paraphrase Rabbi Carmy in class regarding something completely different, each pathway must overcome different obstacles. Some issues will be answered apologetically by one stream, and other issues will seem to flow naturally, while the opposite will be true for the other stream. Neither flows perfectly, and I do not even know if that is a deficiency. Often-times, the tension between the two may uncover or even catalyze ideas and dualities of phenomenal beauty and truth.

I am able to see the merits in the Rambam's view, just as I can hear the view of Abulafia and other Kabalists. I know that Jewish thought lately may tend towards one extreme. However, I do not feel confident enough in the issues to decide definitively about the issue. Perhaps the nature of these issues precludes anyone's really deciding the question.

In Halacha, the questions flow from the text; there is a halachik reality which imposes itself on the world, and we use our texts and minds to decide how it will be applied. Therefore, for example, I can be very sure as to how Rabbeinu Tam explains the passage in the Talmud discussing the length of the wait between milk and meat. I can feel confident enough about the issue to decide definitively, because I have all the facts before me. However, the question of philosophy is often one of reality, of fact. Unless you choose (as I often do) to read the chassidut, kabbala, and other sources metaphorically, it often comes down to a simple question, to wit: "does olam han'shamot function in such a way that the souls of the dead are intimitely interested in the goings on on earth, or are they in spiritual rapture with God such that the temporal, mundane world below is of no interest to them (or perhaps they have no way of relating)? I can easily see both sides of this question, and feel that it is simply a question of fact, of מציאות, one which I can appreciate on both sides, but do not have the tools to decide definitively.

As another of our study group noticed, often I lean to one side or the other. When studying something academically (including "learning"), I may tend towards the rational explanation, or the explanation which requires less assumptions to be complete (think Occam's Razor). However, on an emotional level, I often tend towards the other pole. Perhaps this is really why the range of views exists!

One personal example: the question of theodicy is one which I may feel is easier answered by the more rationalistic approach sometimes. However, after personal brushes with tragedy, I have found myself only comforted by extremely mystical explanations. The concept of gilgul may not appeal to me so much when learning the Ramban or Rambam on Iyov, but when tragedy strikes, it is the only thing that I found to assuage the pain. So, far different than not knowing which is true, I find invaluable benefit in both views.

This is what I meant when I said, "I can entertain the possibility of souls praying to God on our behalf, but don't feel it is true at this point." I think everyone fluctuates, to some extent, between these poles throughout their religious lives.

Bo: Tefillin - Ennobling Servitude

2009-01-28T02:27:00.000-08:00

At the cusp of leaving Egypt, the nation of Hebrews is told, not once, but twice, the commandment of tefillin. In 13:9 and 16, the formulation is similar: we are told to bind our arms and place a remembrance between (above) our eyes, "for with a mighty hand, God released you from Egypt." What is so special about this particular mitzva that it is mentioned now, at this critical moment?

There is a tremendous pitfall when telling the story of the Exodus. Many revolutionaries have become obsessed with the clarion calls of freedom and liberation that pulse from the words of God, "Let me people go!". Often, they and we fail to complete the sentence, "...that they may serve Me." An absence of servitude and subjugation is seen as the goal of the redemption from Egypt. This could not be further from the truth. The Jews were liberated only to accept upon themselves the subjugation of God's law. In Avot (6:1), we learn that the only truly free person is one who has taken upon himself the yoke of Torah observance and learning. Freedom is not freedom when it is left unchecked.

A parable I like to use is that of a prisoner in a deep underground prison. He is locked in his subterranean cell, and the prison is an impossible maze built so that, even if one were able to escape one's cell, he would be lost forever in the labyrinth forever. Now imagine you go to your friend who is being held prisoner there. You unlock his door and say, "you are free." Nothing could be farther from the truth. He is now destined to roam aimlessly, never leaving the prison, with every moment bringing fresh false hopes that will only be dashed later on.

If, on the other hand, you were to hand your friend a map of the prison, and say, "I have outlined your course to find your way out. Do not wander aimlessly. Follow only the directions I give, and you will find your true freedom." At first blush, one could claim that I am trying to limit my friend's freedom. However, in truth, my channeling of his freedom into constructive, useful movement is the only true path to real freedom.

The commandment of tefilin is full of symbolic meaning that impresses itself upon the wearer. Rabbi Hirsch explains in his collected writings that the binding of the arm symbolizes our challange to allow our free-willed actions to be channeled and restricted by the bindings of God's law. The fact that the arm tefilin is applied before the head teaches us that our commitment to the fulfillment of the Torah's precepts comes before our desire and need to understand them rationally.

The symbolism of the commandment of tefilin is precisely the lesson of the map in the dungeon. Only by subserviating ourselves to the strictures of God's law can we truly be free, and find favor and peace in this physical and spiritual world.

Tefilin is therefore a most appropriate reminder to the nation of Israel throughout the generations. At this moment of freedom, remember what true freedom is. Remember why you are being set free, and to whom you are accountable. This ennobles us and sets apart our free-willed duty from the false freedom of the beasts. By recalling the tefilin, we can avoid the misunderstanding of liberty, and enjoy the true benefits of our deliverance.

I Am That I Am

2009-01-13T23:25:00.000-08:00

The first encounter of Moshe with God was permeated with symbolism and a sub-text that has philosophical meaning. Ever since I was a child, I was troubled by the laconic and seemingly evasive answer God gives when Moshe asks his climactic question. When Moshe understands that he will be God's messenger, whether he likes it or not, he asks God, "they will ask me, 'what is His name?' What shall I tell them?" God's answer is "אהיה אשר אהיה", "I will be that which I will be". What is the meaning behind this answer?

In a previous post, we discussed the Rambam's rational proof for God's existence. In other posts, I mentioned that there are other streams of thought in Judaism that decry the very attempt to prove this. Part of the importance of faith is that is not inherently provable as a necessity in our logical system of thought. It is a matter, in a word, of knowledge versus faith. I believe that these two streams are well-articulated in the interpretation of אהיה אשר אהיה found in the Rambam's writings and the Ramban's.

In the Moreh(א:סג), Rambam writes: "לפיכך הודיעו ה' אז מדע שיביאהו אליהם לאמת אצלם מציאות ה', והוא אהיה אשר אהיה. ושם זה נגזר מן 'היה', והיא המציאות. כי 'היה' מורה על עניין "כאן , ואין הבדל בין אמרך "כאן" או "וג'ד" בלשון העברי. וכל הסוד הוא בכפילתו הביטוי עצמו, המורה על המציאות כאלו הוא תואר. כי 'אשר' משמשת להזכרת התואר הסמוך לה, לפי שהיא שם חסר, וזקוק לסמיכות, כעניין "אלד'י" ו"אלתי" בערבית. ולפיכך עשה את השם הראשון, והוא המתואר, 'אהיה'; והשם השני, שהוא מתארו בו, 'אהיה', והוא הוא עצמו. וכאלו ביאר כי המתואר הוא התואר עצמו. והנה זה ביאור עניין שהוא מצוי שלא במציאות.נמצא תמצית אותו העניין ופירושו כך: 'המצוי אשר הוא המצוי', כלומר: מחויב המציאות., וזה הוא אשר הביא עליו ההוכחה בהחלט, שיש שם דבר מחויב המציאות, לא נעדר ולא יעדר, כמו שאבאר ההוכחות לכך. וכאשר הודיעו יתעלה את הראיות אשר בהם יאמת מציאותו אצל חכמיהם, לפי שאחר זה נאמר "לך ואספת את זקני ישראל." In essence, he says that the word אהיה means "that which exists". The next word, אשר, means "which is contingent upon". Thus, the statement אהיה אשר אהיה encapsulates the argument from contingency. In essence, God is that which exists (אהיה) in such a way that it is contingent upon (אשר) itself (אהיה)! God is therefore that (logically) first cause which exists necessarily, upon which all other things are contingent.

This converts Moshe's question and God's answer to an extremely important, fundamental discourse. The Jewish nation swelters under the oppressive weight of slavery. They have reached (according to the midrash) the lowest levels of spiritual impurity, and indeed, have reverted to idolatrous practices. How, asks Moshe, can they be shaken from this stupor and re-enlightened? How do I show them that there is only one God, and that He will now release them from their chains of bondage? How can I make them know You?

And God's answer is no evasion, no vague promise about being with the people in other times of national trouble (see Rashi). Rather, the answer according to Rambam is the rational proof of God's existence! It is with this that God arms Moshe as Moshe accepts his task.

On the other hand stands the Ramban. For him, the rational proof (if it even exists) is an inappropriate way to approach God. Perhaps the Hebrews felt abandoned by God in Egypt. According to some, the exile of Egypt was not a punishment so much as a crucible from which to forge the chosen People. And so, it may well have seemed to the Jews, as bitter weeks and months became years, as vilification led to slavery and genocide, that God had indeed abandoned the Jews. It was not so much that the Jews lost faith in God, but that they came to the opinion that while He may exist, His handling of worldly affairs is haphazard at best, and without a just course of cause and effect.

This, then, was Moshe's question: "When the Jews hear that I come as Your agent, they will not believe, for they do not believe that You execute justice and good in this world. How can I convince them that it is otherwise?" In other words, Moshe asks not of God's existence, but of his הנהגה, His method of interaction with the world. It is to this that God responds, in the words of the Ramban: "אהיה עמם בכל צרתם יקראוני אענם...ועוד אמר כיוצא בזה במדרש אגדה: מהו אהיה אשר אהיה? כשם שאתה הווה עמי כך אני הווה עמך. אם פותחין את ידיהם ועושים צדקה, אף אני אפתח את ידי".

For the Ramban, in essence, אהיה אשר אהיה is a statement to those who believe in God but not his justice. It means, I will act with you as you act. If you act with kindness, I will act towards you thus. If you cause suffering, I will cause you suffering. It is the concept of מדה כנגד מדה, the perfect balance and fairness with which God infuses His actions. In this statement of purpose, God states unequivocally that there is justice in this world. God is intimately interested in Mankind and our activities, and the length of hardships does not imply a breakdown in the system of God's calculus. The arc of the world may be long indeed, but it does bend in the end to justice. Even the suffering of the Jewish nation in Egypt is not for naught, and a lack of human perception does not make this any different. (Whether the כלי יקר is right, and the suffering of the exiles in Egypt is punishment for allowing the גלות to take hold of the hearts and minds of the Jews, or it is punishment for the sale of Yosef, or it is not punishment, and rather, a necessary step in the creation of the nation, makes no difference. The important point here is that שכר ועונש and צדק have not been forfeited by God.)

It is this reiteration of God's foundational principal in His relationship to his creatures that validly answers the hopeless sense of abandonment, and Moshe accepts it.

Either way, in 4:31, the Torah testifies to the worthiness of Moshe's question and God's answer: ויאמן העם, וישמעו כי פקד ה' את בני ישארל, וכי ראה את עניים, ויקדו וישתחוו. The nation had faith (Rambam?), and heard that God remembered the children of Israel, and saw their suffering (Ramban?), so they bowed and prostrated themselves.

Peace House and Peace

2008-12-02T20:01:00.000-08:00

Update and Disclaimer: I wrote the following essay before learning that there are a number of youth in Chevron who are instigating violence. I want to be clear: I do not condone violence against innocents. I do not condone spray-painting cemeteries. If the media is being honest (which is quite a דן לכף זכות), then I reject the actions of the few who purposely attack to satisfy their own desire for "action". Of course, the media has a track record of mis-reporting to make it look as though settlers attack innocent Arabs, when in reality the Arabs attack first, and the Jewish response is taken out of its proper context. Again, if the media is honest, then I reject the attacks on innocents.

However, I have been assured by many who are in the know that these youth are in the small minority. Most Jews who made their way to Chevron are using their time there learning Torah, and trying to use their bodies as tools to prevent the gross injustice of evacuating a legally owned home. It is in their support that I wrote the following lines. I support the non-violent resistance to injustice that was so successful in the United States civil rights movement, and hope that this model carries the day. Ultimately, I am not sure we should be willing to pay the price of civil war, even if it is instigated by the other side.

I have been reflecting upon the drama in Chevron that, as I write these lines, unfolds under a blanket conspiracy of silence from the traditional media in Israel and abroad. Young and old, loyal Jews have packed into the house that was, beyond a shadow of a doubt, purchased by a Jew from an Arab. For obviously political and ideological reasons, the Supreme Court of Israel willfully ignored video footage recording the sale, and ordered the residents of the building out.

While rockets smash into fields, streets and homes of southern and not-so-southern Israel (testimony to the wisdom and foresight of previous governmental withdrawls), those in power are intent to show a band of "settlers" that they have been singled out for abuse and injustice, in a way that would raise the ire of the EU and UN, if only applied to the Arabs. A blinder, more obtuse heavy-handedness and simple hatred is hard to imagine.

I was in a cab in Jerusalem recently, and the driver stated passionately that, "the Supreme Court has ruled, and this is a country of laws. They must obey the law..."

How short-sighted an opinion. How dangerous to justice, morality and the fiber of our national position. For it is a moral duty to oppose injustice, and justice requires the opposition of immoral laws. At times, obedience is a vice. It becomes so when, in its service, we abdicate our moral responsibility to oppose evil and injustice. In the words of Albert Einstein, we must "never do anything against conscience even if the state demands it."

It is a moral duty to oppose the law of the land when that law attempts to remove a rightful owner from his property. However, many argue that there is danger in tipping the status quo in Chevron. The situation there is volatile, and peace must be preserved at all costs.

In response to this are three points. First, the court's decision in no way made the argument that civil unrest was being fomented by Jews residing in the Peace House. Their argument was that, blind to all evidence to the contrary, the building's ownership was questionable, and as such, must be evacuated until the legal owner is ascertained.

However, on a practical level, the interest of civil peace is ill served by this eviction notice. Over the past few days, Arab rioters have continually rained cinderblocks upon Jewish passers-by, with the army and police force arresting not one of these attempted murderers. In fact, a Jewish teen-ager is presently in the hospital with his head smashed in by a cinderblock, fighting desperately for his life. The Arab violence is the practical and immediate result of Jewish demonstrations of weakness. Furthermore, the damage done to the fabric of Israeli society, when the police and army are used for political purposes against citizenry can be seen in the damage from the infamous Amona pogrom. The peace of Israel is seriously damaged by these shows of executive and judicial force.

Finally, a philosophical study of the nature of peace demonstrates that opposing this immoral law is anything but a danger to peace. In Bamidbar, when Pinchas kills the prince of Shimon and the Midianite woman he sins with, he is given "בריתי שלום", the covanent of peace, by God. How can his actions vest him with the blessings of peace, when he fomented infighting and anger amongst the people? The answer given by our sages is that, "true peace is the following of justice, the setting right of wrongs in this world, as God's law desires it. Peace is not the absence of violence, but the reign of morality and of truth." And so, fighting for truth and justice is a search for peace, not a step away from it.

The American consciousness, suffused with the lofty oratory of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights movement's call to fight injustice, will understand implicitly the importance of fighting unjust laws. To the policemen and soldiers of Israel, I quote Thoreau, who bade: "If... the machine of government... is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law." The Rambam states it centuries earlier: "If a king decrees against the moral word of the Torah, he is not to be obeyed." Stand up for what is right, and you will have a clean conscience. Stand up for right, and you will have peace of mind.

Sometimes, the path to peace is broken and unpaved. Those who choose to reach that goal may have hard times ahead, but they can take comfort in the fact that they have not sold their consciences. To our brave brothers and sisters in Chevron today, I send my sincere thanks and prayers. May God grant you success.

Mazal Tov!

2008-08-13T22:52:00.000-07:00

הדרן עלך תלמוד בבלי, והדרך עלן!

True Faith in a Doubting World

2008-08-05T15:45:00.000-07:00

In the fifth book of the Torah we begin this weekend, God warns us to keep His commandments. If we do not, we will be sent into exile, and 'we will be singled out for suffering' (Deut 29:20). The nations will stand in wonder at the torture and destruction of God's beloved nation, and they will say, 'it must be punishment for turning away from God's covenant' (29:24). And yet, no matter how far we fall, God will redeem us. 'God will return with our exiles, and have mercy; He will gather us from the lands of our dispersion', into Israel (29:3-5). God promises us this.

In Amos (9:13-15), we are again promised the vision of salvation, this time even more clearly and in far more detail:

"יג הִנֵּה יָמִים בָּאִים, נְאֻם-יְהוָה, וְנִגַּשׁ חוֹרֵשׁ בַּקֹּצֵר, וְדֹרֵךְ עֲנָבִים בְּמֹשֵׁךְ הַזָּרַע; וְהִטִּיפוּ הֶהָרִים עָסִיס, וְכָל-הַגְּבָעוֹת תִּתְמוֹגַגְנָה. יד וְשַׁבְתִּי, אֶת-שְׁבוּת עַמִּי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּבָנוּ עָרִים נְשַׁמּוֹת וְיָשָׁבוּ, וְנָטְעוּ כְרָמִים וְשָׁתוּ אֶת-יֵינָם; וְעָשׂוּ גַנּוֹת, וְאָכְלוּ אֶת-פְּרִיהֶם. טו וּנְטַעְתִּים, עַל-אַדְמָתָם; וְלֹא יִנָּתְשׁוּ עוֹד, מֵעַל אַדְמָתָם אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לָהֶם--אָמַר, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ."

"'When the plowman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of grapes him who sows seed; the mountains shall drip with sweet wine, and all the hills shall flow with it. I will bring back the captives of My people Israel; they shall build the waste cities and inhabit them; they shall plant vineyards and drink wine from them; they shall also make gardens and eat fruit from them. I will plant them in their land, and no longer shall they be pulled up from the land I have given them,' says the Lord your God."

In Makot (24b), Rabbi Akiva and his friends visit Mt. Scopus. They witness a fox scamper through the ruins of the Holy of Holies. While his friends break down in tears, Rabbi Akiva laughs. Astonished, his friends ask, "How can you laugh?" He counters, "How can you cry?" The rabbis answer, "The Holy of Holies, concerning which God commanded that any stranger who enters it shall die, now is desecrated by foxes, and we should not cry?" Rabbi Akiva responds, "This is precisely why I laugh. Uriah prophesied that because of Israel's sins, the Temple would be plowed into a field. Zechariah foretold of elderly men and women once again inhabiting the streets of Jerusalem. Before seeing the fulfillment of Uriah's prophecy, one might have doubted that Zechariah's would come true. But now that we see the realization of the first, we can be sure that the second will also come true!" His friends took solace in this, and said, "Akiva, you have comforted us."

The two prophecies that Rabbi Akiva mentions are essentially re-formulations of the verses from the book of D'varim. Akiva saw the dreadful destruction of the Temple in its full effect, an epic destruction which, though horrific, demonstrated God's continued involvement and fidelity to His promises to our nation. Thus, the fulfillment of the exile was intrinsically a promise for redemption.

However, the Talmud also states in Sanhedrin that one possibility is that the ultimate redemption will come only after Israel despairs of it, and loses hope. Indeed, throughout the intervening two thousand years, we have, as a nation, become numb from our pain and suffering, slipping into national depression. Paradoxically, by suffering so much, we may lose the conviction that our suffering comes from God and is the fulfillment of a plan. And the way history plays out subsequently, faith in God's plans for history are further in danger.

In the past millennia, Jews and gentiles have accepted prima facie the authenticity of the Torah and other books of the Bible. Even without the fulfillment of the positive prophecies of reconstruction, they have survived with their faith in God and His word. They lived and died for a day when their children and grandchildren would be able to witness the fulfillment of God's promises. They needed no proof.

However, around the turn of the last century, scholars and skeptics have begun to question, not only the dating of certain works, or the exact authorship of certain parts of some books, but the very concept of God's revelation of His will and future plans to Mankind. Whole sections of Jews may not believe in the divinity of our scripture, or even in the existence of God! Humanity has become cynical, and so, have chosen to question God's revelation.

And so, the laugh of Akiva that echoed for more than a thousand years began to dim. The epic nature of the destruction is forgotten, and perhaps we are like all other nations, with no special divine providence guiding our suffering to ultimate redemption. This is the despair which is discussed by the passage in Sanhedrin. We might lose our faith!

However, we must pay attention to the historical currents that surrounded this movement. The return of Jews to Zion with the intent of rebuilding the land and Jewish culture gained steam. Eventually, European Jewry was destroyed, and out of the fire, like a phoenix, the modern state of Israel rose. The remnants beat back blood-thirsty hordes of Arab soldiers, intent on destroying them. This happened, not once, but five times. Jews returned and continue to stream to their land, and even the anti-Zionists admit that, if not ראשית צמיחת גאולתינו, we are living through, at least, עיקבתא דמשיחא.

This is God's most poetic answer to the skeptics. God counters their questions by making the living word of His books come true! Hashem always keeps us open to faith. Sometimes we are sustained by faith in the word, as the generations before us. However, if we begin to question its authenticity, he makes it come true, so we can no longer doubt it.

In Nitzavim and Amos, God promised us redemption, and placed his name on it as a seal of truth. Before, the destruction was enough of a promise to believe in the redemption. But in a world where this is no longer enough, God gives us the redemption to re-ignite our faith. It happens now as we watch! And yet, we are blinded by its shining light, even as we live through it. Future generations will ask us, did you not see the obvious fulfillment of God's word?

I realized, while speaking to a skeptical friend, that what we are witnessing with our own eyes is the irrefutable realization of the prophecies of God. These verses are our generation's personal Har Sinai experience; this is our revelation! We ourselves bear witness to the fact that God exists, and that He keeps his promises to Israel. Thus, the laughter of Akiva is renewed, and our faith in our future is strengthened.

God's hand forces history, and history, against all odds and against all precedent, favors Israel (by all accounts a dead nationalism) and the nation of Israel rises again in the land of Israel, just as the Torah and prophets foresaw.

The Talmud discusses two ways the redemption can play itself out. If we merit, it will be upon the wings of an eagle, in a glorious way, and can happen "hayom", any day. However, if we do not merit it, we will be forced into a redemption process of "in its time", with messiah as a poor man, riding on a donkey. This is a process where the Jews may suffer greatly, until they call out to God as a last resort.

It seems the redemption we witness today is a hybrid. There are aspects that are tremendously glorious, and some that are as sad and full of suffering as possible. This validates the thesis of the Vilna Gaon, that there is no binary choice between the glorious and inglorious redemptions, but a sliding scale. Any action we do, any show of true faith in the God of Israel, brings us one unit closer to the achishena, and any action in the opposite direction leads us towards the other pole of the scale. It is all actions that apply, but especially those that demonstrate Israel's fundamental reliance only on God, not on other nations (as evidenced by the haftarah of Shabbat Shuva).

Thus, while there of course is a messiah we await, who brings the process to its conclusion, the Vilna Gaon places the responsibility and merit for an easy, glorious redemption directly in our hands. How empowering! Each of our actions affects the redemption, and we are all, in a sense, messiahs.

The day of Tisha B'av is different from other fasts, in that it is not only a day of mourning, but also of repentance. If we learn this lesson, and redirect our actions towards our Father in heaven, we can contribute our lives to the task of bringing the national scale of geula towards the achishena scale, and further from be'ita.

Who Really Wants Peace?

2008-07-30T09:44:00.001-07:00

Israel just wants to live. We don't ask anything of the world, whose history towards our people is blood-spattered. We just want to live in peace, without bombs, terrorists and hostile armies probing us constantly for any sign of weakness of which to take advantage.

What other country has army musicians who sing of dreams "when we will no longer need guards" on the walls of our cities?

Here is one of my favorite Israeli songs, by Dan Almagor and Beni Nagri, called Guard of the Walls:

אני עומד על החומה
עומד בגשם לבדי וכל העיר העתיקה
מונחת לי על כף ידי אני מביט בה מאוהב
אני עולה לכאן תמיד סתם להביט
אבל עכשיו אני נמצא כאן בתפקיד.

כן, כן, מי חלם אז בכיתה
כשלמדנו לדקלם על חומותייך ירושלים
הפקדתי שומרים
שיום יגיע ואהיה אחד מהם.

אני עומד על החומה
עומד מקשיב אל הקולות
קולות השוק והמהומה
קריאות רוכלים ועגלות
הנה הוא קול המואזין
הנה דינדון הפעמון אבל עלי להאזין
אם אין שום נפץ של רימון.

אני עומד על החומה
רועד מקור ומסתכל הנה שקעה כבר החמה
שומר מלילה מה מליל אור הירח במלואו
שוטף חומות ושערים מתי יבוא היום שבו
לא נזדקק עוד לשומרים.

I stand on the wall,
In the rain, alone, and the Old City
Is in my palm, while I gaze at it, enraptured,
I come up here often to view it,
But now I am here on duty.

Oh, who dreamed back then, in school,
When we learned to recite "Upon your walls,
O Jerusalem, I have set watchmen,"
That one day I would be one?

I stand on the wall,
Listening to the voices
of the bustling marketplace,
Calls of merchants and sounds of carts,
There is the voice of the Muazzin,
And the ting-a-ling of a bell, but I must be certain
That there is no explosion of a grenade.

I stand on the wall,
Shivering with cold, and watching the sun set,
Standing guard from night, under the full moon,
As it bathes the walls and gates.
When will the day come when
Finally we will need no more guards?

Prophecies of Destruction and Redemption

2008-07-25T09:31:00.000-07:00

On the arid plateau of Masada, the dry, hot wind has parched all that was left after the deaths of the Jewish rebels. Among the archeological finds in the area were a number of desiccated seeds from the now extinct Jerusalem Palm tree. In the past few years, scientists in Israel have induced these seeds to sprout forth new life -- life that has been two thousand years frozen in time, waiting for the return of the land's rightful inhabitants. Yechezkel prophesies, "ואתם הרי ישראל ענפכם תתנו ופריכם תשאו לעמי ישראל כי קרבו לבא". Rashi explains, "כשתתן א"י פריה בעין יפה אז יקרב הקץ ואין לך קץ מגולה יותר": "When the land of Israel gives forth its fruits freely, the redemption is near, and there is no clearer sign of the redemption than this..." What a miraculous realization of this Rashi! This inspired part of the following ideas.

In one of his sichot to his students, Rabbi Lichtenstein chooses to compare the task and prophetic endowment of Moshe to that of Yirmiyahu, whose calling by God is the substance of our haftarah. In reading his words, I developed what I believe to be an interesting take on the distinction between Moshe and Yirmiyahu, which I hope to expand upon as the years progress.

Let us examine the inception experiences of both Moshe and Yirmiyahu. The first difference that immediately presents itself is age. Yirmiyahu is a young man, while Moshe was chosen when he was already a mature man, at eighty years old. Also, it is important to note the manner in which each candidate responded to God's invocation. Moshe protests against his appointment as messenger of God for days, and when he finally culminates with his speech impediment as an excuse, God loses patience, as it were. On the other hand, Yirmiyahu seems quite willing, and his only hesitation is that he is too young to be a leader. As soon as Hashem assures Yirmiyahu that He will be with him, the young prophet moves forward with faith and complacency. Why is it that Moshe, the more mature one, searches for more excuses than Yirmiyahu?

Upon closer reflection, we notice that the two prophets are actually being called to quite different tasks. God summons Moshe to the unimaginable task of raising a nation of slaves out of the sweltering heat of their oppression. He then would have to bring this stiff-necked people through a desert, fighting them each step of the way. He would feel so strongly the futility of his task at times, that he would ask to be relieved of his position. And he would bring the nation from the heights of Sinai to the depths of the golden calf, finally leaving them, his dearest desire unfulfilled, and leave his student to bring them into the Promised Land. God tells Moshe, "I will be with your mouth" (Ex. 4:15). "With" implies a dialogue, a co-participation. Almost in a partnership with Hashem, Moshe is to be the prophetic leader of the Jews.

On the other hand, Yirmiyahu is to walk the streets and alleys of Jerusalem, prophesying its destruction. He was not meant to be a leader. Indeed, more often than not, reviled by his brothers, he finds himself the outsider, and the very enemies of Israel release him from his fraternally induced incarceration on the eve of the burning of the city. Yirmiyahu is most definitely not a leader. Whereas God is "with" Moshe's mouth, and there is an element of teamwork, God "places his words" in Yirmiyahu's mouth (compare to the prophetic experience of Bilam). There is monologue here, no dialogue. He is a prophet only, a mouthpiece for the message of God.

Because of Moshe's role as leader and prophet, he is a completely public figure. He separates from his wife, and is praised by Rashi (Ex. 19:14) for his neglect of his own affairs, finding time only for the matters of the nation. For Moshe, no national suffering can be dealt with as a tragedy with private mourning. When God threatens the nation with destruction for the sin of the Golden Calf, Moshe draws his dialogue with God into sharp relief, carrying on a spirited, almost disrespectful argument with God, in which he successfully arbitrates the salvation of Israel. All of the nation's troubles are his, and he responds to them as an intercessor, not as a private citizen.

In contrast, we do not find Yirmiyahu attempting to change the decree against Jerusalem. And when it is finally enflamed, he joins the chained ranks of Jewish prisoners. He seeks no audience with God, he has no special connection to utilize and mitigate the suffering. Instead of the monologue of God which he faithfully transmitted, now all that Yirmiyah can produce is a dirge-like monologue of his own, the book of Eicha. In it, and as an equal to them, Yirmiyah is found lamenting the suffering of his brothers, crying into the howling wind of the dark abyss, receiveing no particular response from God. Relieved of his mission as mouthpiece, he reverts to the status of individual member of Israel, pained as they are by hester panim, that iron curtain that has descended between God and His people.

And through these distinctions emerges the defining characteristic of the two men's roles: exile and redemption. Moshe represents a vivid image of the redemption: the rise of Israel's honor and respect, and with this, the rise of that intimate dialogue between God and His chosen ones. Moshe leads the Jews through his special relationship, his interactive prophetic nature. On the reverse side, Yirmiyahu is the prophet who ushers in the exile. He is no leader, for the Jews will have no centralized leader in their dispersion. He is rather a prophet of doom, and he signifies the beginning of the end of prophecy. Eventually, as the Rambam implies, God's word to Man became so mundane in the eyes of humanity, that the phenomenon of prophecy ceased altogether.

This is so because of the general principle that the leader of the nation reflects the spiritual position of Israel at that time (Arachin 17a). When the Jews follow the law and are on a spiritual and national high, they are in the redemptive mode. When this is not the case, the prophecy takes on the form of Yirmiyahu's, and eventually ends.

This interaction with God changing from dialogue to monologue can perhaps be encapsulated as the seed of the Jerusalem Palms. When the dialogue relationship begins to lose its potency, Hashem allows it to desiccate, as it were, into the monologue. Indeed, as the Jewish people spread out over the world in their exile, prayer took the place of sacrifice, and the monologue of the Jewish nation represents the freezing of our special intimate national relationship with God, preserved by Him until the time that redemption again becomes the paradigm, when humankind finds a new hunger, "no hunger for bread or thirst for water, rather for the word of God!"

When Man finds himself parched for a taste of this life-giving intimacy, this dialogue with God, then the shift from exile to redemption (begins) is made. However, this process is also a long and arduous one, and according to the Gaon from Vilna, must begin as our present history teaches us, with a physical re-awakening and movement towards Israel, and then the spiritual one.

Rabbi Hirsch teaches that the purpose of our three weeks of mourning is not to simply to grieve over the past. We are particularly meant to reflect on where we are in our present situation, and compare that to the ideals of the Torah. And so, as his first message to the Jews, and the last verses of our Haftarah, Yirmiyahu begins his book with a prophecy of the youthful vigor of Israel. This is not only a look back at the Mosaic prophetic paradigm, but a look far into the future, past all the suffering that will fill the sad pages of the book of Jeremiah, into the redemption of the distant future, whose stages we today are experiencing.

We look during these three weeks not only at our defection from our mission that led to Jerusalem's destruction, but also at the "youthful love" of our nation, following God into the wilderness, and we remind ourselves of our purpose in this world: to bring ourselves back to that reality, and to be willing to sacrifice for it!

With this, our Tish'a B'av takes on meaning not only as a period of mourning, but one of renewing our strength, re-aligning ourselves to our task, and rededicating ourselves to the redemption, which we pray and act for every day.

May we merit it quickly!

Bilaam's Lion

2008-07-10T09:31:00.000-07:00

In this week's portion, Bilaam is asked by Balak to curse the Jewish nation. He comes, and is literally reined in by God Himself, forced to praise the very nation he wishes to obliterate. In two parts of his praise for the nation, he refers to Israel as a lion. In the first (Bamidbar 23:24), he states: "הן עם כלביא יקום וכארי יתנשא", "The nation, like a (young) lion will stand, as a lion will rise up". In the second (24:9), "כרע שכב כארי וכלביא מי יקימנו", "[the nation] bends and lies down as a lion, and as a lion (cub) who will raise it up?"

First of all, I point out that traditionally, the word לביא has been taken to mean lion cub, as opposed to ארי which seems to be a full-grown lion. I have not been able to confirm that there exists this distinction in biblical Hebrew or in related languages, and would appreciate any input from others in this matter. However it is clear that traditional sources seem to make this distinction. My translation above injects the traditional sense in parentheses.

What is interesting about these verses, which appear in separate prophecies of Bilaam, is that they seem to complement each other, and the second seems to finish the train of thought left incomplete by the first. First, a young cub (clearly representing the nation of Israel) rises up, and then is a grown lion, and afterwards, we see the grown lion lie down, and a cub rise afterwards. What is going on here?

I believe that these prophecies, from the mouth of one of the worst enemies of Israel, contain not simply blessings, but fundamental information regarding the eternity and ultimate recognition of Israel's special task and teachings that is being transmitted to Moav, and, also, any nation that decides to engage in the extermination of the Jewish People. After all, Bilaam did not speak to Israel, but to her enemies; clearly his message was pertinent to them. What could be more relevant to those who wish to destroy us, than to teach them of the purpose of Israel, and warn them of their eternity, and the futility and suicidal nature of attempting to destroy it?

And so, what is the lesson? It seems to me that these verses are a hint to the ever-renewing vitality of Am Yisrael, the concept of בדמייך חיי. Let us follow the stages of the prophecy. First, Israel grows in strength from a לביא to an ארי. This is in the context of "getting up", קימה. The cub first rises, and then, after it is established as a nation, it becomes great, powerful and respected as it reaches maturity, יתנשא. This rise in prominence is a direct result of its maturing attitude towards its teleological purpose in the world. עם ישראל is special precisely when it follows the dictates of the Torah, and produces a society within geographical boundaries. When we accomplish this, we demonstrate the sublime truth and fidelity of God and His Torah. The nations will marvel, רק עם חכם ונבון הגוי הגדול הזה...אשר לו חוקים צדיקים. (Although Judaism rejects Calvanistic theories of success implying Divine approval for the individual, it is clear from the second chapter of שמע that these principles do hold true for the national life of Israel.)

And thus Israel continues, worthy of its strength, as a powerful lion at the height of its perfection, as long as the Jews remain standing, upright, in their fulfillment of their Torah.

However, when the nation falters and becomes less than steadfast in their convictions and actions, when the ארי of Israel begins to lie down, kicking out in disdain for its national destinity and mission, things change. As the second passage relates, the grown lion can end up lying down, and lose the respect and position that it had before, כרע שכב כארי. When the nation leaves the path of קידוש ה, which it maintains only through national felicity to God's Torah, then even as a mature lion at the pinnacle of his strength, it cannot continue. It begins to weaken, lie down, and its vitality flags. Exile, debasement and condemnation await the nation of Israel when it does not follow God's Torah.

And yet, the story is not over, and the weakened lion's demise does not end with his death. Rather, the verse wonders at his re-emergence once again as a לביא, as a young, versatile lion cub, ready to rise in the ranks again. כלביא מי יקימנו: who would have thought to raise him up again as a young lion poised again to rise in prominence? No nation in the history of the world has survived exile and degradation as long as Israel has and still maintains its unique position amongst the other nations. We never stopped yearning and planning our return to our land and our Father in Heaven's graces. And when, finally, we do rise again, it is with the vigor and vitality of a cub again! Who would have believed this possible?

And yet, this wonder at the rise-from-the-ashes regeneration, is precisely what our national life consists of. From the depths of our greatest failures we rise to ever-new heights, demonstrating the miraculous nature of our national existence. This is the symbolism of the New Moon, the regeneration out of the lowest point and this is why the moon symbolizes Am Yisrael. When Israel returns to God, God comes forward, as it were, to accept her, and glorious victory is snatched from the depths of the dark despair. בדמייך חיי!

Israel's enemies, with their missile launches and militaristic posturing, would do well to remember this lesson from their prophet. עם ישראל חי!

Quick Thought on Prayer and the Occult

2008-06-23T20:07:00.000-07:00

There are two issues that we have touched upon on this blog, concerning which I had small insights today. Neither as it stands really merits its own post; the ideas can be deduced from the previous posts on the subjects. However, I would like to explicitly state them. Perhaps they will grow into posts of their own, and perhaps commenters will have something to add or criticize. They are works in progress, and represent unfinished lines of thought. Either way, they are presented here as kernels, for future expansion.

Previously, we have discussed different aspects of prayer. The question has been raised, why is it that we find no empirical evidence that prayer is effecacious? Perusing the internet for scientific studies done on the subject, one is not struck by any evidence that those who are prayed for heal more quickly than others.

First of all, the assumption that prayer should lead to immediate amelioration is dismissed: God knows what is best, and He does not need to take orders from us. Furthermore, to assume that we know what is best physically and spiritually for a subject is hubris. What we really want when we petition God is the best for our subject; complaining when it isn't what we think it should be is short-sighted.

Prayer gives us a way to commune with God; it is the language of our relationship, and, ultimately, we pray to become sensitized to the suffering around us, and to learn what is important to us. When we pray, we refocus our thoughts on what is important. We change ourselves as well, it is true, and demonstrate that the subject of our prayer matters to us, and is part of our circle of importance. These elements are new realities that grow from prayer, and help perhaps to change the lot of the subject.

However, even from a completely empirical perspective, the studies I have seen turn prayer into a formulaic, uninspired repetition of chosen words. It is a far cry from the prayer that religious people engage in usually. However, even if the study adequately demonstrated what it set out to, it would not change the deeper and more holistic benefits of prayer.

----

I have written about the Rambam's view of שדים or demons. It is clear that he dismissed the possibility of dark forces that can do evil without God's permission. I just wish to add to this that this is different than accepting the existence of, say, viruses. Viruses are a natural phenomenon that have no will of their own, and they function exactly as God intended, never straying from His will. The idea of supernatural evil entities with the ability to act independently is unacceptable to the Rambam. It is this belief that free will could have been given to a creature other than man that he finds so repulsive. The world is an ordered one, which we approach in an honest way. Only Man has free will. That there be an entity to fear that mankind must take into account other than God -- this borders on idolatry.

Thoughts?

Who Would Have Thought?

2008-06-23T19:53:00.000-07:00

Report of Gazan Arabs firing a mortar into Israel today show how much of a sham this "cease-fire" was.

I just never understood the idea: if they are a terrorist entity, why are we having a truce, anyway?

Either way, as everyone knew, it is now over, and the only one to benefit was the Hamas. Way to go, Olmert.

Speaking of him, it looks as though Olmert's government will fall in a long overdue vote of no-confidence. The man should be ashamed at how corrupt, weak and ineffectual the office of Israeli Prime Minister was under his command. I pray we vote for a real leader this time around.

Rabbis Can Make Mistakes

2008-06-16T13:26:00.001-07:00

...Or, The Rabbis Were Not Infallible

Many readers will realize that this post presents no new idea and should not challenge anything we believe. I wish this post were not necessary, but it seems we must constantly remind ourselves of the basics of the halachik process and the dangers of hero-worship.

And so, the Talmud (Chulin 57a) discusses defects and injuries that render an animal (in this case, bird) טרפה, and unfit for consumption.

During the discussion, Chizkiyah (the Amorah, not the king) posits that birds do not have lungs. The rabbis immediately say, but we see empirically that birds do, indeed, have lungs! (Interesting fact: bird's lungs are circulatory as opposed to the "bellows" lungs mammals have. Air is not brought in, stored, and expelled tidally, but continues through a maze of para-bronchi that allow the air to travel in one direction from the moment it is brought in, until expelled. Of course, there are animals without any lungs at all, like the lungless salamander.)

After clarifying that this, ideed is what Chizkiyah meant, and could not be reconciled reasonably with the facts, Rabbi Yose concludes that Chizkiyah was not knowledgeable about avian anatomy.

The important point here is that the rabbis challenge Chizkiyah not from study, verses, or masorah, but from anatomical evidence. The conclusion of Rabbi Yose is that Chizkiyah lacks secular knowledge, and this renders him incapable of ruling on avian defects and injuries.

B'ha'alotcha: Just Desserts

2008-06-14T21:53:00.001-07:00

In this week's portion, the Jewish people are blessed with the gift of manna. The ultimate food, it was so light that no waste remained after consuming it. It looked like "z'ra gad" white seeds (11:7), and tasted wonderful. (Contrary to the verses, the midrash tells us that it could taste like anything one liked.) And what do the rabble of the nation complain of? "We recall the fish (dagah) that we ate in Egypt with a free feeling, the cucumbers, melons..."

It is extremely hard to understand this type of complaint in the context of the food of angels that the nation enjoyed at that very moment. What could motivate such an ungrateful, disrespectful complaint against divine leadership?

In order to understand this, Rabbi Shulman, in an article, turns to the Mesilat Yesharim. There, Rav Moshe Chaim Luzzato explains that, as a perfectly good Being, it is God's nature (as it were) to bestow good upon others. This is part of the reason for the creation of the world. However, it does not take one a long period of time treading the face of the globe to notice the tremendous lack of justice and thus, good, in our earthly domain. Infants suffer ghastly torture at the hands of monsters, and saintly men and women die in mass graves at the hands of murderers. On the other hand, evil men prosper, and abuse the advantages given to them. It is clear that the true good with which God blesses his creations is not to be expected to be fulfilled fully in this world. The world to come, the world of souls, and the world post-messiah, where humanity will enjoy a perfect harmony between the physical and spiritual sides of its existence, are the places one can hope to find this holy grail of "good", and soak in the bliss of God's radiant beneficence.

In this case, we must understand why Hashem would choose to place us in this world first? Why not put humanity in the redeemed world, instead of first in this world, where evil so often seems to triumph?

In response to this, Jewish thought responds with nahama d'kisufa, or the concept of shameful sustenance. God made us with a keen sense of shame at receiving things we do not deserve. The Ohev Yisrael (the Apter Rebbe) quotes the Talmud (Shabbat 104b) which explains that the letter gimel in the Hebrew alphabet stands for gomel, one who does acts of loving-kindness towards his peers. The letter dalet, on the other hand, stands for dal, a poor man. And why does the letter dalet face away from the gimel? Because it is human nature to be embarrassed at receiving charity. However, when the poor man is given a chance to do something of value for his patron, small as it may be, he thus is able to assure his benefactor that he is cognizant of his indebtedness, and this tempers his feeling of shame. He knows he owes the kind man, and he knows the kind man knows he knows. This is, at least, something.

And now, we can understand more sympathetically the actions of the rabble and the Jews who joined in their complaints. They were receiving manna, described as z'ra gad, from God. The gimel comes before the dalet, and the dal turns away in shame. The Jews felt the shame of receiving a tremendous blessing from God, even in their lowly spiritual level! They knew they did not deserve it. This hurt their human pride tremendously.

And so, they recalled the dagah (dalet before gimel, facing the gimel without shame). In Egypt, they were able to eat food without embarrassment. What they received there, at least, they knew, they deserved the little they got. Perhaps this is the meaning of "chinam" in the passage: they received the food in Egypt free of shame -- free of nahama d'kisufa. They longed for this feeling of self-sufficience, without worrying about the shame of receiving something for nothing.

If so, this seems an admirable trait. What is wrong with this feeling? And why does the Torah go out of its way to remind us that it was particularly the rabble who complained?

In order to understand this, we must recall that the foundation of the Jewish national life was the Exodus from Egypt. The fact that God took us out of the land of our captivity with an outstretched arm forms the basis of our relationship with Hashem. As the Talmud states, this was one of the three episodes that God arranged to occur in the middle of the day, as if to say, anyone who would like to attempt to stop me, is welcome to try.

In fact, the Torah made sure we would never err to think that Moshe was some type of charismatic leader who was able to, by the strength of his personality, redeem the Jews in a natural manner. He had a speech impediment; not exactly your first candidate for public speech. In addition, Rav Hirsch points out, immediately after the Exodus, Yitro is horrified by the lack of organizational skill Moshe demonstrates in his judicial system. Moshe so needs Yitro's help in these matters that he practically begs his father-in-law to stay with the nation earlier in our parasha. This lack of leadership ability is also meant to highlight to us that it is only an all-powerful Divinity that could effect the Jewish release from bondage. This is also the reason that Moshe's name does not appear in the Pesach Hagaddah.

In the same vein, God made our experience in the desert one which we could never attribute to our own powers. We were not to slaughter our own animals to support ourselves. On the contrary, God made our clothes grow with us miraculously, and fed us through direct heavenly decree. The lesson is clear: we had no part in our own salvation. We were completely dependant upon God for everything, and we continue to be indebted to Him to this day for his undeniable care then, as well as His continued care now.

It was this lesson that was so painful for the rabble, the asafsuf, to internalize. They would rather be chinam min hamitzvot, free from the yoke of the mitzvot, from this "debt" to God, even if it meant eating fish and melon instead of heavenly bread.

When we internalize this lesson and base our personal and national actions upon the miracles of the desert, may we come to deserve the ultimate redemption, quickly in our days.

Yom Yerushalayim

2008-06-02T09:26:00.000-07:00

Jameel sent me this link, which allows you to read and listen to the radio transmission from the liberation of the Temple Mount. It is haunting and gave me goosebumps.

It really drives home my point about modern history as our generation's Har Sinai revelation, and my post for Israel's Independence Day.

May we continue to build our state and land, and may we not lose sight of the real and practical goal of redemption!

The Prophetic Nature of Minhag

2008-05-12T13:04:00.000-07:00

I have posted before on Rav Kook's concept of minhag. He holds that God endowed our national soul with a prophetic uniqueness. Its acceptance of practices is a type of prophecy. This national n'vuah-spirit is something that has real consequences. Here I simply want to quote a passage from the Talmud (מנחות לב:א) which supports this view:

"Rav holds that minhag prevails: If Eliyahu were to come and tell us that we may use a soft shoe for the chalitzah process, we would listen. If he were to tell us that we may not use a sandal [as is the custom and halachah today], we would not heed him."

Clearly, this passage tells us that in the future, when Eliyahu the prophet comes to clarify all confusing or complicated issues in Jewish law, he will not be contradicting any practices that have become universal to all Jews, and it seems that Rav Kook's concept of national n'vuah-spirit explains this.

Education for Individuality

2008-05-09T11:25:00.000-07:00

"Once a week, we had a Current Events period. Each child was supposed to clip an item from a newspaper, absorb its contents, and reveal them to the class. This practice allegedly overcame a variety of evils: standing in front of his fellows encouraged good posture and gave a child poise; delivering a short talk made him word-conscious; learning his current event strengthened his memory; being singled out made him more than ever anxious to return to the Group." - To Kill a Mockingbird, Harper Lee

"Why was Avraham referred to as "עברי"? For the entire world was on one side, and he was on the other." - Midrash, ב"ר מב ח.

A peculiarity is noted at the beginning of this week's portion. The first verse states, ויאמר ה' אל משה אמר אל הכהנים בני אהרון ואמרת אליהם לנפש לא יטמא בעמיו. "God said to Moshe: Speak to the priests, sons of Aharon, and tell them that they shall not become impure through contact with the dead." Rashi wonders, why the redundancy? It would have been enough to tell Moshe to tell the kohanim about impurity. Why first command him to "speak to the priests"?

To answer this question, Rashi quotes the Talmud (Yevamos 114a): Both אמור and ואמרת are used in order to warn the adults regarding the children. Though minors are not technically included in the many positive and negative commandments of the Torah, grown-ups are forbidden to give them forbidden food, or make them commit sins. Indeed, this is a source for the concept of חינוך, preparation or education, through which parents prepare their children for their adult lives as committed Jews. We teach our children and train them in observance of the commands, so that by the time they reach bar- and bat-mitzvah, they will be motivated and intimately familiar with their duties.

Why is it that the Torah places the hint for the idea of חינוך here, embedded in the laws of the priesthood, of all places? Rabbi Yakov Weinberg provides a fascinating insight into this. Rabbi Frand explains with an allegory: Imagine a town where the children play baseball in a vacant lot next to the cemetery. When the inevitable home-run is hit over the wall of the cemetery, one of the children will have to run in and retrieve the ball. A kohen father must tell his son, "when you play baseball, you must be certain to never go after the ball if it goes into the cemetery." The child asks why, and is told, "no matter what the other children do, you are a kohen, and you are not allowed to enter a grave-yard. The fact that everyone else does it is does not mean that you may. You are different."

The situation of the young kohen and his father reveals a critical message of Jewish education: be your individual self! We must impress upon ourselves and our children that God made us unique, and this uniqueness is not something to squelch, but something to treasure and nurture.

How often do we find ourselves judging our level of commitment to Torah learning or שמירת המצוות by those around us? How easy it is to fall into that trap! We may tell ourselves, "well, I learn more than my neighbor", or "I don't speak as much lashon hara as my friends", but that is not how we should measure our strengths or weaknesses. We may say, "my son is about as studious motivated as his friends", but this is not the attitude that will lead us to raise children in greatness. To quote Rav Zushia, "God will not ask my why I was not a towering Moshe Rabbeinu; he will ask me why I wasn't the best Rav Zushia."

When we internalize this message, the peer pressure that is so damaging to people of all ages will have less sway. It will remove excuses for mediocrity and allow us and our children to emerge as great individuals, instead of average Joes.

This is also the key to the fight against assimilation. Avraham's greatness was not that he was good "for his time" (as was the case with Noach), but because he grew with no thought to where his journey took him, as long as it was towards truth. And so, he ended up on the opposite side from the rest of the world, and began our "nation of priests".

Too often, as evident from Scout's experience in her Maycomb school (in To Kill a Mockingbird), our educational institutions attempt to manufacture children who see the value that the anonymity of "blending in" provides. Judaism rejects this doctrine resoundingly, encouraging individual expression and creativity. Within the bounds of halacha, this brings about a nation of constant youth and vigor, able to confront all issues it is faced with, as a strong group of cherished individuals.

Memorial Day

2008-05-06T12:07:00.000-07:00

ת נ צ ב ה

Woe to the nations of the world, who have no atonement. For Yeshayahu wrote that, instead of the copper will be gold, instead of iron -- silver, in place of wood is copper. All property destroyed by the nations will be replaced and forgiven. However, the saintly Jews who were murdered throughout our two-thousand year horror, what can replace them? Concerning this, Yoel wrote, "I will forgive them, but for the blood they spilled I can never forgive..." (Rosh Hashana 23a)

Israel is not a widow -- our God lives, and demonstrates His power through our miraculous return to Zion after two millenia of destruction. He will not forget the horrors of our past, and he will not forgive the murder of our innocent. God will not forget, and neither will we.

May the days of our mourning turn to days of exhuberance, with the completion of the universal redemption.